FRANCE AND THE HATED SOCIETY:
MUSLIM EXPERIENCES

Saied R. Ameli
Arzu Merali
Ehsan Shahghasemi

Islamic Human Rights Commission
www.ihrc.org.uk
A policeman looks for evidence after nearly 500 graves of Muslim war veterans were desecrated on the eve of Eid ul-Adha in 2008, near Arras in north-east France.
Contents

Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. 6
Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 7

Chapter 1
Muslims in France and Europe: A Short History of Subalternisation .................................. 9

Chapter 2
Muslims in Today’s France ................................................................................................. 20

Chapter 3
Discursive Racism as Human Rights Violations .................................................................. 37

Chapter 4
Theory and Research Method ............................................................................................. 59

Chapter 5
Research results ..................................................................................................................... 62

Demographic specifications of Muslim respondents in France ........................................... 63
The effects of demographic variables on experiencing hate crime in France ...................... 75
Effect of mediation variables on hate crimes and Experiences in France .............................. 94
Effect of demographic variables on the experience of hateful policies ............................. 97
Analysing open-ended questions ........................................................................................ 99

Chapter 6
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 112
Recommendations & Concluding Thoughts ....................................................................... 122

Appendix A .......................................................................................................................... 126
Appendix B .......................................................................................................................... 127
Notes .................................................................................................................................... 135
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................ 137
List of Tables

Table 1: Age group frequency distribution .................................................... 61
Table 2: Gender frequency distribution ........................................................ 62
Table 3: Country of birth frequency distribution ......................................... 63
Table 4: City or town of residence frequency distribution ......................... 63
Table 5: Ethnic origin frequency distribution .............................................. 64
Table 6: Country of citizenship frequency distribution ............................... 65
Table 7: Marital status frequency distribution ............................................. 65
Table 8: The Muslim visibility level frequency distribution ....................... 66
Table 9: The proportion of Muslims in the neighbourhood frequency distribution ............................................................. 67
Table 10: Income group frequency distribution ......................................... 68
Table 11: Education frequency distribution ................................................ 69
Table 12: Work status frequency distribution ............................................. 70
Table 13: Religiosity frequency distribution ................................................ 70
Table 14: The frequency of hate crimes experienced by Muslims in France ............................................................................................................. 72
Table 15: Effect of age on experience of physical assault ............................ 74
Table 16: Effect of age on experience of hearing racially or culturally offensive remarks ................................................................................. 75
Table 17: Effect of gender on experience of others reacting as if they were intimidated or afraid ................................................................. 76
Table 18: Effect of gender on experience of being expected to be less competent because of Islam / hijab ......................................................... 77
Table 19: Effect of gender on experience of verbal abuse ............................ 77
Table 20: Effect of income group on experience of being ignored in public places .............................................................................................. 78
Table 21: Effect of income group on experience of verbal abuse ............... 79
Table 22: Effect of education on experience of being told you are oversensitive or paranoid about racism ................................................. 80
Table 23: Effect of education on experience of being insulted or harassed ............................................................................................................. 83
Table 24: Effect of education on experience of physical assault ............... 84
Table 25: Effect of work status on experience of being laughed at or mocked ........................................................................................................ 85
Table 26: Effect of work status on experience of being physically avoided ........................................................................................................ 86
Table 27: Effect of work status on experience of being insulted or
harassed .................................................................................................................. 87
Table 28: Effect of religiosity on experience of being insulted or harassed ................................................................. 88
Table 29: Effect of religiosity on experience of being expected to fit stereotypes of a Muslim .................................................. 89
Table 30: Effect of religiosity on experience of being talked down to .......................................................... 91
Table 31: Effect of being visibly Muslim on experiencing verbal abuse .................................................................................. 92
Table 32: Effect of being visibly Muslim on experience of being expected to be less competent because of Islam / hijab .......... 93
Table 33: Effect of being visibly Muslim on experience of being laughed at or mocked ........................................................................... 94
Table 34: Effect of demographic values on experience of hateful policies .................................................................................. 96

List of Charts

Chart 1: Domination Hate Model of Intercultural Relations (DHMIR) .. 61
Chart 2: Reasons for hate ideology development amongst people ..... 98
Chart 3: Political reasons for hate spreading against Muslims .......... 102
Chart 4: Experiencing hate practice ............................................................. 107
Chart 5: Negative Muslim experiences according to category .......... 111
Chart 6: Average percentage of negative experiences of Muslims in 29 categories according to frequency ................................................. 113
Chart 7: Average percentage of negative experiences of Muslims in 29 categories based on age groups ......................................................... 114
Chart 8: Average percentage of negative experiences of Muslims in 29 categories based on gender ........................................................... 114
Chart 9: Average percentage of negative experiences of Muslims in 29 categories based on income status ................................. 115
Chart 10: Average percentage of negative experiences of Muslims in 29 categories based on education .................................................. 116
Chart 11: Average percentage of negative experiences of Muslims in 29 categories based on work status ................................. 117
Chart 12: Average percentage of negative experiences of Muslims in 29 categories based on religiosity ........................................ 118
Chart 13: Average percentage of negative experiences of Muslims in 29 categories based on the extension of being visibly Muslim .. 119
Acknowledgements

The authors of the report would like to thank Ebrahim Mohsen Ahooiee for his contribution to this report and the following for their work on this report and their support.

For their time and dedication and support to this report and the project special thanks to Nora Rami, Nawel Rieg, Dr Abdallah Thomas Milcent, Mohammed El-Sayed Bushra and Ihsan Abdullah. Further help, advice and support were gratefully received from Foued Bourabiet, Samy Debah, Houria Bouteldja, Andrea Meza Torres, Liz Fekete, Assed Baig, Nick Rodrigo, Alvin Mabushi, Hussain Araki, Mohammed Kamali and Ramón Grosfoguel.

The following organisations must be mentioned for their support but also for their pioneering and difficult work in this field and in an increasingly vicious political and legal realm: Comité 15 mars et Liberté, Collectif contre l’Islamophobie en France, Parti des Indigènes de la République. This report is dedicated to all of those fighting the injustice described herein.
Introduction

This report is part of a pilot project to assess the experiences of hostility and discrimination against Muslims, ran concurrently in the UK (Ameli et al, 2011) and France. It seeks to give voice to Muslims living within these borders with regard to the experiences, expectations and understanding of the situation they live, and their visions for a better future. In assessing the types of hostility and discrimination they face, this report, and the project in general, seeks to achieve a statistical representation of levels of such, including incidents that are referred to as hate crimes, as well as working towards a recognition of what that term includes for both communities and policy makers.

In so doing, existing research, including both statistical and theoretical work, is overviewed and presented, and related to or tested against both the findings of this report and the theoretical approach developed over the project (see Chapter 4). This theoretical approach has developed through several research projects undertaken at the Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) and by the authors separately over the last 8 years, and has culminated with the Domination Hate Model of Intercultural Relations (DHMIR) as a theoretical framework. Ameli (2010) compares older models of intercultural communication and proposes DHMIR as a fuller model for studying intercultural sensitivity.

Chapter 1 sets out a historical-cultural context to this report, and uses the \textit{longue durée} as a framework for the underlying structural issues that have developed and presented themselves in the daily lives of the respondent communities in the survey. Starting with the revelation of Islam (corresponding to the 7th Century CE), it charts French interaction with Islam and Muslims through various eras until the present, where Muslims and Islam exist as an ongoing paradox within a Westphalian conceptual framework.

Chapter 2 presents an overview of Muslims in France today, including demographics as well as economic and
political issues. Chapter 3 overviews human rights violations as documented by other organisations, research and the media. Chapter 4 outlines the theoretical framework of DHMIR. Chapter 5 presents the findings of our survey of Muslims in France (Strasbourg area) as part of the project.
Chapter 1

Muslims in France and Europe: A Short History of Subalternisation
Introduction

Setting out a historical-cultural context to the presence of and historical interactions between Muslims, Islam and France, is not unproblematic. Despite the contentious nature of such an exercise, for the purposes of this report the long-durée (longue durée) (Grosfoguel & Mielants, 2006) is an apposite approach when arguing, as this report does, that structural issues precede and underlie discursive racism and human rights violations. A brief history of such interactions can also chart how the current asymmetry of epistemological validity excludes, suppresses and diminishes Muslim narratives in France (Grosfoguel & Mielants, 2006; Scott 2007).

