

**Shadow Report to the United Nations Human Rights Committee with Respect to the
Seventh Periodic Report of Canada**
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The Environmental Justice and Sustainability Clinic is a public interest legal clinic and experiential education initiative housed at Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto. We work to advance environmental justice and sustainability in Canada by carrying out a variety of legal work on a *pro bono* basis for a variety of clients (individuals, communities, NGOs, municipalities, First Nations, social enterprises, etc.), in cooperation with external public interest-oriented lawyers and legal service organizations.

Report on the Violation of the Rights to Indigenous Self-Determination and Democratic Participation of Indigenous Peoples in Canada Due to “Fast-Tracking” Legislation for Major Projects

Written and Submitted by: Allyson Manzie for the Environmental Justice and Sustainability Clinic
(under the direction of Professor Dayna Scott)

Supported by: Kerrie Blaise, Legal Advocates for Nature’s Defence and Jamie Kneen, MiningWatch Canada



Contact Information

4700 Keele Street,
North York M3J 1P3
Ontario, Canada

Tel: 416-736-5721

Web: <https://ejsclinic.info.yorku.ca/>

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1. Executive Summary

This submission to the Human Rights Committee focuses on breaches of Article 1, the right to self-determination, and Article 25(a), the right to democratic participation, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).¹ By implementing the *Protect Ontario by Unleashing our Economy Act* 2025 (POUEA)², the *Special Economic Zones Act*, 2025 (SEZA)³ (Schedule 9 of the POUEA), and the federal *Building Canada Act* 2025 (BCA)⁴, Canada has failed to meet its obligations under the ICCPR in regard to its commitment to support self-determination, specifically Indigenous self-determination, and failed to comply with its obligation to provide access to the participatory democratic process.

Accordingly, the Environmental Justice and Sustainability Clinic (EJSC), supported by Legal Advocates for Nature's Defence (LAND) and MiningWatch Canada, submits this statement to highlight a shared concern regarding the erosion of Indigenous self-determination and democratic participation specifically through the expedited legislative frameworks (the POUEA, the BCA and the *Special Economic Zones Act*) that bypass consultation, consent, and accountability. These new pieces of legislation undermine Canada's obligations under the ICCPR and disproportionately impact Indigenous peoples and their rights.

With specific regard for Article 1, the Committee has made it clear that state parties should consult Indigenous Peoples to seek their free, prior and informed consent whenever legislation and actions impact their lands and rights; and resolve land and resources disputes with Indigenous Peoples in a manner that respects treaty rights.⁵ The newly introduced legislative regimes examined in this submission fall short of these requirements, as outlined by the list of issues prior to submission of Canada's seventh periodic report, as well as further restrict the right to democratic participation as outlined in Article 25(a).

¹ *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 1976) [ICCPR].

² *Protect Ontario by Unleashing our Economy Act*, 2025, SO 2025, c 4 [POUEA].

³ *Special Economic Zones Act*, 2025, SO 2025, c 4, Schedule 9 [SEZA].

⁴ *Building Canada Act*, SC 2025 c 2 [BCA].

⁵ United Nations Human Rights Committee, *Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Canada*, 13 August 2015 at para 16.

The Environmental Justice and Sustainability Clinic, therefore, respectfully requests that these failures be raised by the Human Rights Committee during its examination of Canada in its 145th Session during the 2-19 of March 2026.

2. Background

In alleged response to the recent tariffs imposed by the United States President Donald Trump, the *BCA* and Ontario's *POUEA* were introduced as strategic legislative responses aimed at mitigating economic uncertainty by “fast-tracking” certain types of major development or infrastructure projects. The federal *BCA* seeks to “enhance Canada’s prosperity, national security, economic security, national defence and national autonomy by ensuring that projects that are in the national interest are advanced through an accelerated process.”⁶ Similarly, Ontario’s *POUEA* was enacted to “unlock the potential of Ontario’s critical minerals by streamlining approval processes for mining and critical infrastructure projects” in order to fuel economic growth.⁷

