



SUBMISSION

TO THE 78TH SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

Russian Federation

Violations of economic, social and cultural rights in the context of military service, forced mobilisation and conscription and alternative civilian service for conscientious objectors

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INTRODUCTION

1. This submission focuses on violations of economic, social and cultural rights, particularly the **right to freedom from discrimination (art. 2(2)) and the right to work (art. 6)**, as well as, consequently, other affected rights, such as the right to take part in cultural life (art. 15) or the widest possible protection and assistance to the family (art. 10), in the context of military service, forced mobilisation and conscription, as well as alternative civilian service for conscientious objectors to military service.

DISPROPORTIONATE FORCED MOBILIZATION AND CONSCRIPTION

2. In the List of Issues, the Committee requested:
“9. [...] Please also provide information on measures taken to combat the disproportionate forced mobilization and conscription of members of Indigenous Peoples and minorities in the State party and of persons from territories under its effective control, including Crimea”.¹
3. The State party, in its Replies to the List of issues, after citing the main laws on military and alternative civilian service, claims that:
“57. During the period of partial mobilization applied in the Russian Federation in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 647 of 21 September 2022, our adversaries, engaging expert groups under their control and using a biased media, actively carried out an information campaign to discredit the activities of the country’s armed forces during the special military operation, including by spreading information about ‘forced mobilization’”.²
4. The term “forced mobilisation” is used in such case both because of the way it is implemented (e.g. raids) as well as how it affects persons which should not be mobilised (e.g. persons eligible for exemption, conscientious objectors, foreign citizens). Besides this Committee, the terms “forced mobilisation” and/or “forced conscription” have been used also by the Human Rights Committee, the OHCHR,³ and the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation.
5. The **Human Rights Committee**, has expressed concerns *“about reports of [...] forced conscription of civilians [...] including in the areas where the State party exercises effective control.”* In the part about “Accountability for alleged human rights violations committed in the North Caucasus federal area”, the Human Rights Committee expressed *“its concern about reports of forced conscriptions for the war in Ukraine and violent suppression of peaceful protests against these conscriptions in the North Caucasus federal area.”* It has been also *“gravely concerned about allegations of forced mobilization and conscription of thousands of Crimean inhabitants, many of whom are Indigenous people.”* And requested to *“Immediately end the practice of forced mobilization and conscription of Crimean residents”*.⁴
6. The **Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation**, in her first report stated:
“78 [...] Forced mobilization in Siberia has been particularly aggressive. Journalist and human rights activist, Natalya Filonova, from the Siberian Republic of Buryatia, participated in an anti-mobilization event. She was arbitrarily arrested and placed in pretrial detention in November [2022], and her teenage son with disabilities was sent to an institutional facility against her wishes. Statistics on military losses in the Russian Federation by region indicate that the number of soldiers killed from sparsely populated Siberian republics is several times higher than the losses in, for example, the Moscow region. [...]
E. Conscientious objection to military service and mobilization
*96. Federal Law No. 113-FZ of 25 July 2002 “on alternative civilian service” allows conscientious objection for army conscripts under mandatory military service, but not to reservists and others called up during military mobilizations, such as that announced in September 2022.*⁵ Many

reservists who have been mobilized were denied their right to conscientious objection by military commissions, despite a 1996 Constitutional Court decision that the right to alternative civilian service must be respected.

97. Although mobilization is purportedly regulated by Federal Law No. 31-FZ of 26 February 1997 “on mobilization in the Russian Federation”, many men have been mobilized by deception, the use of force, or by taking advantage of their vulnerability. Mobilized men have been immediately sent to military units, with or without their consent and without regard for their age, health or family situation. Those refusing to fight have been put in “detention centres for the mobilized” in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine and threatened with execution, violence or a prison sentence if they did not return to the front lines.