Such an account needs to recognise both the transnational nature of Islamic community and organisation in its various forms from Islam’s revelation until the present era, as well as the political-cultural changes that saw the emergence of the Westphalian era, and thus a political entity called France, and the development of the current world order, through colonialism to transnational political organisation and the emergence of the so-called West.

This approach also interrogates the oft-raised question, “Why are there suddenly problems now?” – raised within Western European contexts vis a vis Muslim communities living therein (Klausen, 2005), taking it beyond simplistic and epistemically problematic assumptions regarding the rise in Muslim populations, family reunification and the rise of so-called Islamic fundamentalism, extremism and radicalisation.

Interaction from the Declaration of Prophethood and General Discussions about the Rise of Islam

According to Roy (2007), the first Muslim minorities living under Western Christian domination date back to the eleventh century in Sicily, while Bowen (2006) argues that mosques were built on French soil in Rousillon in the 8th century. However, Islam’s encounter with the West is as old as Islam itself. In the 6th century, Dihyah Kalbi delivered the message of the Prophet
Muhammad (peace be upon him) to the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius (Pagden, 2008). In this message, the Prophet invited Heraclius to accept Islam.

Expansion of the Islamic Empire after the death of the Prophet Muhammad, though beset by internal political differences and wars, saw the rapid incorporation of many lands and peoples who often converted to Islam en masse. Whilst Orientalist and Civilisational accounts of this expansion emphasise the use of violence, others highlight that such accusations cannot be generalised to all Muslim expansion, and highlight the role of commerce and encounter as an equally, or even more, significant factor (particularly in the rise of Islam in South Eastern Asia). Other accounts emphasise the role of European violence during the Crusades, amounting in many recent discussions to genocide (Said, 1978; Ameli et al, 2007).

The role of otherisation of Muslims in the immediately pre-Westphalian period, and concurrent to the Conquest of the so-called New World in 1492, is argued to be a cultural and violent phenomenon and is seen as key to the defining of the West against Muslim (Geisser, 2006), Slavic, enslaved (Nimako & Willemsen, 2011) and Indigenous (Grosfoguel & Mielants, 2006; Newcomb 2008) ‘other(s)’ in order to legitimate ‘Western’ Empire building based on cultural notions of superiority. It is the latter period that Grosfoguel (2006) argues underlies the ‘cartography of power of the “world-system” for the past 500 years’.

Grosfoguel (ibid) further sets out the interlinkage between the religious difference set out in the pre-modern/colonial world and current ‘difference’ expressed as racial/ethnic resulting in inequalities, violence and discrimination against Muslims living in, for example, France. Geisser (2006) argues that there is French specificity in its representation of Islam that breaks from ‘prevalent European ones, separating it from its common Christian legacy’ (ibid). This ties in, in later chapters (3 & 5), to the contention of authors like Fysh & Wolfeys (2003), that the reductionist approach to present day issues of discrimination and hatred against Muslims, and the concurrent rise of the far right, cannot simply be viewed through the general experience of social and economic problems that beset not only France, but all of Western Europe.
Mediaeval Encounters and the French Role in the Crusades

The confrontations between Muslims and Franks must be set in the context of the already existing Muslim presence in Europe in (current day) Spain and Portugal. Accounts of the arrival of Muslim armies in 711 vary and are sometimes entirely overlooked. Noakes (1993) suggests that the armies arrived at the request of one of the sides in the civil war in Visigothic Spain and that Muslim rule was voluntarily accepted. Orientalist and Civilisational accounts suggest or imply violence (e.g. Goldschmidt and Davidson, 2006).

Islamic Spain went through a succession of different relationships with the established Caliphates, averring overall religious primacy from the Umayyads to the Abbasids as the Caliphate changed hands, despite the Umayyad rulers holding political sovereignty in Al-Andalus (Noakes, 1993). This continued until 929, when the eighth ruler of the dynasty, Abd al-Rahman III al-Nasir, claimed the caliphal title for himself and his progeny (Noakes, 1993).

Competing historical narratives portray Muslims as aggressive and brutal or as benign conquerors and scientific pioneers. Recent reevaluations of history, the enquiries into the historiography of the Islam-Europe relationship, as well as a more concerted effort to shift ‘the geopolitics and body-politics of knowledge from a North oriented gaze of the world-system towards a South oriented view’ (Grosfoguel, 2006) have examined critically the canon of Western knowledge relating to this history and its legacy.

European accounts of confrontations between Muslim Arab armies and Franks are cited as detachments appearing north of the Pyrenees as early as 718; this was followed in the next three years with their arrival and/or passing through Narbonne (719) and Toulouse (721). The 725 exploits through the Rhone valley saw the capture of Nimes, as well as the traversal of Vienne and Lyons, and passing into Burgundy (Saunders, 2002:91). The incursion and expansion of Islam into Europe was ‘stemmed’ (Goldschmidt and Davidson, 2006) in central France in 732, when they made their deepest incursion at Poitiers. They were
defeated between Tours and Poitier in 732 (Turner, 2005). Whilst the battle became part of a European imaginary of Western legend, with Weir (2001) putting the battle among the most significant wars in human history, it is reported in Muslim chronicles as a minor skirmish (Noakes, 1993).

There is no space nor scope in this report to try and untangle these conflicting reflections of the same events, except to highlight that mainstream canonical histories of this interaction in the Western or North-centric view emphasise Muslim violence and European victimhood, with little or no reciprocal critique of European participation in these events beyond that of victim. This belies an underlying obsession with Muslims as the violent outsiders trying to incur onto European soil, a leitmotif that runs through not only political and social discourse today vis-à-vis Muslim presence, but which marks out the subalternisation of Muslims as a crucial part of the formation of a ‘European’ historical identity, as well as a current idea of what it means to be European.

Meanwhile, Islam advanced further into North Africa (what is now Tunisia and eastern Algeria), with an Abbasid governor, sent by the Caliph Harun in 800 to Tunis, founding his own dynasty, collectively known as the Aghlabids. It is thought that most Berbers had converted to Islam by that time and that such conversion was voluntary (Doak, 2011). Subsequently, it is argued that Berbers were given political and civic equality and responsibility within the new political structure and many Berbers formed parts of the Muslim armies that fought against Christian armies. It was the Aghlabids who advanced into nearby Sicily, Italy and southern France, which eventually led to the complete control of Sicily by Muslims in 902 (Theotokis, 2010).

The rise of the Fatimids in 909, at the expense of the Aghlabids in North Africa, was also impactful, particularly with regard to the oncoming crusades in the late 11th century, seeing the further fracture of centralised Muslim power. The Fatimid Caliph Ubaid Allah in 934 also challenged and was challenged by Europe with raids and attacks on Egypt by the latter and France and Italy by the former (Saunders, 2002).

Whether regarded as Muslim or European aggression, Al-i Ahmad’s description (1984: 46) of Europe’s position in the 11th
century preceding the first crusade, is apt:

“... the West – the World of medieval Christianity – was encircled to the utmost possible degree by Islam, that is, when Islamic powers confronting it from two or three directions (east, south and southwest)…”

In 1095, Pope Urban II, himself a Frank of noble blood, declared a Papal Bull at the Council of Claremont based on a request from the Byzantine Empire for help in fighting the Turks. Part of the Papal Bull granted amnesty to criminals in exchange for their participation in the mercenary armies that were to take on the Turks and also eventually to take Jerusalem for Christendom (Ereira and Jones, 1994). According to Riley-Smith (2005), Urban delivered his speech in French and his audience was explicitly the French who were encouraged to fight (the Spanish in fact were encouraged to fight the Muslim rulers in Spain). The impact of the rising and receding fortunes of Muslim and European colonial power over the next two centuries on the psyche of all communities is hotly debated. In the current world-system context, the crusades still play a part in anti-Islamic discourse (see Chapter 3), with right-wing groups adopting crusader imagery in an attempt to portray their attacks on Muslims as part of an unbroken chain of confrontation and as a relgio-patriotic duty of white culture e.g. the British National Party’s adoption of crusader imagery, specifically that of the crusader (Merali and Shadjareh, 2002); or George W. Bush’s use of the phrase ‘crusade’ after 9/11, although this appears to have not translated so easily into French political and media discourse as it has in the UK.

