



Information for the CESCRC Committee for the concluding observations on the 7th periodical report of Russia

6 August 2025

This report is submitted by the [Memorial Human Rights Defense Center](#), the [Anti-Discrimination Centre Memorial](#), [Civic Assistance Committee](#), and the [Stichting Justice Initiative](#).

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I. Climate change - Paragraph 5 of the LOI

1. In their Reply to the LOI, the authorities failed to provide any information, specifically requested by the Committee, on measures taken by the State party with regard to the mitigation of climate change, including specific measures, and their impact, to meet the nationally determined contributions for reducing emissions that the State party has set itself under the Paris Agreement. The authorities also failed to

provide any information on the progress made in reducing per capita greenhouse gas emissions and on targets that the State party has set for further reductions.

2. By Decree of 26 October 2023 No. 812, the President of the Russian Federation adopted the updated Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation (hereinafter “2023 Climate Doctrine”) which replaced the previous 2009 document. The 2023 Climate Doctrine (paras. 18-19) reproduces the flawed GHG emission reduction targets contained in the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of 4 November 2020 No. 666 “On Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions” and the Strategy of Socio-economic Development of the Russian Federation with a Low Level of Greenhouse Gas Emissions until 2050 as adopted by the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 29 October 2021 No. 3052-p. Those targets presuppose the continued increase in GHG emissions until at least 2030. GHG emissions will also remain at high levels up until 2050.
3. In contrast with the 2009 Climate Doctrine, the 2023 Climate Doctrine omits any reference to the burning of fossil fuels as the primary cause of climate change. The 2023 Climate Doctrine also postulates the “equivalence of measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and measures to increase absorption of greenhouse gases” (para. 22(e)). This is contrary to the Paris Agreement which obligates States parties to undertake “rapid reductions” of GHG emissions, reflecting each State party’s “highest possible ambition”, as the primary means to reach the long-term temperature goal of 1,5 °C (Article 4, paras. 1, 3). Taken as a whole, the 2023 Climate Doctrine reflects Russia’s utter failure to comply with its obligation to mitigate climate change.
4. In September 2023, 18 Russian individuals and 2 Russian non-governmental organizations submitted an application with the European Court of Human Rights concerning violation by Russia of Articles 2, 8, 13, 14 and 34 of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in light of its failure to reduce GHG emissions. This is the first climate case brought by Russian applicants before an international court. The case is currently pending consideration.

II. Equal rights of men and women (article 3) - Paragraph 10 of the LOI

5. The authors of this report welcome the fact that more and more professions previously included in the so-called List of Prohibited Professions for Women are becoming available to women. This list is gradually being reduced; the last reduction dates back to December 2024, when a number of mining jobs were allowed by an order of the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Russian Federation; restrictions on certain professions in the field of transport were previously lifted as well. However, the very idea of professional bans motivated by the “protection of women's reproductive health” is discriminatory.
6. Unfortunately, a legislative initiative on excluding the discriminative article 253 from

the Labor Code failed. In December 2022, the respective Bill No. 251841-8 was submitted to the State Duma in order “to eliminate the legal foundations of professional and economic discrimination against women”, i.e. the complete removal of restrictions on women's choice of profession. However, in May 2023, the bill was rejected after the first reading under the explanation that “women, being involved in heavy or harmful work, will thus worsen their reproductive health, as well as reduce their own level of social security, which in turn will negatively affect the demographic situation in our country.” The authors of this report continue to insist on the complete abolition of the List and the corresponding article 253 of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation, which restricts women's right to work.