A. *The Building Canada Act, 2025:*

Receiving Royal Assent on June 26th, the *One Canadian Economy Act* enacted two pieces of legislation: Part 1, the *An Act to enact the Free Trade and Labour Mobility in Canada Act*, and Part 2, the *Building Canada Act (BCA)*. Part 1 aims to reduce the burden of federal barriers to interprovincial trade with the intended goal of streamlining the transportation of goods and services across the country.⁸ Part 2 establishes a statutory framework to expedite activities deemed to be projects “in the national interest” by streamlining federal review.⁹ For instance, the *BCA* allows for projects identified as Projects of National Interest (PONIs) to be pre-approved, allowing Cabinet and a designated Minister the power to bypass or short-circuit legal and regulatory safeguards, including but not limited to those required under the *Impact Assessment Act*, the *Fisheries Act*, and the *Canadian Navigable Waters Act*.¹⁰ Crucially, the legislation gives the federal executive branch the power to decide which

⁶ *BCA*, *supra* note 4 s 4.

⁷ *POUEA*, *supra* note 2.

⁸ Government of Canada, “Supporting Legislation” (11 December 2025), online: <<https://www.canada.ca/en/one-canadian-economy/services/free-trade-labour-mobility-canada-act.html>>.

⁹ Government of Canada, “Building Canada Act – Projects of National Interest” (19 December 2025), online: <<https://www.canada.ca/en/one-canadian-economy/services/building-canada-act-projects-national-interest.html>>.

¹⁰ Government of Canada, “Building Canada Act – Projects of National Interest” (19 December 2025), online: <<https://www.canada.ca/en/one-canadian-economy/services/building-canada-act-projects-national-interest.html>>.

projects will be subject to the fast-track and which laws and regulations will be waived. This is with the stated intention of strengthening Canadian industries and advancing economic independence.¹¹

B. The Protect Ontario by Unleashing our Economy Act, 2025:

Receiving Royal Assent on June 5th, 2025, the *POUEA* enacts, amends, and repeals several statutes that play a role in planning, approving, and delivering infrastructure and resource extraction projects in Ontario.¹² This is with the stated objective of protecting Ontario's economy from the impact of existing and threatened tariffs posed by the United States Government by accelerating the permitting of energy and infrastructure development projects.¹³ These development projects are said to "mitigate the impact of trade disruptions, and ensure the long-term prosperity and security of [Canada's] economy."¹⁴ In order to speed up development, Schedule 9 of the *POUEA* enacted the *SEZA*, which effectively grants the provincial Cabinet the ability to suspend ordinary provincial and municipal law to facilitate accelerated development.¹⁵

C. Special Economic Zones Act, 2025

The *Special Economic Zones Act*, enacted under Schedule 9 of the *POUEA*, grants the Lieutenant Governor in Council (the provincial Cabinet) expansive and undefined powers to pass regulations designating areas of the province as "special economic zones." Additionally, the *SEZA* affords the Minister of Economic Development, Job Creation, and Trade the ability to hand-pick "trusted proponents", as well as designate projects that may be exempt from any provincial or municipal law or regulation.¹⁶ This allows the provincial executive to bypass the legislature's role and unilaterally abandon existing laws and regulations, including those that detail criteria for approvals and permits and safeguard environmental protections and respect for Indigenous rights.¹⁷

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *POUEA*, *supra* note 2.

¹³ Fatima Syed, "Bill 5: a guide to Ontario's spring 2025 development and mining legislation" (14 May 2025), online: <<https://thenarwhal.ca/ontario-bill-5-explained/>>; Government of Ontario, "Minister's Foreward" (6 November 2025), online: <<https://budget.ontario.ca/2025/fallstatement/foreword.html#section-2>>.

¹⁴ Ministry of Energy and Mines, "Technical Briefing: Protect Ontario by Unleashing Our Economy" (17 April 2025), online: <<https://news.ontario.ca/assets/files/20250422/b3fef46c83bf4da5fbf591daca760b7b.pdf>>.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *SEZA*, *supra* note 3 s 6(2).

¹⁷ Canadian Civil Liberties Association, "Submissions on Ontario Bill 5, Schedule 9 Special Economic Zones Act, 2025" (26 May 2025), online: <<https://ccla.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/2025-05-26-CCLAs-Submission-on-Bill-5-Schedule-9.pdf>> [CCLA Submission].