Imagery of Muslims in the modern French context can be traced to contemporary representations of Islam and Muslims. The perception of Muslims in twelfth-century France was overwhelmingly negative, though occasionally paradoxical. Through commerce and the assimilation of Eastern culture in Muslim Spain, there derived an admiration of Islamic civilisation and, to a great extent, an appreciation of the famous figures of Islamic history: the scholar Alfarabi, the philosopher Avicenna, the scientist and mathematician Averroës, and the hero Salah al-Din (Dulin-Mallory, 1999: 166). An appreciation
of the quality of life enjoyed within Muslim lands was also acknowledged, though through the validation of plunder. In Robert Greene’s heroic play Orlando Furioso (1594), to cite just one example, Orlando plans to defeat his Saracen foes and return to France for a wedding, his ship laden with luxury goods (Vitkus, 1999: 221).

From the crusades, however, the perception of the Saracens as cruel, cunning, black idolaters advancing barbarously into the Christian north is seen in the many *gestes du roi* and *chansons de geste* of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In the *gestes* of Garin de Monglane, Doon de Mayence, de Blaye, de Nanteuil, and de Saint Gilles, the enemies are Saracen, as is also the case in many of the famous *gestes du roi*, such as Fierabras and Aquin (Dulin-Mallory, 1999: 166).

Asbridge (2010) argues that the crusades had little ongoing impact on Muslims once they were concluded with Muslim victory. He argues that they have been more significant in so-called Western imagination than Islamic, with a resurgence of an idea of continuing Western violation arising in the Muslim world only in the 19th and 20th centuries, perhaps as a response to the effects of colonialism. Newcomb (2008), however, argues that Pope Urban’s declaration that Christians could violently seize the property of those they would fight and kill in the Holy Land was a theological interpretation of Christian thinking that led not just to massacres of Muslims in the First and subsequent crusades, but became a precedent and recurring theme in the sanitisation of violent conquest through the idea of so-called ‘discovery’ for many centuries after the end of the crusades, and was key to the legitimisation of the bloody Conquest of the Americas, as well as the dispossession by law of the Native Americans by the laws and legal precedent set by the newly formed independent United States of America.

The devastation of lands caused by the crusades had direct impact on the rise of Europe (Al-i Ahmad, 1984) and the changing of relations between Europe and Islamic empires by the end of the 15th century from imperial to colonial (Grosfoguel, 2006). Geisser (2006) argues that the idea of ‘Islamic’ threat was instrumental in the formation of a European identity as Christian. Asbridge (2010) suggests that Urban’s motivations in launching the crusades were political. He contends that Urban
sought to revive and consolidate Papal power after a debilitating power struggle with the emperor of Germany. While there may have been some motivation on the part of Urban to actually help the Byzantine Empire defend itself from Turkish advances, Urban used the idea of going beyond extending such help to “reconquering” the Holy Land itself, as a unifying motif simultaneously unifying bellicose elements in Europe in conflict with each other against an external ‘other’, and asserting papal influence over the Latin West (Asbridge, 2010).

Key to the launch of the crusades was the act of dehumanisation of Muslims. Most historians now concede that the lurid polemic of Urban in his sermon at Clermont, in which he launched the crusades, of Muslim violence and atrocities against Christians had no basis in fact. It was an explicit act of propaganda and otherisation which had the power to provoke extreme acts of violence, including large scale atrocities against the otherised community.

13th Century Interaction until the Westphalian period and 1492

The subsidence of the crusades did not see a subsidence in Europe-Islamic confrontation, with attacks from a pseudo-Christian Mongol empire in the mid-13th century (Al-i Ahmad, 1984) coinciding with and orchestrated with European powers. Saunders suggests that when Louis IX of France was in Cyprus preparing a new attack on Egypt, a Mongol embassy arrived there to discuss a joint offensive against Islam (2002: 179). In 1250, the French king launched from Cyprus a naval attack on Egypt. For the second time in thirty years, the Franks landed in Egypt and occupied Damietta; they advanced up the Nile to Mansurah, but were defeated (Goldschmidt & Davidson, 2006: 130).

Such battles saw the rise of Europe and the mixed, but declining, imperial power of Muslims. According to Geisser, anti-Islamic rhetoric and ambition were crucial to identity formation ‘helping western Christendom to exist as a political,
cultural and religious entity’. Norman (1993 cited in Geisser, 2006) argues that in this period:

“... a collective way of thinking had taken place. By its strong internal cohesion, it represented the unity of the Christian doctrine in its political opposition to the Islamic society and played an evident social role, coordinating the military aggression with intellectual aggression.”

The importance of 1492 to the current world-system (Grosfoguel, 2006) and the reproduction of Islamophobia is significant. It is the year that Christian monarchy was restored to Spain and the conquest of the New World took place. Both events were marked by acts of gross violence and genocide, with the expulsion of Jews, Arabs and Muslims from Spain and the forced conversions to Christianity in the Iberian Peninsula; and the usurpation of the Americas and mass killings of indigenous peoples.

“These “internal” and “external” conquests of territories and people not only created an international division of labor... but also constituted the internal and external imagined boundaries of Europe... privileging populations of European origin over the rest. Jews and Arabs became the subaltern internal and “Others” within Europe, while indigenous people became the external “Others” of Europe” (Mignolo 2000 cited in Grosfoguel & Mielants, 2006).

Nimako (2011) argues further that the enslavement of millions of Africans was a concurrent subalternisation that resulted from a combination inter alia of the need to develop new trade routes to circumvent the rise of Safavid power, economical aspirations in the New World. Additionally this also served the need to affirm a common European identity against a demonised other in order to legitimise further ‘discovery’ and conquest. These processes, according to Nimako, were in fact the key to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.
The rise and decline of the Ottoman Empire, eventually leading to its break up in the early 20th century, marked the change from European imperial relations with the Islamic world to a colonial one (Grosfoguel & Mielants, 2006), as did the Dutch colonisation of Indonesia (17th century), British colonisation of India (18th century) and the Middle East in the 19th century. Geisser (2006) suggests there was a shift from a religious enmity to a political one. Grosfoguel & Mielants argue:

“... that this shift represented a secularisation of the Theological Christian imaginary of 16th and 17th century to a “scientific evolutionary hierarchical civilisation” imaginary that turned the late 15th century “people with the wrong religion” (imperial difference) into the inferior “savages and primitives” of “people without civilization” (colonial differences) in the 19th century.”

The setting up of alliances and trade deals between various European powers and various Muslim powers attests to the idea that monolithic religious confrontation was no longer an issue, though the tropes of religious demonisation remained strong in cultural discourse.

The Impact of French Imperial Ambition post-1789

Geisser (2006) argues that the French Revolution and the Declaration of Human and Civic Rights in 1789 saw a France that was less obsessed with Islam than its Jewish community and sees the resurgence of Islamophobia in the last century as a retrogressive step. French imperial ambitions, under Bonaparte, saw it embark on colonial expansion (briefly) over Egypt at the end of the 18th century; the conquest of Algeria in 1830 and extending their influence in the Middle East through Egyptian ruler and agent Mehmet Ali, who took Syria from the Ottomans in 1831 (Goldschmidt and Davidson, 2006: 166).

France’s economic and cultural ties with Egypt remained strong, but by the end of the nineteenth century, in spite of French opposition, Britain dominated the Nile Valley. France
did, however, take control of most of the rest of North Africa (Goldschmidt and Davidson, 2006: 167).

Despite competing colonial ambitions, the British and French collaborated in the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire and the carving up of the Middle East. The 1915 Sykes-Picot pact carved up the Middle East between the French and British.

The decline of Empire as exemplified with the Suez Crisis in 1956 saw France embroiled with Britain and Israel against Egypt. The Algerian War of Independence, however, holds a key role in affecting the psyche of French-Muslim relations in France in the post-colonial period, and will be discussed in the context of modern day developments and the immediate history of Muslims in France in the next chapter.

Understanding the immediate history of colonialism in creating Muslim ‘subjects’ within a French empire; the impact of subalternisation within the *longue durée* of Muslims in a discursive narrative of political power; and a societal expectation of superiority are critical to understanding contemporary events in France today and the experiences of Muslims.
Chapter 2

Muslims in Today’s France
Introduction

In discussing the contemporary history of Muslims in France, it is necessary to look at social issues vis a vis policy, racism, discrimination and Islamophobia. However, these do not operate in a vacuum and events from the turn of the 20th century, the end of the colonial era and French state and elite self-perception and their impact on the body public must all be overviewed, albeit in summary. In doing so this chapter touches on the role laïcité and the envisioning of France by commentators, policy makers, academics and Muslims. Further, it needs to interrogate briefly French societal and elite self-perception, as well as that of internal and external commentators, public figures and academics of the ideas of multiculturalism, communautarisme and republicanism in the French context.