7. In addition, government submissions claim that Russia’s gender-pay gap reflects women’s “choice” of lower-paid work to accommodate family duties ([E/C.12/RUS/RQ/7](#), para. 63), yet state statistics contradict this narrative. In 2023, the pay gap between men and women in leadership positions was [49.1 %](#) - the widest since 2005. In 2023, a woman employed full-time as a manager earned on average 111 513 rubles per month, while a man in the same position received 166 260 rubles.
8. Human rights monitors, including Stichting Justice Initiative and Ad Rem, [report](#) systemic intimidation, extrajudicial detention, and coercion of women in North Caucasus asserting legal or parental rights—e.g., [incommunicado detention, torture, or forced custody relinquishment](#). [Harmful practices](#)—honor killings, [child marriage](#), FGM, bride kidnappings—persist with impunity, despite UN criticism (CRC, CEDAW). Ad Rem’s 2023 [study](#) highlights severe underreported domestic and sexual violence, with legal loopholes enabling forced “reconciliation” marriages. There are evidences of widespread honor violence, police return survivors to abusers are documented in [Chechnya](#); highest rates of violence, trafficking, FGM, infanticide, poor access to justice in [Dagestan](#); reputation blackmail leads to deaths/exile, justice lacking in [Ingushetia](#); state inaction, legal discrimination, and “traditional values” justify abuse [across the region](#).
9. In the Memorial Human Rights Defense Center’s previous alternative report for the list of issues we described that women and LGBTIQ+ individuals are often subjected to discrimination in North Caucasus in access to their main social and cultural rights. The Committee asked questions on these issues to the authorities. However, the authorities did not comment on these issues in their reply to the questions of the Committee. We note that the situation in this area has not improved.

III. The rights to work and just and favourable conditions of work (articles 6 and 7) - Paragraphs 11 and 12 of the LOI

10. In Memorial Human Rights Defense Center’s previous report, we described the negative effects on employment opportunities which are due to “profuchet register” in Dagestan. Currently the practice of using this register against the persons suspected of

“religious extremism” is [continuing](#) although the authorities deny its existence in the domestic courts. In addition, the authorities started to use this practice against the participants of protest actions.

11. Russia's migration policy has been constantly tightening over the past decades, both at the level of strategic documents and at the level of legislation and practice. Recently, anti-migrant measures and state-supported xenophobia have been directed mainly against migrants from Central Asia, while there are still many of them in Russia. Among the anti-migrant measures and violations of labor and other rights of migrants from Central Asia, it should be noted: restrictions on work in certain areas (in public catering, taxi, retail, agriculture, education, construction, social services, etc.; such bans are introduced by the authorities of the respective regions). It is planned to introduce state fees for patents, work permits, registration and increase fees for registration at the place of residence, registration of documents for transport. Since 2025, a restrictive “register of controlled persons” has been in effect, to restrict the rights of foreigners who have violated migration legislation, while migrants often find themselves there by mistake.
12. It is particularly worth emphasizing the incitement of xenophobia and anti-migrant sentiments by high-ranking Russian officials and representatives of law enforcement agencies; conducting violent anti-migrant raids in workplaces, markets, hostels, mosques, and public places; involving far-right activists in police operations and actually delegating them the right to violence; supporting far-right anti-migrant groups such as “Russkaya Obshchina” (a very well organised movement having thousands supporters).
13. The Russian labor market is experiencing an acute shortage of labor resources. By de facto expelling migrants from Central Asian countries, the Russian authorities are planning or already carrying out mass labor migration from countries such as India, Pakistan, African ones, Indonesia, Myanmar. Experts note that the salaries of workers from these migrants are 1.5-2 times lower than those from Central Asia; for such migrants, the Russian authorities are going to abolish some requirements (in particular, they are not required to pass exams on the Russian language and history).
14. Of particular concern are the agreements between Russia and North Korea on the export of migrant workers (under the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between the Russian Federation and the DPRK, which entered into force on December 4, 2024), as it violates international sanctions against North Korea (established by UN Security Council Resolutions 2375 and 2237 (2017)). It is known that groups of migrant workers from North Korea are under the full control of curators, they cannot move freely, at least part of their earnings are taken away by the state, they work 12-20 hours a day, 6-7 days a week, and do not eat enough. An [Insider journalistic investigation](#) has revealed that North Korean citizens are being recruited en masse formally receiving study visas and being legalised as “interns”

through special Russian agencies affiliated with high-ranking Russian officials. According to open data from the Federal Migration Service of the Russian Federation, in 2024 more than 13 000 people entered Russia from North Korea, almost 8 000 of them on a study visa. It is predicted that by the end of 2025, the number of North Korean workers in Russia could reach 50,000.

15. In addition to forced labor, North Korean citizens, despite the sanctions, are [involved](#) in military operations as part of the Russian army in the war against Ukraine. The Russian authorities have long denied this fact, but since April 2025, information about this has been disseminated from official sources, including in statements by president Putin. The military contingent of the North Koreans was estimated at 15,000 people, of whom about 5,000 people were killed.