98. Mobilization has been particularly aggressive in the most remote and poor regions of the Russian Federation with minimal population, disproportionately mobilizing men from minority ethnic groups and Indigenous peoples with populations of less than 10,000 (such as the Yukagirs and peoples of Dagestan). The authorities have imposed travel restrictions, blocking exit routes from towns and villages during mobilization sweeps. They have broken into people’s homes at night and taken away all the male working-age population from whole villages. [...]

112. [...] (s) Ensure respect for the right to conscientious objection to military service – in law and in practice – and provide unhindered access to alternative civilian service for conscientious objectors, both conscripts and reservists, and particularly those mobilized to participate in the war on Ukraine; investigate any allegations of harassment, use of force, torture and ill-treatment or other human rights violations by military officials against recruits and reservists in the conduct of the ongoing mobilization campaign, and bring perpetrators to justice”.⁶

7. In subsequent reports, the **Special Rapporteur** cited similar findings⁷ including **torture and ill-treatment** of conscientious objectors and mobilized men, including members of indigenous people and minorities.⁸

8. The **European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA)**, in December 2022 reported:

“2.3.3. Drafting of ethnic minorities

In October 2022, the media reported that ethnic minority populations of Siberia and the North Caucasus as well as Crimean Tatars were disproportionately affected during the mobilisation. On 5 October, citing the research by Vazhnye Istorii and CIT, Meduza reported that the percentage of people drafted under the mobilisation order reached 5.5 % in the Krasnoyarsk region, 4 % in Sevastopol, 3.7 % in Buryatia, 2.6 % in Dagestan, and 2.2 % in Kalmykia. It was also noted that poorer regions had mobilised a larger share of the reserve. Thus, 23 out of 26 regions that have drafted more than 1 % of their reservists had lower per capita average income than the national average. Poorer regions have a higher number of people with military experience since the contract with the RAF [Russian Armed Forces] is one of the few employment opportunities in these areas. According to researcher Sam Cranny-Evans as well as Meduza, this could explain why the higher number of reservists conscripted under the mobilisation order was in poorer regions. The same ethnic groups reportedly had disproportionate numbers of war casualties.

Activists in Buryatia reported on intense recruitment following the announcement of the mobilisation order. According to the head of the Free Buryatia Foundation, Alexandra Garmazhapova, more than 3 000 draft notices were delivered in the republic within the first day of the mobilisation. Dorjo Dugarov, one of the leaders of the Buryat National Democratic Movement, told TV Rain (Dozhd TV) ‘that up to five thousand people were mobilised overnight.’ The mobilisation efforts were reportedly organised ‘more like a raid,’ with draft notices being delivered late at night ‘and handed out indiscriminately to everyone.’ In one of the villages, 450 people were reportedly mobilised within the first 24 hours. According to Victoria Maladaeva, vice president of the foundation Svobodnaya Buryatia (Free Buryatia), 20-30 men were drafted from every village. The local authorities admitted that draft notices had been issued to 70 fathers of large families: all of them were reportedly returned home following clarifications, even though some of them had already been assigned to respective military units. In one of the reported cases, a draft notice was issued for a man who died two years ago.

Disproportionately high numbers of the mobilised men were reported also for the Crimean Tatar community, who constitute around 13 % of the 2 million population of Russia-occupied Crimea.

A Ukrainian human rights NGO Crimea SOS, as reported by the Guardian on 25 September, estimated that 90 % of draft notices in Crimea were issued to Crimean Tatars. No other sources were found to corroborate on this figure.”⁹

9. On the basis of international law, the issues of (forced) mobilisation and conscription in the State party are distinct from those in (other) territories under the State party’s effective control and therefore should be examined separately.