Such an overview has some overlap with the subject matter of Chapter 3 i.e. actual recorded human rights abuses and the context of epistemic and discursive racism as discussed in existing literature.

French State Self-perception: Communautarisme / Multiculturalism and Laïcité

A key issue in English literature on France and the defining of French state self-perception is the imposition of ideas from the UK and North America and attempts to translate these, both literally and paradigmatically, into French and onto France as a model.

Terms which are abounded include secularism and laïcité, communautarisme, multiculturalism and communalism, as well as monoculturalism. All of these cross refer with French republicanism and universalism and inherent notions of superiority and epistemic racism, which will be discussed in Chapter 3.

Delanty (2010: 73) argues that the paradigmatic model of monoculturalism is the French republican tradition. ‘Multiculturalism’ is then confined to the private sphere. This,
contrasted by French public discourse to the much disparaged idea of *communautarisme*, tied to the UK and, in particular, the US social models. According to Scott (2007), *communautarisme* in France, which she translates as communalism, is not what the term means in America. Whereas the US allows hyphenated identities and group organisation, the French concept, and its derisive conceptualisation of communalism as a US concept, is that it is incompatible with French values, as it is one of group priority over national identity.

To be French, then, is to be an abstract, unencumbered individual, free from any public manifestation or affectation of difference. It is only as an assimilated individual that a person can express himself as a French citizen. This abstract individual, as will be further discussed in Chapter 3, not only represents the ideal of French republicanism, he represents an idea of state neutrality and, therefore, equality against the incursions of divisive notions such as religion. Grosfoguel and Mielants variously argue, however, that this abstract individual is in fact gendered, elite and racialised as a white, upper class male (*communautaristes masculine blanc*) whose gendered, racialised class interest are the foundational values of the republic (Grosfoguel & Mielants, 2006 and Grosfoguel, 2006) operating invisibly to institutionalise and normalise their privilege:

“If racial / gender / sexual minorities protest discrimination, they are accused by the “*communautaristes masculine blanc*” in power to be acting as “*communautaristes*” as if the elites in power were racial and gender blind / neutral, behaving towards everybody with a “universal principle of equality”.” (Grosfoguel quoted in Settoul, 2006: 5)

Fysh and Wolfreys (2002) argue that ‘from 1880s – 1970s the republic did not even try to offer immigrants the equal treatment implied in its abstract principles.’

Grosfoguel (2006b) argues that this is a vision of the exact pejorative *communautarisme* (Scott’s translation communalism) that French self-perception derides as the reality of US and UK multiculturalism, which supposedly privileges ethnic and religious groups over the individual. Grosfoguel (2006b) and
Murray (2006) claim that this exact lack of neutrality actually hails from a sense of Christian or Judeo-Christian identity, despite protestations of secularism or laïcité. This theme – its underpinnings in the transformation of epistemic global racisms and Islamophobia from religiously discriminatory discourses to biological and cultural racist narratives – and the rise of the neoreacs in the post-9/11 era in France will be dealt with in Chapter 3.

Murray (2006) argues that the public discourse that recognises the failure of the French state’s assimilationist paradigm post the 2006 riots still cannot accept the social reality of multiculturalism that exists in France and, with it, a failure to tackle, and denial of the existence of, racial oppression and discrimination. He argues that:

“An apparent unwillingness to acknowledge that modern France is multiracial and multicultural engenders a justified feeling of rejection and exclusion among the country’s ethnic minorities.” (2006: 35)

Murray contends strongly that racism is institutional in France and suggests that there are strong foundational factors with a xeno-racist ideal of l’invisibilité de la République. Based on a revolutionary ideal to counter federalism and the serious threat of the break-up of the French state, the idea is now espoused as a xeno-racist idea that posits Muslims and other minorities as posing the exact same threat.

Defining Muslims

Murray (2006) sees a connection between an inflated state perception of ‘Frenchness’, a vision ‘entrenched in its past and skewed by obsession with ‘republican values’, and ‘les glories nationales’ and the problematique of terminology when talking about ethnic and religious minorities.

Amongst terms used in public discourse, Murray cites les immigrés as a generic term ‘employed by many to refer to black people (French citizenship notwithstanding)’. This is despite
the rise of colloquial terms such as ‘les beurs et les blacks’ now used frequently by communities. Murray argues that the very term communauté, or minorities ethniques and noir, are treated with caution, whilst ambiguous and patronising terms such as ‘les personnes issues de l’immigration’ (persons of immigrant origin) ‘les jeunes des quartiers difficiles’ (youths from difficult areas) and ‘les personnes de couleur’ (people of colour) (Murray, 2006) are also used.

Even where the state has been involved in trying to positively rehabilitate imagery of minorities in the public space, the presumptions of what minorities are comes through as deeply problematic and inconsistent with minorities’ perceptions of themselves.

In 2004, Prime Minister Jean Pierre Raffarin commented, “We must recognize the contribution made by immigration to the building of France and change perceptions of this phenomenon, for our cohesion as a nation is at stake.” A museum, which opened in 2007, includes permanent exhibits related to the history of immigration in France from 1789, as well as temporary exhibits, symposiums, and a multimedia documentary resource centre (Bailey, 2008:80).

Meza Torres (2011) cites an incident at Cité nationale de l’histoire de l’immigration (French migration museum), where an exhibit of a ‘poor banlieu’ (poor suburb) elicited an angry response from some of those photographed therein who objected to being termed immigrant, as they saw themselves as French (citizens).

The use of the term indigènes (natives) is also still employed both pejoratively by policymakers, but also as a reclaimed term by communities themselves e.g. Parti des Indigènes de la Republique (PIR) who have reclaimed the term as an expression to counter the dehumanisation faced by minorities, but also as a term of political organisation and agitation. The use of the term in PIR’s name avers to the ‘series of French colonial laws (codes de l’indigénat) which gave colonised people a subordinate status defined in racialised terms.’

The term indigènes hails from the time of the occupation of the ‘Maghreb’ and the terms given to denote the status of those occupied in the French social hierarchy.
Algeria, the arrival of Muslims en masse in France, the War of Liberation and Its Impact

Scott (2007) argues that Islamophobia in France has some specificity and antecedents to the occupation of Algeria in 1830. Whilst this specific racism targeted Muslims, Fysh and Wolfreys argue that anti-immigrant racism is a characteristic of French policy and society and that the turn of the 20th century and the arrival of immigrants from various countries saw separate forms of discrimination and official policies that actually hindered and created obstacles to integration.

Tens of thousands of North African men and men from Indochina were brought to France at the turn of the 20th century to work in munitions factories and mines (Fysh & Wolfreys, 2003). Algerian men were brought to France during the first half of the 20th century by the French government and private companies to fulfil shortfalls in unskilled labour (Bowen, 2010: 16). This also occurred during the Great War, when they were imported to replace French factory workers called up for active duty, and to serve in the military themselves.

However, arrivals of foreign workers that came in response to “successive waves of capitalist expansion” were given work permits that tied them to regions and professions, thus they were literally prevented not only from integration, they were denied movement and development (Fysh & Wolfreys, 2003). They argue that Poles were encouraged to stay separate and organise even their Catholic devotions separately, whilst Algerians were not conferred status other than ‘subjects’ and denied virtually all rights until 1962. In Algeria (then considered part of France) or upon arrival in mainland France from the early 20th century, they were not allowed to organise politically, vote, hold meetings, edit newspapers, contest colonial authority, or move to metropolitan France without special permits. They were a new type of migrant that sat ill with the French idea of ‘elective citizen’, for they were neither citizen nor foreigner, but ‘subject’ (Fysh & Wolfreys, 2003). Tunisians and Moroccans also came during this wave, but did so without permits, as their countries were protectorates and not considered part of France, therefore they were not entitled to apply for the same permits (Scott, 2007).
Like the Italian workers who came to France at the turn of the 20th century, they faced horrendous working conditions. At least 10% of the workforce in steelworks and mines in Lorraine were of Algerian origin and a disproportionate amount of industrial accidents befell those of Maghrebian origin (Fysh & Wolfreys, 2003).