IV. Protection of family and children (article 10) - Paragraph 17 of the LOI

Ukrainian children taken to Russia

16. Russia's violations of international humanitarian law against Ukrainian children are documented by many expert groups (cf., the [T4P](#) (Tribunal for Putin Initiative) coalition; [ADC Memorial](#)).
17. The children's family ties were permanently or for a long time disrupted due to their displacement, evacuation, and emigration. In the course of documenting Russia's war crimes, numerous cases of obstructing the evacuation of civilians to the territory controlled by Ukraine, blocking humanitarian corridors, and shelling vehicles in which residents of war zones tried to leave for Ukraine are noted. In these circumstances, evacuation towards Russia was the only way to escape.
18. As for the voluntary sending of children from already occupied territories to recreation camps, the voluntary and informed consent of parents can in many cases be questioned, since the very conditions of war and the hidden threat from the occupying forces are conditions of coercion. The Yale School of Public Health [report](#) (2023) provides numerous evidence of the coercive nature of such consent.
19. Ukrainian children were taken far beyond the occupied territories. The [report](#) from the Yale School of Public Health identified at least 43 institutions where children were moved for both short and long periods. They are located throughout Russia – from the Crimea, Rostov region, Krasnodar Territory to the Urals, Siberia and the Far East.
20. The office of the Children's Ombudsperson of the Russian Federation Lvova-Belova claims that there were no obstacles to the return of children who ended up in holiday camps on the other side of the front from their parents. However, there is a lot of evidence from parents that they were only asked to personally pick up the children, thus the return of the children was delayed indefinitely. Ukrainian human rights

activists confirm that the practice of returning children by proxy did not appear immediately – the first such well-known case occurred as early as 2023 (Daria Kasyanova, program director of the SOS Dityachy Mistechka Ukraina charitable Foundation, [BBC](#) article on 27 April 2023). To reach the children's camps in the Krasnodar Krai, parents had to travel through several European countries (the Baltic States, Belarus) to Russia and then cross it from north to south. Not everyone had foreign passports or sufficient financial resources. Many parents did not know about the help in the return of their children, including financial assistance provided by the charity funds [Save Ukraine](#) and SOS [Dityachy Mistechka Ukraina](#). At least 4 camps are known where the planned length of stay of children was significantly exceeded: Artek, Luchistyt and Orlyonok (Crimea), and Medvezhonok (Krasnodar Krai).

21. Being held in the occupied territory or in the regions of Russia and the difficulties of returning do not only concern children stuck in holiday camps. There are cases of organized transportation of children with disabilities who were in special institutions to institutions in Russian-controlled territories. These are, in particular, about 100 children from a boarding school in Oleshki (Kherson region), where poor child care took place under the Russian administration. There is a well-known story of a 16-year-old teenager with a disability who was returned to his mother after 8 months ([Medusa](#), 03/31/2023).
22. Article 10 of the Convention protects the children's right to preserve their identity, including name, nationality, and family ties. This is hindered by the placement of children in Russian families (either adoption or temporary custody); the assignment of Russian citizenship to children; changing their names and other personal data; stigmatization of all matters associated with Ukraine; militarization of education.
23. The Russian authorities used to deny the facts of the adoption of Ukrainian children in Russia, insisting that they were just temporarily placed in foster families. However, there is reason to believe that cases of formal adoption are numerous. A well-known and documented case of the adoption of a child from Ukraine, with a change in her name and place of birth, relates to the adoption of a girl taken from the Kherson Regional Orphanage by a high-ranking Russian politician, Sergei Mironov, head of a political party, and his wife ([investigation](#) of “Important Stories”, 23 November 2023). At the time of the removal to the Moscow region (August 2022) from the city occupied by the Russian army, the girl was 10 months old; according to an informed source, the girl has relatives in Ukraine.
24. It should be noted that the practice of falsifying the personal data of children during their adoption in Russia took place long before the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army. ADC Memorial is aware of cases (2010-2019) – all of them concerned children from the Roma Hungarian-speaking community of the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine - when children taken from their families ended up in Russian children's institutions, were recorded as “foundlings”, although information about their relatives

was known, placed in the database of children who can be adopted, and then they were adopted by Russian citizens. At the same time, not only the names of the children were changed, but also their dates of birth, which subsequently caused problems in the upbringing and education of children (in particular, the assessment of children's compliance with educational and psychological standards was carried out according to the age indicated in the falsified documents, and the child was recognised as mentally retarded). ADC Memorial drew the attention of the UN CRC to this problem back in 2014, in a [report](#) to its 65th session.