3. Methodology

The EJSC is a legal clinic operating out of Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto. The Clinic has been assisting some small remote First Nations in Ontario since 2017. These First Nations, such as Neskantaga First Nation, have homelands in the area known as the “Ring of Fire” which falls within Treaty No.9. The Ring of Fire is the name mining companies have given to a prospective mineral district in the far north of Ontario, said to be rich in “critical minerals” important for economic development in the current moment of geopolitical uncertainty.

The Ring of Fire has been named as the government of Ontario’s first priority for designation as a Special Economic Zone, and it has also been touted as a priority for designation as a PONI under the federal *BCA*. Both orders of government have indicated that they intend to “fast-track” permitting and approvals processes in the region.

The Indigenous Peoples of Treaty No.9 territory, including Neskantaga First Nation, have strenuously objected to these legislative changes, to no avail. The EJSC assisted Neskantaga First Nation in making submissions to Parliamentary and legislative committees prior to the passage of the legislation, which was introduced into law very rapidly last spring and summer. In the course of making these submissions, the EJSC has collected the testimonies of leadership and several members of Neskantaga First Nation, and other affected Treaty No.9 Peoples, in respect of the threats to their rights of self-determination and democratic participation that are posed by these new legislative regimes.

4. Responses to the Legislation

Since their enactment in June, both the *POUEA* and the *BCA* have been strongly rebuked. As of July 2025, nine Ontario First Nations have joined together to challenge the *POUEA* and the *BCA* in Court.¹⁸ Collectively, they are requesting an injunction to stop both levels of government from using their powers under the new legislation as, according to the court filing, they “represent a clear and present danger” to the Nations’ self-determination rights and violate the Crown’s obligation to act honourably.¹⁹ The legal challenge also seeks to have both the *POUEA* and the *BCA* struck in their

¹⁸ Carl Meyer, “Attawapiskat organizers want to join First Nations court case against Ontario’s Bill 5” (16 December 2025), online: <<https://thenarwhal.ca/bill-5-lawsuit-intervenors/>>.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

entirely on the basis that they are unconstitutional and fail to advance reconciliation with Indigenous peoples. In addition to this Court challenge, many not-for-profit and civil society organizations participated in the legislative process and released their own legal analysis, calling for the withdrawal of *POUEA* and the *BCA*, whether in part or in full.²⁰ Many of these comments have been made with particular reference to Canada's international obligations under the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Accordingly, this submission aims to contribute to and reinforce the ongoing international discourse concerning the rights of Indigenous Peoples in Canada, as well as further the discussion on the ICCPR.

5. The Rights Violated

Article 1 Self-determination

A. Special Economic Zones Act, 2025

The Indigenous Peoples of Canada constitute peoples entitled to exercise the right to self-determination under Article 1. Article 1 of the ICCPR guarantees all people the right “of self-determination.... by virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”²¹ The Supreme Court of Canada’s framework holds that a people’s right to self-determination is usually fulfilled through *internal* self-determination, which is defined as “a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an existing state.”²² However, Canadian Aboriginal Law scholars Benjamin Richardson, Shin Imai and Kent McNeil have broadly defined self-determination, in the context of Indigenous peoples, as “the right of a people to determine their own political status and control their economic, social, and cultural development, without external compulsion.”²³

²⁰ Legal Advocates for Nature’s Defence, “Legal Analysis and Implications of Bill 5 “Protect Ontario by Unleashing our Economy Act, 2025”” (7 May 2025), online: <<https://naturesdefence.ca/2025/04/30/legal-analysis-and-implications-of-bill-5-protect-ontario-by-unleashing-our-economy-act-2025/>>.

²¹ ICCPR, *supra* note 1 s 1.

²² *Reference re Secession of Quebec*, [1998] 2 SCR 217, 1998 CarswellNat 1299 at para 126.

²³ Benjamin J Richardson, Shin Imai, and Kent McNeil, *Indigenous Peoples and the Law: Comparative and critical perspectives* (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2009) at 13.