Given the nature of the work in which these men were involved, tendencies towards political organisation focused around trade union activity and communism (Fysh & Wolfreys, 2003). However, despite this ‘natural fit’, and even the fiercely assimilationist approach of the first and main organisation for this group, the Etoile Nord-Africaine (ENA), the relationship between autonomous political organisation and its would-be allies on the left has been fraught with tension and rejection of the ‘new migrant’ voice, a rejection that still impacts and is mirrored today (see below).

Key developments in the so-called settlement of North Africans in (metropolitan) France (before Algerian liberation in 1962) include the state-sponsored establishment of the Paris mosque (La Grande Mosquée) in 1926, the establishment of the first Muslim hospital in Bobigny in 1935 and the first Muslim cemetery in 1936. Additionally, the 1920s saw the establishment by some provincial cities of offices of ‘North African native affairs’, ostensibly to deal with finding work and lodgings and dealing with paperwork (Fysh & Wolfreys, 2003; Scott, 2007). Such events form the basis of various arguments by e.g. Geisser (2006) and Bowen (2010) that France is not inherently Islamophobic and that its relationship with its Muslim communities is currently in a retrograde phase that is undermining its previously more enlightened interactions with Muslim citizens.

There is clearly some justification in this argument, particularly Geisser’s assertion that a generalised view of France as exceptionally Islamophobic and driven to persecute its Muslim subjects exists in literature on France (particularly English language literature using a North American or British lens through which to view events). The risk of exceptionalising the French-Muslim/Muslim-French experience needs to be avoided and a more nuanced approach taken. Nevertheless, both the operation of structural issues and internal critiques need
incorporation. Reviewing these key institutional developments in the establishment of (a) Muslim community/ies in France raises questions over how progressive such moves are.

The ENA critiqued the establishment of the Paris Mosque as an expensive show put on for tourists from which local working class Muslims were/would mainly be excluded (Fysh & Wolfreys, 2003). The opening of the Muslim hospital happened after several rejections of such institutions in various cities and, according to Scott (2007), was the result of a deliberate policy by French authorities to keep Muslims separate, the Bobigny example being one of enforced separation in Paris. Likewise regarding cemeteries she states:

“Until 1936, when a Muslim cemetery was built, they [Muslims] were buried in paupers’ graves. In Lyon, rather than allow Muslims to remain buried with anonymous French paupers, their remains were removed in 1928. The administrator who ordered the removal declared (somewhat contradictorily, since there were no individual markings on these graves) that ‘they have been expunged from the sites of remembrance.’”

Finally, socialist contemporary Magdelaine Paz, commenting on the further role of the local ‘north African native affairs’ offices to surveil the group and expel those deemed undesirable, describes the policy as ‘spying, corruption, crude police methods, the whole lot associated with the most abominable racial prejudice …’ (Schor, 1985 cited in Fysh & Wolfreys, 2003).

On the eve of World War II there were 120,000 North Africans in France, 70,000 of whom were based in and around Paris (Fysh & Wolfreys, 2003). The interwar years saw labour migration continue with much from Algeria. The era of massive immigration, however, began after the Second World War as a result of the colossal effort to rebuild France after the devastation wrought by the war (Bowen, 2006).

Immigration from the Federation of French West Africa (AOF) saw other Muslims arrive in France (Harrison, 2003: 1) in the postcolonial era, largely after these countries had won independence.
The Algerian War of Liberation left indelible marks on state-Muslim relations, lending itself to manipulation by contemporary and current political discourses, affecting social integration and notions of citizenship and identity post-1962.

Independence from France, as espoused in Metropolitan France, rested in the interwar years with the ENA and found no allies even amongst the left, including the Communist Party. A more in-depth discussion as to the failure of the idea of French universalism, as discussed by Geisser (2006), Grosfoguel & Mielants (2006) and Murray (2006), and the role of French intellectualism in the production and promotion of Islamophobia will be presented in Chapter 3. It is important to note that this was not the sole reason for a rejection of Algerian national aspirations by the left in the inter-war years. Combined with a dubious assimilationist policy vis-à-vis equality for minorities, the left and particularly the Communist Party, with which ENA was most closely associated (they were formed with the help of CP), also sought to make broad anti-fascist alliances in the interwar period against the rise of a political right across Europe, which for France would eventually usher in the fascist Vichy era during the Second World War. Nevertheless, the demonisation of Algerian aspirations by the Communist Party echoes in left-wing demonisation and rhetoric today. Fysh & Wolfreys (2003) point to ENA leader Hadj Messali’s rapturous welcome in Algiers during the general strike of 1936 and the popularity of ENA’s programme over its contemporaries’ more cautious programmes (Islamic Oulema movement, the new Communist Party of Algeria and the Popular Front government). However, after being banned again in 1937 and reforming as the Algerian People’s Party three months later (with half a dozen or so of its leaders arrested), the Communist newspaper *L’Humanité* described those involved in the enterprise as ‘Trotskyites’ serving the interests of fascism. The accusation is all the more painful in its rancour given that Messali was imprisoned under Vichy, offered a release in exchange for his endorsement, which he refused, meaning he spent most of the war imprisoned or in exile (Stora, 1992 cited in Fysh & Wolfreys, 2003).

The original French army, defeated at the outset of the Second World War, contained huge numbers of colonial soldiers,
many of whom, like the 17,000 black mainly West Senegalese soldiers, were killed and often summarily executed by the Nazis. The freeing of Algeria from enemy control saw the entry of Algerian fighters into De Gaulle’s army, swelling its ranks from 50,000 to half a million (Thomson, 2009). Despite the crucial role played by these troops in the allied victory, they were both expunged from the historical record and mistreated in their aspirations, whether nationalist or assimilationist, post the war. The BBC, in 2009, revealed secret documents from the war records of the allies that saw France, the USA and the UK conspire to ensure that no black troops were involved in the liberation of Paris, and that it was an (almost) all white affair (Thomson, 2009).

Demonstrations in eastern Algeria for greater rights and national independence were brutally suppressed by the provisional government under De Gaulle as the war ended, at the cost of tens of thousands of lives. The Fourth Republic brought in the Algeria statute in 1947, but it was little better than its predecessor, engendering more inequality:

“[The Algerian Statute] granted the three Algerian departments 30 deputies in the National Assembly, to be chosen by two electoral colleges in which the votes of the just under 1 million pieds noirs of European origin were equal in weight to those of nearly 8 million Algerians (among whom women had no vote at all). A new Algerian assembly with virtually no independent powers was elected on the same basis. Among the absurdities engendered by this ‘reform’ were the full civic rights available to Algerians living in France – to which they were now able to move freely – would allow them to debate the affairs of the Republic on an equal footing with their fellow workers, while they were disqualified from affecting the fate of their home territory.” (Fysh & Wolfreys, 2003)

At its outset in 1954, the French response to the Algerian War of Liberation did not see universal support from the French rank and file, with notable protests from some armed forces, writers, artists and other public figures who saw the violent and
extreme response of French forces to sporadic violent attacks from armed Algerian groups as disproportionate. Nevertheless, the political spectrum, again from extreme left to the right, quickly fell behind the project to keep Algeria French through successive governments. By 1956, even the Communists put their considerable political weight behind the unlimited ‘special powers’ granted to the government to restore colonial order (Fysh & Wolfreys, 2003).

Messalist supporters, shunned again by their Communist allies, marched on Parliament in protest in 1956 only to be met by violence from police and paramilitaries, with hundreds injured and arrested and many drowned in the Seine.

Nevertheless, support for the liberation struggle amongst those in Metropolitan France was strong, with businesses and families giving weekly contributions to organisations supporting the struggle. This in itself led to internecine fighting among groups battling to gain control of these resources, a battle which cost many lives in France and Algeria, and which was eventually won by the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale). It is estimated that even after independence, in some years 80% of the financial resources for the provisional Algerian government came from the donations from Metropolitan France (Fysh & Wolfreys, 2003).

The effects on ordinary Algerians in France saw the imposition of Algerian specific night time curfews, made possible by a still unrepealed law of 1955. They also endured random arrests, beatings, interrogations and internment without trial. By the end of 1959, over 11,000 were in prison or concentration camps. Many others were deported to Algeria, where they often faced military justice. Over 44,282 were arrested during the war, affecting 1 in 10 of the Algerian community. (Fysh & Wolfreys, 2003).