25. The massive granting of Russian citizenship to Ukrainian children and change in Russian legislation for this purpose indicates that the formal adoption of children was the planned goal (Russian citizenship is not formally required for temporary guardianship). By imposing Russian citizenship on children taken out of Ukraine, the authorities are aiming to keep them in the country permanently, and combined with the anti-Ukrainian propaganda and militaristic attitudes prevailing in the public space and in the school environment, these actions are aimed at completely breaking children's ties with Ukrainian identity, culture, and language.
26. The violation of Article 10 includes lack of opportunities for displaced children to learn or receive education in the Ukrainian language. There were no opportunities created for learning of and in the Ukrainian language for these children in Russia. Not all refugee children were able to continue online education in Ukrainian schools, inter alia because their schools in the temporarily occupied territories switched to Russian curricula.

Domestic violence

27. Russia still has no dedicated law against domestic violence. The 2019 bill has been frozen indefinitely, and despite periodic assurances from parliamentarians in 2024-25, no timetable for its revival exists. Critics [claimed](#) the proposed measures amounted to excessive interference in the family. In this legal vacuum, “battery within the family” has, since 2017, been treated merely as an [administrative offence](#) punishable by a modest fine or up to fifteen days’ detention. Fewer than 10 % of victims go to police and [over 96 %](#) say they were dissatisfied with the police response.
28. The existing articles of the Russian Criminal Code, which the Russian state cites as sufficient for investigating and prosecuting acts of domestic violence, are also insufficient and ineffective in these situations. For example, because “intentional causing of light harm to health” (Article 111) or “intentional causing of average-gravity harm to health” (Article 112) are prosecuted privately. It means that survivors are forced to gather evidence, identify witnesses and pursue the case themselves, a burden that leads roughly four out of five to abandon their complaints under pressure from perpetrators or relatives. The police frequently issue “technical refusals” and advise victims to “reconcile,” [keeping cases off](#) the crime register and

outside official statistics.

29. With official data unreliable, civil-society organisations provide the clearest picture. An independent project created by the Consortium of Women’s Non-Governmental Organizations “Light Algorithm” [recorded](#) at least 2 284 women killed by a partner in 2022 - 2023.
30. The UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Russia [warns](#) of an additional surge linked to the return of pardoned convicts who fought in Ukraine, many of whom commit violent crimes upon coming home: 19 cases were documented from September 2023 to March 2024 (para. 92). Online polls suggest that the prevalence of partner violence against women may be as high as 38.2 %, exceeding the 30 % global and European averages (para. 91). Participation in the war is considered a mitigating circumstance by judges, thus obstructing women seeking redress from violence. It can result in reduced penalties, such as shorter prison sentences or just a fine for the perpetrator (para. 93).
31. Yet protective infrastructure is grossly inadequate: the Ministry of Labour [lists](#) only 134 crisis centres in 57 of 89 regions, offering about 2 423 places. Twenty-eight regions have no shelter at all, and many NGO-run safe houses [have been closed](#) because of the political repression against activists, some NGOs that provide support and assistance to women were declared “foreign agents.” For instance, “Nasiliu.net” has been designated “foreign agents,” [fined](#), stripped of grants and forced to reduce services.

V. The right to sufficient level of living (article 11) - Paragraph 19 of the LOI

32. There are more than one hundred compact Roma settlements on the territory of Russia, each inhabited by several dozen to several thousand people. As a rule, only a few houses are legalized in such settlements, while the rest can be considered “illegal constructions.” The population of the so-called “tabors” is constantly growing, and, unable to buy land or take it on a long-term lease due to poverty, many residents of Roma settlements have to build new houses on the same plots without notifying government authorities and without obtaining a building permit. These houses are considered unauthorized construction and are subject to demolition, it is impossible to formalize ownership of them backwards; in case of demolition, compensation is not provided. It is impossible to legally bring water, electricity and gas to an unregistered house and pay for them individually; residents cannot obtain registration at their place of living. In turn, without the registration, there is no access to social benefits and medical care, and children have difficulty enrolling in school.
33. Rooted in Soviet times, the problem of legalizing houses in compact Roma settlements has not found a systematic government solution, thus most Roma settlements across the country are under threat of demolition. The authorities rather

take repressive measures against residents of compact settlements; they turn off gas, water and electricity, and seek demolitions of houses through the courts, without offering any alternative housing. The purpose of such measures is to find a reason to expel the Roma from the village, district, or city under their jurisdiction. Despite the development of infrastructure in the Roma settlements is under monitoring of the Federal Agency of Interethnic Affairs (FADN), the reported results of formalisation of the settlements are quite poor.