▪ **Analysis and conclusions on forced and/or disproportionate mobilisation and conscription of members of Indigenous people and minorities in the state party**

10. Conscription and mobilisation in a state are not necessarily unlawful *per se*. Nevertheless, the way they are implemented should be in conformity with international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law and standards.
11. When implementing mobilisation, the **right to conscientious objection to military service** should be respected. The right to conscientious objection to military service applies both in peace and wartime¹⁰ and is inherent to the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion,¹¹ which is non-derogable in times of public emergency under article 4(2) of ICCPR. The right to conscientious objection to military service applies to all persons affected by military service, including conscripts, professional members of the armed forces and reservists, both to pacifists and to selective objectors, and should be available at any stage, before, during or after military service.¹²
12. In addition to violations of civil and political rights (such as the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the right to liberty, etc.), **the unlawful conscription (including through mobilisation) or punishment of conscientious objectors to military service unduly restricts also their social, economic and cultural rights, such as their right to gain their living by work which they freely choose or accept (art. 6), the widest possible protection and assistance to their family (art. 10) and their right to take part in cultural life (art. 15).**
13. In addition to the above, the legitimacy of conscription and mobilisation is contested, when they are applied in order for individuals to be used in an **unlawful war**, whether because of how it was initiated (*jus ad bellum*) or because of how it is conducted (*jus in bello*). There is a widespread opinion that the Russian invasion in Ukraine, which the International Court of Justice, in the context of provisional measures, has asked to be suspended,¹³ “is a manifest violation of the United Nations Charter and an act of aggression that is a crime under international law”.¹⁴ As for gross violations which could amount to war crimes by the Russian armed forces, they have been pointed out, *inter alia*, by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,¹⁵ the International Criminal Court¹⁶ and the UN Commission of Inquiry.¹⁷
14. **Forced mobilisation and forced conscription do not comply with international law, including international human rights law and standards, per se**, and therefore it is **not sufficient** to ask for a non-disproportionate or non-discriminatory exercise of them. **Forced mobilisation and forced conscription should cease immediately in all cases.**
15. Mobilisation and conscription, when they are not forced, could be legitimate, but insofar they entail restriction of rights, they should be implemented in a **non-discriminatory** way according to art. 2(2). Therefore, **measures should be taken to end disproportionate or discriminatory mobilisation and conscription of members of Indigenous Peoples, minorities or groups of particular social origin or status in the State party.**

▪ **Analysis and conclusions on forced mobilisation and conscription in territories under the State party’s effective control**

16. The territories under the State party’s effective control in Ukraine fall within the provisions of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL). According to IHL: “The Occupying Power may not compel protected persons to serve in its armed or auxiliary forces. No pressure or propaganda which aims at securing voluntary enlistment is permitted.”¹⁸ Furthermore, “compelling a protected person to serve in

the forces of a hostile Power” is cited among the grave breaches.¹⁹ Similarly, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power is a grave breach.²⁰ In addition, according to Rule 95 of the ICRC’s study on customary IHL, “Compelling persons to serve in the forces of a hostile power is a specific type of forced labour that is prohibited in international armed conflicts. The Hague Regulations specify that it is forbidden to compel nationals of the hostile party to take part in operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent’s service before the war.²¹ [...] The prohibition is repeated in the list of war crimes in the Statute of the International Criminal Court.^{22,23}

17. Therefore, as far as it concerns “*persons from territories under its effective control, including Crimea*”, the State party not only has an obligation to cease immediately forced mobilisation and forced conscription, or to end disproportionate or discriminatory mobilisation and/or conscription, as explained above, **it is also under the obligation to cease any mobilisation and any conscription of such persons whatsoever.**

LACK OF RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHT TO CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION FOR VOLUNTEERS / PROFESSIONAL MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES

18. In March 2023, the European Bureau for Conscientious Objection (EBCO), Connection e.V., the International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR), and War Resisters’ International (WRI), citing major western media and independent Russian media and civil society organisations, strongly denounced the reported detention by the Russian authorities of large numbers of soldiers and mobilised civilians in a number of centres in Russian-controlled areas of Ukraine, because they were refusing to participate in the war. Russian authorities were reportedly using threats, psychological abuse and torture to force those detained to return to the front.²⁴
19. The four organisations noted that soldiers who cite reasons of conscience among the reasons for refusing to continue to fight should be considered conscientious objectors according to international law. **Those who specifically oppose the Ukraine war count as conscientious objectors, whether or not self-defined.** They highlighted that the “**right of conscientious objection to military service applies no less to professional members of the armed forces than to conscripts**, as it has been explicitly recognized, *inter alia*, by the OHCHR,²⁵ the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE),²⁶ the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,²⁷ and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), of the OSCE.²⁸ [...] The right to object also applies to **selective objectors** who believe that the use of force is justified in some circumstances but not in others.”²⁹
20. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Russian Federation, has confirmed incidents of detention, torture and ill-treatment,³⁰ and has highlighted that **regular contract troops are not allowed to resign.**³¹
21. Equivalently to conscripts and mobilised reservists, **the unlawful continuation of employment (or detention) of professional members of the armed forces who have become conscientious objectors to military service**, in addition to violations of civil and political rights, **unduly restricts also their social, economic and cultural rights, such as their right to gain their living by work which they freely choose or accept, (art. 6), the widest possible protection and assistance to their family (art. 10) and their right to take part in cultural life (art. 15).**

ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES TO THE MILITARY AND THE ARMAMENTS INDUSTRY

22. In the List of Issues, the Committee requested:

“11. Please provide information on measures taken, and their impact, to ensure employment opportunities alternative to the military and the armaments industry. In this regard, please also

provide information on the impact of those measures on disadvantaged and marginalized groups, in particular persons with disabilities, including war veterans."³²

23. In its Replies to the List of Issues, the State party does not appear to provide explicit and adequate answer concerning the specific issue of "employment opportunities **alternative to the military and the armaments industry**" (emphasis added).

FEES/COSTS TO BE REPAID ON EARLY TERMINATION OF SERVICE

24. Another relevant issue related to the right to work is that of the fees/costs required to be repaid in case an individual terminates early one's service in the armed forces. In its Conclusions for the Russian Federation, in the context of examining article 1(2) of the European Social Charter (equivalent to article 6(1) of the Covenant), the **European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR)** has repeatedly stated that:
*"[A]ny fees/costs to be repaid on early termination of service must be proportionate".*³³
25. It is worth noting that the above is valid in case of termination *unrelated* to conscientious objection to military service. In case a professional member of the armed forces ceases serving in them because of having developed conscientious objection to military service, **there should be no fees/costs at all, otherwise these would amount to unlawful punishment for exercising the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.** (See relevant part above)

VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF ICESCR -AND POSSIBLY OTHERS- IN RELATION TO THE DURATION OF ALTERNATIVE CIVILIAN SERVICE

Alternative civilian service and the right to earn a living in an occupation freely entered upon

26. The **European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) of the Council of Europe**, the monitoring body of the European Social Charter, has elaborated extensively on the relation between the alternative civilian service for conscientious objectors to military service and the right to earn a living in an occupation freely entered upon. (Article 1(2) of the European Social Charter).
27. In its decision on the merits concerning the Complaint No. 8/2000 by the Quaker Council for European Affairs (QCEA) against Greece,³⁴ the ECSR while stating *"that conscientious objectors who perform alternative civilian service are not workers who earn their living in an occupation freely entered upon within the meaning of Article 1 para. 2 of the Charter"* (para. 22), found *"however, that alternative civilian service may amount to a restriction on the freedom to earn one's living in an occupation freely entered upon. Such a situation comes therefore within the scope of Article 1 para. 2 of the Charter"* (para. 23). In essence, the ECSR found that certain duration of alternative civilian service imposes an **"absence from the labour market"** which could be excessive or disproportionate in comparison with the duration of military service.³⁵ Subsequently, the ECSR examined the situation in Greece by that time and found that the "18 additional months during which the persons concerned are denied the right to earn their living in an occupation freely entered upon, do not come within reasonable limits, compared to the duration of military service. It therefore considers that this additional duration, because of its excessive character, amounts to a disproportionate restriction on "the right of the worker to earn his living in an occupation freely entered upon", and is contrary to Article 1 para. 2 of the Charter" (para. 25).
28. Subsequently, the ECSR started to "systematically examine" the compliance of virtually all State parties with Article 1(2) as far as it concerns the length of alternative civilian service, usually in comparison to that of military service (since 2002 under a new heading "Other aspects of the right to earn one's living in an occupation freely entered upon"³⁶), and found cases where the situation were not in conformity with Article 1§2 of the Revised Charter".³⁷ Gradually, the ECSR adopted a position that under Article