On either view, a key aspect of self-determination is the degree to which Indigenous peoples are regaining control over their own lands and resources.²⁴ In order to fulfil its obligation to ensure self-determination, the Canadian government must guarantee that members of Indigenous communities are able not only to choose how to order their economic, social, and cultural affairs, but to do so freely and actively.²⁵ In the context of legislation that seeks to provide unabashed discretion to the government, the *SEZA* severely jeopardizes Indigenous Peoples' ability to exercise self-determination, develop their own priorities, and pursue their economic, social and cultural development. Specifically, the *POUEA* enables the Cabinet and the Minister to create lawless zones where the provincial executive, instead of the legislature, has the final say regarding which laws and regulations do or don't apply, overriding the will of Indigenous governments.²⁶ In practice, the *POUEA*'s introduction of "special economic zones" makes meaningful consultation and, therefore, accommodation nearly impossible, as well as completely precludes a right to consent.²⁷ By removing mechanisms that trigger the consultation process, including the need for permits and approvals, the *POUEA* and "special economic zones" effectively erase constitutionally-required opportunities for Indigenous voices to be heard.²⁸ Accordingly, Indigenous peoples' ability to exercise self-determination, develop their own priorities, and pursue their economic, social and cultural development is severely at risk.

B. *Building Canada Act, 2025*

The right to self-determination is a fundamental principle in international law. Not only is it enshrined in the ICCPR, but it also finds authority in a number of other international human rights instruments. In this respect, such instruments have placed specific emphasis on minority participation, noting that governments should be sensitive towards minority communities and, in particular, their right to engage with and participate in the government of the country to which its members are citizens.²⁹ Further, it has been recommended that with specific respect to Indigenous

²⁴ Government of Canada, A Quality of Life Framework for Canada, "Indigenous Self Determination" (29 October 2025), online: <<https://www.statcan.gc.ca/hub-carrefour/quality-life-qualite-vie/good-governance-saine-gouvernance/indigenous-self-determination-autodetermination-autochtones-eng.htm>>.

²⁵ UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 'General Recommendation No 23' (18 August 1997) UN Doc A/52/18 annex V para 4(d) [CERD].

²⁶ *CCLA Submission*, *supra* note 17.

²⁷ Nick Leeson et al, "Ontario's Bill 5 & The Discretionary State" (12 June 2025), online: <<https://www.woodwardandcompany.com/news/ontarios-bill-5-the-discretionary-state/>>.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ CERD, *supra* note 25.

peoples, states must ensure that members of Indigenous communities have rights in respect of effective participation in public life and that no decisions directly relating to their rights and interests are taken without their informed consent.³⁰ The *BCA*, which grants the federal executive largely unrestricted authority, actively denies public participation and specifically impedes Indigenous self-determination in respect of various federal approvals that otherwise would trigger processes for addressing the rights and interests of affected Indigenous peoples, such as *Fisheries Act* authorizations or impact assessments. Of specific concern is the “pre-approval” of designated PONIs, as this pre-authorization does not allow for meaningful consultation or accommodation of potentially impacted Indigenous communities. Accordingly, the *BCA* pre-judges Indigenous consent, effectively removing the ability of First Nations to influence government decisions as well as order their own economic affairs.³¹ The choice of legislative form adopted in the *BCA* therefore undermines the degree to which Indigenous peoples are regaining control over their own lands and resources.

Further, the Federal Court has recently ruled that Canada’s domestic implementation of UNDRIP, under the *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act*³², creates positive and justiciable rights, thus adding a new layer of protection of Indigenous rights on top of that already existent in Canadian law.³³ However, since the *BCA* undermines Indigenous communities’ ability to provide or withhold their Free, Prior, and Informed consent under the UNDRIP, the ability of Indigenous peoples to fulfill their responsibilities to “protect their lands and resources for the benefit of future generations in accordance with their values, traditions, and law” is compromised.³⁴ Thus, the *BCA* severely jeopardizes Indigenous communities’ ability to pursue their own economic, social, and cultural development, a component deemed necessary in Canada’s understanding of self-determination.

³⁰ CERD, *supra* note 25.

³¹ Jamie Kneen, “The Building Canada Act Is a Shocking Power Grab – And Powerful Political Theatre. What Happens Next?” (20 June 2025), online: <<https://miningwatch.ca/blog/2025/6/20/building-canada-act-shocking-power-grab-and-powerful-political-theatre-what-happens>>.

³² *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act* SC 2021, c 14.