34. In the case of conflict situations (conflicts of neighbors, criminal episodes in which someone from the Roma is suspected), the non-Roma population demands that the authorities “evict the Gypsies”, often mass demonstrations and “community gatherings” are organized for this purpose. In a number of cases, Roma actually had to leave their place of residence, as they feared aggression from non-Roma neighbors (the most massive anti-Roma demonstrations in recent years demanding eviction: pogrom in Chemodanovka, Penza region, 2019; pogrom in Khakassia, 2019; pogrom in Korkino, Chelyabinsk region, 2024; Podlesnoye, Saratov region, 2025). The most massive house demolitions of the last decade occurred in the village. Plekhanovo (Tula, Central Russia), 2016-2018, where residents of more than 120 destroyed houses found themselves homeless.

Legal erosion of USSR's accountability in the cases of the “Children of the GULAG”

35. The 1991 Law “On the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression” guarantees free housing for individuals born in exile to politically repressed parents during the Soviet era – “children of the GULAG” – in the cities where their families lived before exile. However, bureaucratic obstacles and unclear mechanisms have hindered its implementation.
36. In 2019, the Russian Constitutional Court [ruled](#) in favor of Mses A. M., E. S., and E. M. – children of repressed individuals born in exile in the 1930s – declaring it unconstitutional to deny them rehabilitation solely due to their age at the time of repression, and ordered authorities to remove barriers to compensation and facilitate their return home. Despite this, the “children of the GULAG” continued to face inaction, and their 2021 class action [lawsuit](#) against the State Duma was dismissed by the Russian Supreme Court, which insisted that the Constitutional Court’s ruling was self-executing and required no further enforcement.
37. Legal efforts continued regionally, with contrasting outcomes. In 2024, Mses A. M., E. S. and E. M. sued the Moscow administration for housing compensation. Ms E. M. initially [won](#) in January 2025, in a groundbreaking ruling that ordered the city to pay for an apartment. However, the decision was [overturned](#) in April 2025, with the court arguing her rights were being upheld by her existing placement on the housing waitlist. The remaining lawsuits were [dismissed](#) in May.

38. Meanwhile, the P. Greek family, exiled in the 1940s, fought a long legal battle in Krasnodar Krai starting in 2020. After first securing registration for housing, they requested monetary compensation instead. This led to the first court [ruling](#) in Russia granting such compensation, calculated at the value of 33 square meters per person. Though regional authorities [attempted](#) to reduce the payout to 18 square meters, the courts ultimately sided with the family. Finally, in July 2025, the Krasnodar Regional Court [confirmed](#) that each of the four members of the P. family was entitled to full monetary compensation based on 33 square meters of housing per person. The Krasnodar Krai region paid each of them 5.5 million rubles, totaling 21.9 million rubles.

VI. The right to health (article 12) - Paragraph 20 of LOI

39. In the Memorial Human Rights Defense Center's previous alternative report for the list of issues, we described that the residents of the Komsomolskoye village, Kizilyurt district in Dagestan, are deprived of this right. The constant movement of freight transport through the village leads to severe air pollution, an [increase](#) in cases of tuberculosis, other respiratory diseases and cancer among residents. In the current report we would like to provide an update on the situation.

40. On 1 April 2024, the residents of the village submitted a request to the Makhachkala Interdistrict Environmental Prosecutor's Office. They requested information on the implementation of the decision of the Kizilyurt District Court of 7 February 2011. In this decision the court recognised the inaction of the local administration and decided to suspend the movement of trucks through the village until the technical condition of the road is assessed. The request of the residents was transferred to the Kizilyurt Interdistrict Prosecutor's Office, which [replied](#) on 30 August 2024 that there were no enforcement proceedings on the case and that the case file had been destroyed.