1§2 the duration of alternative service may not exceed **one and half times** the length of military service.³⁸

29. The **European Court of Human Rights**, in 2017, appeared to adopt the aforementioned criterion of ECSR, that the alternative service cannot exceed in length 1.5 times [50% increase] the length of military service.³⁹ However, this standard appears to be obsolete compared to UN standards.
30. According to the **Human Rights Committee**, (and contrary to the findings of ECSR in the case of Austria⁴⁰) an increase of the length of alternative service of 50% compared to that of military service (i.e., 9 months instead of 6⁴¹) “*may be punitively long if not based on reasonable and objective grounds*”.⁴² More recently, in **2024**, examining the case of Greece, where the discrepancy between alternative and military service ranges between 25% and 67%, and where the (full) alternative service is 25% longer than the (full) military service (15 months compared to 12 months),⁴³ the **Human Rights Committee** has also expressed concerns.⁴⁴
31. According to the **OHCHR**, “*Any duration longer than that of military service is permissible only if the additional time for alternative service is based on reasonable and objective criteria. Equalizing the duration of alternative service with military service should be considered a good practice.*”⁴⁵

Finally, the **European Parliament** has repeatedly stated that the length of alternative service should be the same and not last longer than military service.⁴⁶

Excessive duration of alternative civilian service in the State party

32. The equivalent to article 1§2 of the European Social Charter is **article 6 of the Covenant** stipulating “**the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts**”. Therefore, any excessive in itself, or disproportionate in comparison to that of military service, duration of alternative civilian service unduly restricts the right to work within the meaning of **article 6, in conjunction with article 2(2)**.
33. In its Conclusions for 2016, the ECSR noted: “*The Committee notes from the report that the length of military service is 12 months, the length of alternative civilian service is 21 months and the length of alternative civilian service within the armed forces is 18 months. Persons engaged in alternative civilian service are not allowed to terminate their employment contracts on their own initiative, take part in strikes or have additional jobs. They are allowed to receive education by correspondence or evening courses.*”⁴⁷ (It should be noted that the term “alternative civilian service within the armed forces” is problematic, and the adequate term in this case (of the service lasting 18 months) would rather be “unarmed military service”.⁴⁸)
34. According to the most recent report of the European Bureau for Conscientious Objection (EBCO) the situation remains unchanged.⁴⁹ Thus, the alternative civilian service remains punitive and discriminatory in terms of length. This **excessive and disproportionate duration of alternative civilian service unduly restricts the right to work (art. 6), in conjunction with article 2(2) of the Covenant**.
35. It should be stressed that, just as the excessive and disproportionate duration of the alternative civilian service unduly restricts the right to work (art. 6), in conjunction with article 2(2), it equivalently **restricts for an undue period of time other rights, such as the right to take part in cultural life (art. 15) or the widest possible protection and assistance to the family (art. 10)**, always in conjunction with article 2(2).