³³ *Kebaowek First Nation v Canadian Nuclear Laboratories*, 2025 FC 319; *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act*, SC 2021, c 14.

³⁴ Chiefs of Ontario, “Protecting Our Lands: A First Nations Response to Bill 5 & Bill C-5” (2025), online: <<https://chiefs-of-ontario.org/resources/protecting-our-lands/>>.

Article 25 The Right to Democratic Participation

Article 25(a) of the ICCPR guarantees all people the opportunity to “take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives.”³⁵ This participatory right is reflected in Canada’s legislative process: when a bill is introduced, the executive, alongside the legislature and civil society, engages in a democratic dialogue regarding the contents of the proposed bill.³⁶ More specifically, the Canadian system of government reflects a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary democracy consisting of three parts: the King, represented by the Governor General, the Senate, and the House of Commons.³⁷ Members of Parliament (“MPs”) sit in the House of Commons to represent their electoral districts. This allows the MPs to question the Prime Minister and other Government Ministers directly on behalf of their local constituencies.³⁸ They also sit as members of Parliamentary committees tasked with reviewing proposed legislative changes, bringing forward the views of their constituents, and voting on proposed legislation. A similar process unfolds at the level of the provincial Legislature in Ontario (through Members of Provincial Parliament, MPPs).

A. Special Economic Zones Act, 2025

The *SEZA* interrupts this foundational process of democratic dialogue. The legislation introduces three undefined terms: “trusted proponents,” “designated projects,” and “special economic zones.” The criteria for designating “trusted proponents,” “designated projects,” and “special economic zones” remain undefined and immeasurable, and are largely dependent on the opinion or satisfaction of the relevant provincial Minister and/or Lieutenant Governor in Council.³⁹ However, in order for democratic dialogue to function effectively, the executive cannot take crucial decisions out of the legislative branch and give the authority over to members of the executive branch operating in the shadows. When this happens, neither the affected First Nations nor the public and civil society can meaningfully affect decision-making on matters of significance to them.⁴⁰ For instance, in the context of the *SEZA*, a special economic zone can be designated if the Cabinet

³⁵ ICCP, *supra* note 1 article 25.

³⁶ CCLA Submission, *supra* note 17.

³⁷ Government of Canada, “Democracy in Canada” (14 April 2025), online: <<https://www.canada.ca/en/democratic-institutions/services/democracy-canada.html>>.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Legal Advocates for Nature’s Defence, “Taking Action to Stop Bill 5 and Protect Indigenous Rights & Nature: Responding to Ontario’s Proposed Regulation to Designate Special Economic Zones” (28 October 2025), online: <<https://naturesdefence.ca/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Briefing-Note-Protect-Indigenous-Rights-and-Nature.pdf>>.

⁴⁰ CCLA Submission, *supra* note 17.

(specifically, the relevant Minister or Lieutenant Governor in Council) is “of the opinion that” the project activities “are or will be economically significant or strategically important to the Ontario economy.”⁴¹ This wide discretionary power held by Cabinet precludes oversight by MPPs. Another example is the designation of “trusted proponents.”⁴² These are handpicked by the Minister with no independent checks from MPs.⁴³ The only requirement is whether the trusted proponent has a “good record” of legal compliance; what qualifies as “good,” however, is entirely “in the opinion of the Minister.”⁴⁴ Should Canadians or affected First Nations disagree or take issue with the meaning the Minister has chosen to assign to the undefined terms, they will be unable to engage through their MPP, as the *SEZA* removes all authority from the Legislature and assigns it to the Minister.⁴⁵ Furthermore, the *SEZA* narrows public and judicial scrutiny by extinguishing potential causes of actions against the Crown, thereby further eroding government accountability.⁴⁶ Accordingly, the *SEZA* grants the Cabinet unabashed discretion in assigning these terms any possible meaning, thereby preventing meaningful democratic dialogue and participation, effectively undermining the participatory democratic rights outlined in Article 25.