41. On 29 November 2024, the residents [submitted](#) a complaint to the Prosecutor of the Republic of Dagestan. This complaint was transferred to the Kizilyurt Interdistrict Prosecutor's Office, which replied that the complaint should be submitted to the Makhachkala Interdistrict Environmental Prosecutor's Office, where the residents originally applied. On 28 January 2025, the residents [applied](#) to the Volga Interregional Environmental Prosecutor's Office, which supervises the activities of the Makhachkala Interdistrict Environmental Prosecutor's Office. The Volga Interregional Environmental Prosecutor's Office [decided](#) that the statement on the inactivity of the authorities and the non-execution of the court's judgment should be examined by the Prosecutor's office of the Republic of Dagestan, while the environmental issues - by Makhachkala Interdistrict Environmental Prosecutor's Office. On 14 July 2025, the residents received a reply from Kizilyurt Interdistrict Prosecutor's Office, confirming that the case file had been destroyed. The environmental situation in the village of Komsomolskoye has not improved.

VII. The right to education (Article 13-14) - Paragraphs 24 and 25 of the LOI

Roma children

42. Official monitoring data from the Federal Agency for Ethnic Affairs (FADN) shows that the number of Roma children enrolled in school remains low. Of particular concern is the fact that the transition to higher levels of the educational system (from elementary school to secondary school, from secondary school to high school) still remains difficult. Thus, in the 2024/25 academic year, the total number of Roma schoolchildren was 48,837, of whom 29,268 (59.9%) students were in primary school, 19,059 (39%) in grades 5-9, 510 (1%) students in grades 10-11 (FADN, Report on the implementation of a comprehensive action plan for social-economic and ethnocultural development of Russian Roma in the 2nd half of 2024). Despite the transition of Roma pupils from level to level is declared by the FADN as a special focus of monitoring, the insufficient data published by FADN make it difficult to assess the dynamics. However, it is known from FADN that in the 2022/23 academic year, 6085 children graduated from the 4th grade, and only 5181 (85%) from them moved to the 5th grade; in the 2022/2023 academic year, 2711 children graduated from the 9th grade, of whom only 259 children (10%) moved to the 10th grade.
43. The authorities continue to put full responsibility for the current situation onto Roma parents, without taking special measures to ensure that full-time schooling becomes a priority for Roma families. The FADN report for the 2nd half of 2024 says that the Ministry of Education considers sufficient efforts to improve the skills of teachers working with non-Russian children (including preschoolers who do not attend kindergartens), therefore, the FADN will no longer monitor these measures. Meanwhile, the lack of quality schooling for Roma children remains an acute problem. Teachers do not have the necessary knowledge and supporting methodological materials to work with children for whom Russian is not native and who come to the 1st grade without preschool training. Besides, teachers do not have time and motivation to deal with “difficult” students, being burdened with exorbitant paperwork and administrative assignments, which should not be part of their professional duties (a common practice in Russian schools). Often, the teaching staff and the school administration are skeptical about the education of Roma children (there is an idea that “Gypsies will drop out of school anyway”), which in practice results in the absence of any requirements for children and for themselves as teachers.
44. The problem of segregation of Roma schoolchildren into separate classes and schools is denied by the Russian authorities, although separate education is widely practiced in places where the Roma population lives compactly. Despite the fact that the harm and discrimination of this practice are obvious and generally recognized by international bodies, the Russian authorities justify it, calling it a temporary measure of adaptation based “on the decision of parents, taking into account national traditions, nomadic lifestyle” (paragraph 267 of the State Report). Meanwhile,

Russian Roma have not led a nomadic lifestyle for many decades, and segregative education is turning from a “temporary” measure into a general permanent practice.

45. There are cases when schools refuse to accept Roma children and even expel them en masse, out of false considerations about the prestige of the school and under the influence of parents of other children who do not want to see Roma in school. At the same time, nobody controls the arbitrariness of school administrations, and often Roma parents find it difficult to overcome the resistance of school administrations and officials. In August 2018, 78 Roma children were expelled from school No. 33 in the Krasnoglinsky district of Samara.
46. The high level of xenophobia in Russia, both in general and specifically directed against the Roma population, also has a significant impact on the education of Roma children. Domestic conflicts and criminal incidents very easily degenerate into mass riots and even anti-Roma pogroms, resulting in forcible removal of Roma, temporarily or permanently, from their places of residence, as they fear for themselves and their children. In these circumstances, Roma children have to interrupt their education, and many of them permanently drop out of the education system. In its regular report, FADN records dozens of conflict situations with the involvement of the Roma population; some of them are quite serious (Khakasia, 2018; Chemodanovka, Penza region, 2019; Korkino, Chelyabinsk region, 2024).