SUGGESTED RECOMMENDATIONS

36. Connection e.V. suggests the following recommendations:

- Cease immediately any *forced* mobilisation and conscription and take measures to combat disproportionate or discriminatory mobilisation and conscription of members of Indigenous Peoples, minorities or groups of particular social origin or status in the State party.
- Cease immediately any mobilisation and conscription in other territories under the State party's effective control.
- Recognise in law and ensure in practice the right to conscientious objection to military service, including selective conscientious objection, for volunteers/professional members of the armed forces. Release unconditionally all those who have developed conscientious objection to military service, without any punishment, including costs/fees.
- Take measures to ensure alternative employment opportunities to the military and the armaments industry.
- Ensure that any fees/costs to be repaid on early termination of service in the armed forces (unrelated to conscientious objection) are proportionate.
- Reduce the length of the alternative civilian service, in absolute terms and in comparison to that of military service, so that it does not conflict with the obligations enshrined in the Covenant. (articles 2(2), 6, 10, 15)

¹ E/C.12/RUS/Q/7, 2 November 2023, para. 9. <https://docs.un.org/en/E/C.12/RUS/Q/7>

² E/C.12/RUS/RQ/7, 19 November 2024, paras. 55-57. <https://docs.un.org/en/E/C.12/RUS/RQ/7>

³ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/situation-human-rights-ukraine-context-armed-attack-russian-federation>, paras. 109-110.

⁴ CCPR/C/RUS/CO/8, 1 December 2022, paras. 6, 8, 38, 39(e). <https://docs.un.org/en/CCPR/C/RUS/CO/8>

⁵ [Note in the original] See www.refworld.org/docid/5072b6562.html.

⁶ A/HRC/54/54, 18 September 2023, paras. 78, 96-98, 112(s). <https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/54/54>

⁷ A/HRC/57/59, 13 September 2024, paras. 84-90, 101, 124, 150(p), 151(e) <https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/57/59>

⁸ A/79/508, 11 October 2024, paras. 67-69, 107, 113(e) and (p). <https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/508>

⁹ EUAA, COI Report – The Russian Federation: Military Service, December 2022, pp. 34-35.

<https://euaa.europa.eu/publications/coi-report-russian-federation-military-service>

¹⁰ CCPR/CO/82/FIN, 2 December 2004, para. 14. <http://undocs.org/CCPR/CO/82/FIN>

¹¹ E.g. CCPR/C/101/D/1642-1741/2007, para. 7.3. <https://undocs.org/CCPR/C/101/D/1642-1741/2007>

¹² A/HRC/50/43, 11 May 2022, para. 57(d), (e), (g). <https://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/50/43>

¹³ <https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/182/182-20220316-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf>, para. 86.

¹⁴ See for example: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/03/russia-ukraine-invasion-of-ukraine-is-an-act-of-aggression-and-human-rights-catastrophe/>

¹⁵ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/05/high-commissioner-special-session-human-rights-council-ukraine-many>

¹⁶ <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and>

¹⁷ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements-and-speeches/2025/02/un-commission-inquiry-statement-third-year-mark-russias-full-scale>

¹⁸ Art. 51(1) of Geneva Convention IV. <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-51?activeTab=>

¹⁹ Art. 147 of Geneva Convention IV. <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciv-1949/article-147?activeTab=>

²⁰ Art. 130 of Geneva Convention III. <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/gciii-1949/article-130?activeTab=>

²¹ Hague Regulations, Article 23(h). <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/hague-conv-iv-1907/regulations-art-23?activeTab=>

²² ICC Statute, Article 8(2)(a)(v) and (b)(xv). <https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf>

²³ Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, *Customary International Humanitarian Law*, Volume I:

Rules, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 2005, Rule 95, p. 333.