B. *Building Canada Act, 2025*

Similarly, the *One Canadian Economy Act* Part 2, the *BCA*, also grants significant discretionary powers to the executive branch of the federal government. Specifically, sections 21, 22, and 23 of the *BCA* grant the executive largely unrestricted authority to modify and exempt the application of almost any law in the federal statute book.⁴⁷ For example, section 22 specifically notes that the federal Cabinet “may, on the recommendation of the Minister responsible... make regulations exempting one or more national interest projects from the application of any provision of [any law listed in an attached schedule, and any regulations made under them].” In section 21(1) of the *BCA*, the legislation further assigns the power to amend the schedule of listed laws that can be by-passed to the federal Cabinet. In practice, the *BCA* therefore shifts the authority to designate PONIs and decide which laws will apply to them solely to the executive branch, effectively removing all power from the House of Commons.

⁴¹ [*Criteria for Designations* OReg 373/25](#) s 1 [*Criteria for Designations* OReg].

⁴² *SEZA*, *supra* note 3 s 3(1).

⁴³ *SEZA*, *supra* note 3 s 3(1).

⁴⁴ *Criteria for Designations* OReg, *supra* note 40 s 2(1).

⁴⁵ *SEZA*, *supra* note 3 s 3(1).

⁴⁶ *SEZA*, *supra* note 3 s 7.

⁴⁷ David Wright & Martin Olszynski, “Building Canada Act: Move fast and make things, or move fast and break things?” (2025) 13:3 Energy Regulation Quarterly.

This legislative form, known as a Henry VIII clause, is of particular concern for the application of Article 25 of the ICCPR, as this act of shifting power from the House of Commons and MPs to the federal Cabinet effectively politically disenfranchises all Canadians, but especially those who are likely to be significantly and adversely affected by new resource extraction projects. The *BCA*, by removing the authority of MPs to influence whether particular projects affecting their constituents are in fact designated, removes impacted Canadians' ability to challenge the designation of a PONI. Similarly, First Nations, who are the most likely to experience significant adverse impacts on their members' way of life from "fast-tracked" resource extraction projects, will not have a viable route to participate in democratic decisions taken in relation to which laws and regulations will be waived on lands and waters they effectively steward. If decisions about the designation of projects and the list of laws that can be ignored are not required to go through the House of Commons, then people in Canada are not able to "take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives."⁴⁸

Furthermore, these designations have implications for the application of additional related processes, including Crown consultation, compliance with Canadian constitutional and international law, notably UNDRIP, and the possibility of judicial scrutiny. The *BCA*'s streamlined federal approval and permitting process bypasses the regulatory and environmental review processes that give effect to the Government of Canada's duty to consult and as needed, accommodate Indigenous peoples in respect of anticipated impacts.⁴⁹ Bypassing these processes creates uncertainty as to how the government of Canada intends to uphold its constitutional obligations to Indigenous Peoples under section 35 of the *Constitution Act, 1982* and UNDRIP.⁵⁰ Accordingly, we submit that these new legislative forms violate Article 25 of the ICCPR.

6. Recommendations

A substantive analysis of the *SEZA* and the *BCA* reveals that the Canadian government is in violation of Articles 1 and 25 of the ICCPR. The EJSC respectfully requests that the Human Rights Committee inform the Canadian government of its obligations to its citizens under the Convention,

⁴⁸ ICCP, *supra* note 1 article 25 (a).

⁴⁹ First Nations Leadership Council "Commuque to First Nations Bill C-5: Overview and Discussion" (26 June 2025), online:

<<https://www.bcafnc.ca/sites/default/files/2025-06/20250627%20FNLC%20Commuque%20to%20FN%20re%20Bil%20C-5.pdf>>.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

as well as recognize and include in its Concluding Observations the violations that are currently taking place.

To this end, the EJSC specifically asks that the Committee, in its Concluding Observations, recommend the Canadian government to take the following actions:

- A. Recognize the violations both the *POUEA* and the *BCA* have on the public and Indigenous Peoples and their ability to engage in democratic processes, as well as exercise self-determination.
- B. Appropriately consult with and seek the Free, Prior, and Informed Consent of the affected and impacted Indigenous communities as a way of supporting their self-determination.
- C. Facilitate the integration and support of public and Indigenous participation in the implementation of the *SEZA* and the *BCA*.
- D. Repeal and or amend (with the full and equitable participation of Indigenous Peoples and the public) both the *POUEA* and the *BCA* and restore the self-determination and democratic rights of Indigenous Peoples and Canadians.