Minorities' languages

47. Minority and Indigenous languages have significantly lost their positions in school education after the adoption of amendments to the Law on Education in 2018. Russian as the state language is included in the compulsory curriculum; besides, 1-2 lessons per week are allocated for a compulsory subject “native language”. In fact, learning non-Russian languages at school, even in regions, where these languages have official status (for example, Tatar in Tatarstan), is no longer mandatory – these languages can only be selected as “native”. The 2018 amendments were adopted despite protests in the regions of Russia, and led to the fact that, for example, in Tatarstan, teachers of the Tatar language were forced to resign or change their qualifications to teach other subjects.
48. The Federal Government continues to make decisions in the field of language policy, which are painfully perceived in the regions. Thus, from 1 September 2025, the order of the Minister of Education should come into force on reducing the hours of teaching “native” languages (from 2 to 1 hour per week in Russian-speaking schools, from 3 to 2 in schools with non-Russian languages of instruction), as well as on renaming the subject “mother tongue” to “a language of a people of the Russian Federation.”
49. Despite the fact that the languages of the peoples of Russia are actively studied at the academic level, and pedagogically promoted both by local activists and through

government institutions (such as the Federal Institute of Native Languages of the Peoples of the Russian Federation), non-Russian languages are losing ground in the educational field. [According](#) to the HSE Institute for Statistical Research and Knowledge Economics, the number of native language teachers in Russian schools has decreased from 22,000 in 2009 to 15,500 in 2023. From 2016 to 2023, the number of non-Russian languages taught in schools decreased from 54 to 16; The number of children studying in their native languages increased from 292,000 to 173,500 (from 1.98% to 0.96% of the total number of schoolchildren). Some government projects turned out to be formal and temporary; for example, the Foundation for the Preservation and Study of the Native Languages of the Peoples of Russia, established in 2019, was liquidated in 2021 because its activities in developing and publishing textbooks and dictionaries were found to be non-transparent and ineffective, and violations were identified in the actions of its leadership.

50. As of 1 April 2025, amendments to the Federal Law “On Education in the Russian Federation” came into force. Under these amendments, foreign nationals must now provide proof of legal residence in Russia and pass a Russian language proficiency test required for enrollment in educational programs. This law violates not only the international obligations of the Russian Federation, but also its Constitution. The new requirements reinforce the systematic refusals to admit migrant children to school.
51. Many are not even given the opportunity to take the exam due to the set of documents foreign nationals must submit when applying to schools prior testing (Clause 26(1) of Order No. 458 of the Russian Ministry of Education, dated September 2, 2020). The requirements include: “Green cards” (proof of fingerprint registration), medical certificates confirming the absence of socially dangerous diseases. Obtaining these documents has proven particularly difficult, as police officers often refuse to issue green cards to minors, claiming they are unnecessary. Additionally, families must submit proof of income (an employment contract), which, although listed as optional, appears to be a common reason for rejection. This poses an insurmountable barrier for refugees and asylum seekers, most of whom work informally. In general, schools and local education authorities interpret the new requirements arbitrarily, often imposing additional, undocumented conditions (e.g., medical certificates from specific institutions). These are typically revealed only after rejection, with no clear explanation of which document was deemed insufficient. Even when applicants manage to gather all required documents, their applications on portals like mos.ru or gosuslugi.ru may still fail the so-called “interagency verification”, which authorities claim is conducted “automatically.” This system, introduced in Moscow long before the amendments, now appears to be used in the Moscow region as well.
52. Local education authorities, when confronted with complaints, cite the “interagency verification” as beyond their control. Complaints to the Prosecutor’s Office have so far yielded no results—it merely forwards complaints without initiating investigations. We have also appealed to the Office of the Children’s Rights

Ombudsman in Moscow and the Moscow region, but no outcomes have been achieved yet.