Despite such treatment, organised solidarity remained strong and was met with brutal suppression. While peace negotiations were underway and armed forces marked time, a 20,000 strong protest against the Algerian-only curfew imposed in Paris (Ross, 2002) was met by violence from police and paramilitaries. Some 10,000 or more were arrested, with women and children amongst the protestors brutally attacked. Some 200 were murdered and countless others missing
assumed thrown and drowned in the Seine. Jean-Paul Satre reflected that the Jews under the occupation did not suffer such savagery from the Gestapo as the Algerians did from the Republic (Haroun 1986 and Einaudi, 1991 cited in Fysh & Wolfreys, 2003).

After independence, the situation for Algerians remaining in France was full of psychological quandaries. Anyone born before 1962 was entitled to citizenship but needed to ask for it, yet what attachment to French values could there be among the many treated in the manner above because of their ethnicity and political affiliations? Likewise, some 50,000 Algerians who fought on the side of the French (harkis) were brought to France. Shunned by the wider Algerian community as traitors, they did not find acceptance or validation either from the majority community or the government. They were housed in disused army camps and given work in forests. Their descendants face worse employment and educational prospects than any others in France (Méliani, 1993 cited in Fysh & Wolfreys, 2003).

Algerian migration continued until the global recession of 1973–74, when France suspended labour immigration, leaving close to 900,000 Algerians in France (Nielsen, 2009: 37).

Workers came from Turkey on labour agreements beginning in 1969, and settled in Paris or in eastern France; by the late 1990s there were about 350,000 people from Turkey, including Turks and Kurds, in France (Bowen, 2010: 17-18).

Additionally, Muslims from overseas French territories make up important communities. By 2005, about 193,000 Muslims with their origins in Mayotte and 70,000 with origins in the Reunion Islands lived in France (Bowen, 2010: 18).

The total number of immigrants seeking permanent residence increased from 104,400 in 1999 to 141,000 in 2001, with 50,600 more coming for short-term stays as students or with temporary work permits. By 2003, the number of foreigners living in France jumped to 3.3 million, with most from Portugal, Algeria and Morocco. Legal immigrants living in France reached about 9.8 million people, or 15% of the population, in 2005 (Bailey, 2008: 71).
There are about 4.5 million Muslims in France (Cesari, 2010: 10). In 2004–5, there were 4.9 million people living in France who had been born elsewhere (40 percent of whom had taken French nationality) (Bowen, 2010:18). Although France preferred immigrants from other European countries because they were perceived as more “culturally compatible,” in the decade from 1960 to 1970, an estimated 1 million immigrants arrived in France from the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya) region of Africa. Other immigrants in that period included those from Italy, who accounted for 32% of the immigrant population (Bailey, 2008: 71). In 2002 an estimated 76,000 Africans immigrated to France, with 18,500 arriving from sub-Saharan Africa (Bailey, 2008: 15).

According to official data, there were 1.6 million Moroccans living in Europe in 1996, with the greatest number, approximately 653,000, residing in France (Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Démographiques [CERED], 1996). The percentage of Moroccan women residing in France increased significantly from 26.7% in 1975 to 44.4% in 1990 of the total Moroccan origin population, due primarily to changes in immigration and family reunification policies (Freeman, 2005: 153). In general, Muslim populations are younger and more fertile than majority populations. Cesari (2010) suggests that this has prompted many journalists and even academics to hypothesise that these numbers will become even more significant in the future.

Although France remained a country of immigration in the 1980s and 1990s, enforcement of anti-immigration policies beginning in the late 1980s led to a steady decline in immigration to France, dropping by 40% between 1992 and 1995. In 1992 just over 110,000 foreigners legally immigrated to France and, three years later in 1995, that number had dropped to about 68,000 (Bailey, 2008: 71).

As with many European nations, France sought to control immigration as non-majority communities became more demonised by European elites seeking to scapegoat minorities for a variety of governmental failures, including economic
recession and the decline of world prestige. Draconian laws introduced by the French included the “Bonnet” law (1980), which decreed that the entry and presence of illegal immigrants in France was considered a threat to public order and that they had to be removed. This was supplanted by the “Peyrefitte” (1981) law, which allowed the police to stop anyone suspected of being an immigrant to verify his or her identity. The mobilisation of the far-right and entry into government of a far right coalition in the early 1990s saw the introduction of the “Pasqua” law (1993), which reduced the number of residence permits available to immigrants and granted the right to regional authorities to make the decision whether or not to escort illegal aliens back to the border (Bailey, 2008: 78).

A new immigration bill was passed in 2007 that would make sweeping changes to France’s existing immigration policy. Changes included making it more difficult for family members to join relatives in France by lengthening the required waiting time before immigrating from one year to 18 months, and by requiring a DNA test for children who seek to join the mother in France. Further, it required that immigrants prove they can financially support themselves and show that they are making efforts to integrate into French society, and that new immigrants take French language and cultural knowledge tests. Further the automatic right of immigrants living in France for ten years to apply for long-term residency was removed (quoted in Bailey, 2008: 79).

Refugees

Fekete (2011) outlines some of the state practices across Europe which France also uses to intimidate and brutalise asylum seekers. This includes joint exercises with other countries in chartering flights for forcible deportations to unsafe countries of origin. Further, according to Fekete, France has also been involved in the Europe-wide undermining of NGOs working to support refugees. The NGO CIMADE, which provided counselling and legal advice for foreigners inside detention centres, found its contract put out to tender by the government. The contract was then divided between several
agencies, some of which were entirely funded by the government, and then placed under an obligation to ‘be bound by the principles of neutrality and confidentiality’. Additionally, a general rights defender appointed by the Council of Ministers has been proposed to replace the National Commission on Ethics and Security and the children’s guardian, both of which have shown independence and intervened in unlawful actions against children held at airports.

Muslim countries from which many refugees hail include Bosnia, Lebanon, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, and elsewhere (Bowen, 2010: 18).

Whilst some of the restrictive policies regarding immigration and asylum form part of the clandestine crackdown on this issue, other measures taken by the government form part of a Europe wide pattern of ensuring that the state shows itself to be taking significant and often violent action in tackling refugees. In a show of power and humiliation of refugees, the deportation of a single Angolan family by charter flight was accompanied by helicopters flying over Lyon airport to ensure the deportation went ahead (Fekete, 2004).

Housing, Unemployment and the Marginalisation Debate

Whilst many authors and commentators seek to make association between housing and Muslim identity issues (e.g. Bowen, 2010: 19), particularly in the wake of the 2005 riots, such confluences are arguably simplistic and feed off and into many prejudices including the demonisation of the 2005 Paris rioters as solely ethnic and/or Muslim. As Murray (2006) has argued, the rioters were of different communities, not all of particular ethnic origin, and their frustrations were a combination of issues that included racial prejudice sparked by racialised policing, but also the types of social marginalisation that both their situation in banlieus engenders and the societal issues that historically and contemporaneously placed them in such banlieus.

About 18% of all people in France live in habitation à loyer modéré (HLMs), but 50% of North African immigrants, 37% of
other African immigrants, and 36% of Turkish immigrants live in these projects (Bowen, 2010).

Bowen (2010) and other works argue that social housing policy has served to counteract ethnic segregation. This feeds into the myths regarding the high concentration of non-white French communities in banlieus, and overlooks the trajectory of settlement and in some cases forced settlement. Some have argued (OSI, 2010) that the location of many immigrants in such housing was part of the French government policy to tie newcomers to specific locations and professions as discussed above (Fysh & Wolfreys, 2003). OSI (2010), based on its research in Marseilles, argues that the 1980s French policy of social mixing, which is understood to stop or tackle the issue of so-called self-segregation by ethnic communities, has been used in Marseille, at least, to stop ethnic families moving into less segregated areas (2010:303).