<https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/external/doc/en/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf>

²⁴ Connection e.V., EBCO, War Resisters International and IFOR, “Russia: Release all those who object to engage in the war”, 28 March 2023. <https://en.connection-ev.org/article-3751>

- ²⁵ A/HRC/41/23, 24 May 2019, para. 60(c). <https://undocs.org/A/HRC/41/23>
- ²⁶ Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1518 (2001), para. 5.2. https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=16909&lang=en#_blank
- ²⁷ Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec (2010) 4 “Human Rights of members of the armed forces”, paras. 42 - 46. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/506979172.html>
- ²⁸ OSCE, ODIHR, *Handbook on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Armed Forces Personnel*, 2008, p. 85 [second point]. <https://www.osce.org/odihr/31393?download=true>
- ²⁹ A/HRC/41/23, 24 May 2019, para. 60(d). <https://undocs.org/A/HRC/41/23>
- ³⁰ A/79/508, 11 October 2024, paras. 67, 107, 113(e). <https://docs.un.org/en/A/79/508>
- ³¹ A/HRC/57/59, 13 September 2024, para. 90. <https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/57/59>
- ³² E/C.12/RUS/Q/7, 2 November 2023, para. 11. <https://docs.un.org/en/E/C.12/RUS/Q/7>
- ³³ <https://hudoc.esc.coe.int/?i=2012/def/RUS/1/2/EN>, <https://hudoc.esc.coe.int/?i=2016/def/RUS/1/2/EN>
- ³⁴ <https://hudoc.esc.coe.int/eng/?i=cc-08-2000-dmerits-en>
- ³⁵ See a *contrario* in <https://hudoc.esc.coe.int/eng/?i=XVI-1/def/CZE/1/2/EN>
- ³⁶ https://hudoc.esc.coe.int/eng/?i=2002_163_03/Ob/EN
- ³⁷ E.g. <https://hudoc.esc.coe.int/eng/?i=2002/def/ROU/1/2/EN>
- ³⁸ E.g. <https://hudoc.esc.coe.int/eng/?i=2006/def/EST/1/2/EN>, <https://hudoc.esc.coe.int/eng/?i=2006/def/MDA/1/2/EN>, <https://hudoc.esc.coe.int/eng/?i=XIX-1/def/GRC/1/2/EN>
- ³⁹ ECtHR, *Adyan and others v. Armenia*, para. 70. <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-177429>
- ⁴⁰ <https://hudoc.esc.coe.int/eng/?i=XVI-1/def/AUT/1/2/EN>
- ⁴¹ CCPR/C/AUT/Q/5/Add.1, 4 August 2015, para. 131. <https://docs.un.org/en/CCPR/C/AUT/Q/5/Add.1>
- ⁴² CCPR/C/AUT/CO/5, 3 December 2015, paras. 33-34. <https://docs.un.org/en/CCPR/C/AUT/CO/5>
- ⁴³ CCPR/C/GRC/3, 13 September 2023, paras. 184-185. <https://undocs.org/en/CCPR/C/GRC/3>
- ⁴⁴ CCPR/C/GRC/CO/3, 28 November 2024, paras. 28-29. <https://docs.un.org/en/CCPR/C/GRC/CO/3>
- ⁴⁵ A/HRC/41/23, 24 May 2019, para. 60, (l). <https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/41/23>
- ⁴⁶ https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:JOC_1993_115_R_0139_01&from=EN, page C 115/183, para. 51.
- https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:JOC_1994_044_R_0075_01&from=EN, page C44/105, para. 9.
- <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P5-TA-2003-0012+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>, para 42.
- ⁴⁷ <https://hudoc.esc.coe.int/?i=2016/def/RUS/1/2/EN>
- ⁴⁸ EBCO, “Annual Report, Conscientious Objection to Military Service in Europe 2024”, p. 115 (table). https://ebco-beoc.org/sites/ebco-beoc.org/files/2025-06-05-EBCO_Annual_Report_2024.pdf
- ⁴⁹ EBCO, “Annual Report, Conscientious Objection to Military Service in Europe 2024”, p. 119. https://ebco-beoc.org/sites/ebco-beoc.org/files/2025-06-05-EBCO_Annual_Report_2024.pdf