53. According to the Federal Service for Supervision of Education, in May 2025, only 19% of children were allowed to take the test. The remaining 81% were rejected on the pretext of incomplete documents, inaccuracies in data or lack of available places in schools.
54. Although the legal changes did not formally affect preschool education, access to kindergartens for foreign children has also deteriorated. In Moscow, de facto bans on foreign children in state kindergartens existed before, but some districts in the Moscow region were more lenient. Now, however, even these areas have tightened requirements, rigorously checking medical documents and proof of legal residence. Some districts now demand a Residence Permit (VNZH) or Temporary Residence Permit (RVP) for enrollment.

VIII. Cultural rights (article 15) – Paragraph 26 of the LOI

55. The general policy of the Russian authorities in the field of interethnic relations does not contribute to the realization of the cultural rights of ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples. This policy is governed by strategic documents, as well as practical action plans for their implementation.
56. The State Strategy of the National Policy of the Russian Federation contains two main components: measures to form a civil nation and a respective identity of “citizens of the Russian Federation” and measures to support the peoples of Russia, their languages and cultures. Experts criticize the approach used in the previous Strategy, valid until 2025, and in the new Strategy proposed for the next decade (until 2036), in which the formation of a civil nation is actually replaced by the dominance of the Russian ethnic group, the Russian language, while for the second component of the strategy much less attention and resources are allocated. This approach becomes more clear in the proposed draft Strategy until 2036: for the first time, the priority in national policy is declared towards the Russian majority, and 80% of ethno-cultural development activities should specifically cover the Russian ethnic group, Russian culture, and the Russian language. It is obvious that ethnic minorities and small Indigenous peoples are much more vulnerable in the cultural dimension, therefore, the stated approach is perceived by many of their representatives as Russification and suppression of cultures of other peoples.

Distortion of historical memory

57. Since 2022, we have observed growing state pressure on institutions and individuals engaged in historical memory activism, along with efforts to manipulate and rewrite historical narratives in Russia.

58. At the end of 2024, the Gulag Museum in Moscow was [closed](#), allegedly for technical reasons. In January 2025, the Tomsk Museum “NKVD Investigative Prison” [fired](#) a person associated with the founding of the Memorial and broadcasting an independent narrative. In Novosibirsk, in response to the initiative of the Novosibirsk Memorial to hold an event in memory of the Soviet-era dissident Anatoly Marchenko in January 2025, the stands with the biography of Marchenko (who was born in the Novosibirsk region), prepared several years ago, were removed from the local history museum.
59. In the spring of 2025, in Murom, Vladimir region, the court liquidated the legal entity of the local branch of Memorial, and in the Tula region, the premises that the organization had occupied for 35 years are being taken away from Memorial. Since 2021, the Russian authorities have been trying to destroy Memorial organizations, starting with the liquidation of the Memorial Human Rights Center and the International Memorial.
60. In different regions, the monuments and memorial plaques of the [“The Last Address” project](#) to victims of repression are being demolished. A special target for demolition are monuments associated with the memory of the victims of national operations (Poles, Lithuanians, etc.), monuments to the victims of the Katyn massacre, Finnish, Hungarian, German prisoners of war (Tver region, Leningrad region, Novgorod region, etc.). The demolition is conducted by members of nationalist groups with the tacit consent or approval of the Russian authorities.
61. At the same time, the monuments to Stalin and other organizers of Soviet terror are being [established](#) by local authorities in different regions of Russia (Moscow, Mednoye in the Tver region, Voronezh, Vologda region, Chuvashia, etc.). This trend became especially noticeable by the 80th anniversary of the end of WW2.
62. In December 2024, Valery Fadeev, the Human Rights Commissioner of the Russian Federation associated with the president of Russia, [proposed](#) to move the Solovetsky Monument (one of the key symbols commemorating Soviet terror, established by Memorial in 1990) from Lubyanka Square to another location. He explained that if the monument is moved “it would not be an eyesore to Lubyanka employees”, because people come to the stone “not to commemorate, but to protest against the KGB and FSB”. He also spoke against the memorial plaques of the “The Last Address” project.
63. In July 2025, in Sandarmokh (Karelia), a mass burial site for those repressed and executed during Stalin's Great Terror, memorial plaques in memory of Finnish victims of the terror were desecrated, and a sign was erected prohibiting independent installation of memorial signs, although Sandarmokh had been conceived since 1997 as a memorial complex with numerous private monuments established by grassroots organizations.