Whilst people in the outer cities generally have high unemployment rates, the official numbers understate the realities faced by youth in the projects. A town may have a 20% unemployment rate, twice the national average, but for younger residents the rate may be 30%, and for those who left school and throng the projects the rate may be 50 or 60 percent (Bowen, 2010: 19). Again such work ties the idea of Muslim negative experience to social class and social issues, so being working class and living in the projects impacts on levels of marginalisation. Again, as Murray (2006) argues, this masks serious issues of racial and religious prejudice at the state and elite levels. IHRC (2006) argues that:

“Local authorities rarely dare to challenge attitudes to minority ethnic communities, but the objective of greater social intermingling can only be attained through a firm political commitment to confront discrimination head on. Such policies will be unpopular. Political parties are reluctant to promote them.”

A 2005 report on employment concludes that having a North African background makes you two and a half times more likely to be unemployed than if you are (or, more importantly, if you look and sound) “native French,” and that
this situation has changed little in fifteen years (Bowen, 2010: 20). Adida et al. (2002), in their study *Les Français musulmans sont-ils discriminés dans leur propre pays? Une étude expérimentale sur le marché du travail*, tried to bring to light considerable discrimination against Muslims in finding a job in France. Testing on a CV reveals that they are 2.5 times less likely to get a job interview than their non-Muslim counterparts. Their survey also shows that Muslims have an income 400 Euros lower than their non-Muslim counterparts each month. This difference in income is partly due to the employment discrimination experienced by Muslims.

In his reflection on international reactions to the 2005 riots, Murray (2006) states:

“Many Francophiles (and Francophobes for that matter) have expressed consternation and shock that the birthplace of la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme (the universal declaration of the rights of man) has become the setting of a rebellion…”

Chapter 3 will overview the impact of the *longue durée* and recent events on human rights for Muslims in France, looking particularly at the existence and impact of discursive racism from policy and media representation, to individual events and attacks on the ground.
Chapter 3

Discursive Racism as Human Rights Violations
“My first encounter with French racism came in 1967...

“Day after day... I witnessed classic expressions of racism. An Arab man would come in to declare the birth of a son. As was... customary, the office workers would shake his hand, usually twice... as soon as the man left, the comments would begin. The person who had shaken the Arab’s hand would rush to wash his own, making a fuss about how dirty “those people” were. The office staff would ridicule the name of the child..., and they’d recount horror stories about the dysfunctional lives of these infidels.”

Scott (2007) sets the scene for a type of racism that targets Arabs from her days in France in the late 1960s working in a public records office. As an American, she found herself drawn into confrontation over these attitudes as riots broke out across the USA, and her ‘hosts wanted to know how it was that such terrible racism existed in where I came from. In France, they told me, no such prejudice existed; no such riots would ever occur.’ On protesting this claim based on her observations, she was confronted as follows:

“... our attitudes are not racist, they are based in fact. These people are animals, they are not Christians; your blacks are Christian. The Arabs don’t live in real houses but in huts, in holes in the ground; they’re uncivilized, uneducated, unclean. Listen to their music; watch how they dance; they have a natural [or was it unnatural?] rhythm all their own. Your blacks were once slaves, these Arabs have no excuse. This is just how they are; this is the way the Koran teaches them to be.”

This long reference is cited at the outset of this chapter to throw up some of the key issues around racism, Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hatred and human rights abuses in France. The conflation of race and religion, the discourse of indigène, the operation of prejudice in official institutions, and the operation of inherent prejudice within French dominant
culture are all issues discussed and contested by various authors trying to find meaning to the plethora of racist incidents, but also policies that have operated in the current era in France against Muslims.

The foregoing chapters have set a context for the environment in which existing law to tackle hate motivated offences (see Appendix A) operate. Such laws allow hateful motivation to be added as an aggravating factor in the consideration of various crimes. However, the law does not operate in a vacuum, and structural issues of demonisation, Islamophobia and racism, coupled with the operation of an anti-Muslim narrative within a French state conceptualisation of the good, lead to the failure of such laws in adequately tackling the negative experiences of Muslims.

To tackle these issues, the authors will contend later that an understanding of human rights theories regarding minorities that allows difference and promotes and protects the collective expression of difference (Ameli et al, 2006b) are essential to any systematic project to tackle social issues relating to minority integration and experience. Cesari (2010) states that in 2001, the Constitutional Council accepted that sometimes differences must be recognised in the pursuit of true equality, but an overview of law and policy since then vis-à-vis Muslims and religion highlights that this is not the case. Religion and the French state’s attempt to implement what it argues to be neutrality through the doctrine of secularism is in fact the signifier of inferiority in a legal and social culture whose ideological undercurrent laïcité, is a militant ideology reflecting not secularism but a depoliticised Christian identity tied to a particular idea of ‘Frenchness’.

Much, if not most, literature looking at ‘minorities’, particularly Muslims, in France overlooks the situatedness of Christian or Judeo-Christian identity within the French idea of ‘neutrality’, ‘laïcité’, or so-called republican values. As Bowen argues (2010: 15–16), that the presence of Muslims and their practice of faith or visible difference, as permanent residents and citizens of France, conflicts with an idea within larger French society that religion is on its way out of society. Nevertheless, Bowen inadvertently concedes the nature of that French identity as:
“French men and women who were either more or less Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish, or who had thought that religion was on its way out of public life altogether.”

Like other authors, Bowen sees the specificity of French Muslim experiences of discrimination as related to their practice of Islam (without which one supposes he avers that assimilated Muslims face no inequality). Cesari, though advocating the compatibility of Islam in a European and French setting, also avers to the idea of Islamic practice as visible and in conflict with a public space devoid of religion and religious identity:

“Rancor toward Islam runs yet higher because its arrival inflames old passions that have long simmered beneath the surface of “laïcité” (Cesari, 2002: 37).

Monshipouri (2010: 47) is another author who implies a secularised Muslim is somehow at one and peace within France. While criticising the ban on hijab in schools, Monshipouri reads the message from the French elite as sending a message to ‘Muslim citizens and immigrants that they are welcome in society only as long as they set their differences – clothing, identity, and beliefs – aside.’

However, as Keaton (2006:10) argues regarding the centrality of French “national identity” and nationality (arguing they are the products rather than the underpinnings of the revolution), he sees them as not only the basis of the forging of the nation-state, but relevant throughout colonialism to the period of economic euphoria known as the *trente glorieuses* (thirty glorious [years], 1945–1974) to the present. As such, they impact on ‘complex issues and problems, such as immigration, social exclusion, and racism’. Delanty’s description, however, without stating the problem as such, highlights the central problematicque from which critique emanates, i.e.:

“In France this comes from the republican ideology that there is only one political identity: the republican values of the constitution, which are guaranteed by
the absolute neutrality of the state with respect to culture and all forms of ethnicity, be they those of the dominant groups in society or those of recent immigrants” (Delanty, 2009: 73).

IHRC has previously argued (2006) with reference to the otherisation of rioters in 2005 that the processes of inferiorisation and delegitimisation of identity faced by ethnic minorities mirrors that of French nations at the start of the French republican project:

“The policies engendered by the French republican model have been excluding and marginalizing indigenous minority and stateless nations within the French territories since 1794. Then only 15% of what is today’s French territory spoke French, the rest speaking Breton, Occitan, Corsican, Alsatian, Catalan, Basque and Flemish.

“The disaffected youth are experiencing what the Bretons, Corsicans and Basques have known all along, either renounce your language and culture and assimilate – or face exclusion and marginalization.”

Although the nature and extent of fallout over the limits of Republican values to an emancipatory project are important, they must not obfuscate both the operation of the “European/Euro-American Christian-Centric Capitalist/ Patriarchal World-System” (Grosfoguel & Mielants, 2006) or the specificity of French experiences of and the operation of anti-Muslim discourses, whether as a critique of the degeneration of republican values as an intellectual (not structural) discourse (Geisser, 2006), or as institutionalised racism in the sense made understood in the post-Lawrence era in the UK (Murray, 2006).

What follows here is an overview of existing literature on hate attacks and a discussion of these tie in with a more generalised idea of discursive racism as ongoing violations of the rights of minorities.
Discrimination and Hate

Keaton (2006:8) argues that anti-racist groups, both statist and independent of the state, continue to show that racialised discrimination manifests itself in the most basic social structures, including employment, housing, education, social services, the criminal justice system, and relations with the police.

Nationality statistics are unavailable for France, being justified by the state as a necessary measure to protect the identity of France as a nation of French. Minority Rights Group (2011) succinctly identifies the challenges France’s persistence in maintaining this position at every level poses from a human rights perspective:

“The country is only one of four of the 46 members of the Council of Europe not to have signed its Minorities’ Convention (FCNM) and neither has it ratified the Charter on Minority and Regional Languages... It has declared a complete reservation to the United Nations (UN) article on the rights of minorities, saying in effect that there are no minorities in France. With regard to rights of minorities, France continues to have one of the weakest records in Europe.”

Existing statistics reveal that immigrants had a 22% unemployment rate, compared to 13% for the country as a whole. Immigrant unemployment rates tend to be at least twice that of native-born workers (Cesari, 2010). However, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data show that individuals with ancestry from majority Muslim countries have substantially lower educational success (Cesari, 2010). Therefore, 56% of those with ancestry in majority Muslim countries have secondary education or less, compared to 46% in the broader population (Cesari, 2010).
The fact that a thing is not racially named does not mean it is not racialized. The twist in the French context, compared to the United States, is that it is much more difficult to prove racialized discrimination within the population identified officially as “French,” because their ethnic origins are not documented (Keaton, 2006: 8). To be a demonized Muslim of non-European origins and aver that one is French is to transcend the narrow representation of the “authoritative other” while consciously or unconsciously appropriating the categories of dominance and distinction that command recognition within French society. The equation of “Muslim of non-European origins” with “French” also defies the simplicity of these categories, and therein lies the complication (Keaton, 2006: 15).

Other aspects of the discriminatory experience as societal, using Ameli et al (2004b) idea of social discrimination, have been averred to in Chapter 2, and will also be developed through the lens of law and structure as indelibly linked to discourse later in this chapter.

On the ground, organisations like the Committee Against Islamophobia (Le Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en France, CCiF, 2011) make a clear link between the rise in Islamophobic discourse and attacks on individuals and institutions:

“CCiF notes that Islamophobic incidents in France since 2003 have undergone peaks and troughs. Their findings stipulate that acts against institutions and individuals correlated with the social and political policy of the government. In 2004 for example, in the months preceding the passage of the law prohibiting religious signs in school there was a peak in Islamophobic incidences. The years 2005 and 2006 were marked by a regression in Islamophobic acts however a reflux was noticeable after the riots in Clichy. The turning point seems to be the case of ‘The baggage handlers at Roissy’6 which was swiftly followed by the penalising of a Muslim inmate at the Villejuif for wearing a djellaba. As 2006 turned to 2007 cruder forms of Islamophobia became apparent in French society with attacks upon Muslims by neo Nazis and the graves of Muslim WWII soldiers being desecrated, Islamophobia has now very much
infiltrated the public realm and can be visibly seen to have penetrated French social spaces such as shopping malls and other recreational spaces.”

**Islamophobic Hate Attacks Against Institutions**

**Mosques, Mosque Building Controversies and Street Prayers**

The Mosque plays a major role in Islamic culture. It is multifunctional. Two of its most important functions are symbolisation and creating sense of community or brotherhood. However, recent decades have witnessed controversies against building mosques in France, attacks on mosques and attacks on street prayers by local authorities.

For example, some groups began developing projects to construct “cathedral mosques” – usually meaning a large building with a minaret – in Lyon and Marseille. These demands were not always welcomed by other French residents.

In late summer 1987, one mayor even bulldozed buildings used by Muslims for prayer. Others were offended by the sight of Muslims praying in the street on feast days when the available buildings did not suffice (Bowen, 2010: 22).

When a large mosque was to be built in Lyon, a compromise was reached after a decade of legal wrangling between the Muslims building the mosque and the city limiting the height of the mosque’s minarets and banning the muezzin’s amplified call to prayer (Shweder et al, 2004).

As of 2002, only five such mosques stood – those in Paris, Mantes-la-Jolie, Evry, Lille and Lyon – for more than four million Muslims, because efforts to build additional structures had aroused such fierce resistance. Petitions for construction were routinely ignored or refused by town mayors. In 1989, in Charvieu-Chavagneux, the municipality knocked down a building without consideration for the Muslim prayer room located within; in 1990, in Libercourt, the mayor called for a local referendum on the construction of a mosque in clear violation of French law, which forbids local votes on religious matters (Cesari, 2002: 40).
On a local level, a municipality can refuse by majority vote the needed permission to create a prayer hall or build a mosque, for the sake of ‘public order’. (Waardenburg, 2003: 320). This discursive denunciation of places of worship for Muslims is an encouragement to vandalism. On 17 June 2004 the walls of Escaudain’s mosque were covered in racist graffiti and suffered three gunshots. The letters GUD (which refer to a far-right student group) were found in the graffiti. Ten people were taken in for questioning following the attack, which was linked to other attacks in the region against Lens’s mosque and the synagogue in Valenciennes. On 26 June in the same year, racist graffiti was daubed on the front of the Nanterre mosque. Slogans read ‘Leave in the same way as we left Algeria’. The attack came after a meeting in the city of local Muslim representatives, the department’s prefect and Nicolas Sarkozy to discuss ways of combating Islamist activity and community breakdown (Fekete, 2004).

On 20 July 2004, Cronenbourg mosque, centre of worship for Strasbourg’s Turkish community, was targeted with racist graffiti, swastikas and the letters SS (Fekete, 2004). On 22 August, the chairman of the Regional Council of the Muslim Faith in Alsace, Albdelhaq Nabaoui, was the target of a death threat (the second in two months). Graffiti, including a large swastika, were drawn on his wife’s medical practice on the outskirts of Strasbourg. On 9 September, racist graffiti daubed on a mosque in Besancon, close to Strasbourg with the words ‘We’d rather die than lose our identity’ and ‘Get out’ (Fekete, 2004).

In the early hours of 5 March 2004, two Muslim places of worship were attacked in Annecy (Haute-Savoie). The first fire was in a Muslim prayer room at Seynod belonging to Kaplanci, a Turkish movement. It was completely burnt down – the pulpit and books destroyed. The second fire was started in a mosque on the Rue des Alpins in Annecy and damage was limited to a boiler room. This mosque belonged to the Federation of Paris Mosques. The president of the regional council of the Muslim Faith in Rhone-Alpes was concerned that on the eve of the
elections, such acts of provocation would set communities against one another. On 6 March, hundreds of Muslims gathered for a silent demonstration in front of the mosque on the Rue des Alpins. The head of the regional Muslim council, Kamel Kabtane, was disappointed that no leading political figure attended (Fekete, 2004).

In November 2007, the mosque of Villeneuve-sur-Lot was attacked and daubed with racist tags. Graffiti espousing racist Nazi ideology and Islamophobia were found on the walls of the mosque and, according to officials with the police and prosecutors of Agen, its front door was the victim of attempted arson. The facts were discovered at 7:30pm by a staff member of the mosque. The inscriptions “Islam out of Europe”, a swastika and the number 88, referring to the eighth letter of the alphabet for “Heil Hitler” were found painted on the walls in black. A wooden pallet was also on fire against the front door but did not cause more than some minor damage (Le Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en France (CCiF), 2011b).

In the latest of one of the more recent attacks, on the morning of Sunday 18 December 2011, offensive inscriptions were discovered on the wall of the mosque in Pau (Béarn) and on Tuesday 20 December, while the faithful went to the mosque in Décines (Rhône) for morning prayer, they discovered that Nazi markings were painted on the front of the place of worship (Le Collectif Contre l’Islamophobie en France (CCiF), 2011a).

The targeting of mosques is not new. On 17 March 1977, a bomb exploded in front of a mosque. No one has claimed responsibility for the attack. According to a preacher, the police, long seeking a pretext to search the mosque, arrived quickly after the attack and stayed for hours. The police investigation continues (Cesari, 2002: 48). Though Fysh & Wolfreys (2003) set this attack in the context of far-right violence against Muslims in the late 1970s, CCiF’s report for 2010 (2011) states that:

“22 mosques were targeted, including eight who suffered serious damage (such as fire, etc.). 11 of them were covered in hostile and insulting messages (such as
“Islam out of France”). Finally, the last 3 have been soiled by urine and/or pig heads.”

Further they state:

“CCiF has recorded 36 Islamophobic acts [against institutions] in total in 2010, which is up 71% from 2009. In 2010 three cemeteries have been desecrated, 26 mosques have been damaged 8 of which suffered severe physical damage whilst 11 of them were tagged with messages like “Islam out of France”. Three were soiled by urine and/or pigs heads. Opposition to mosque projects supported by political parties and associations develops through blocking building permits by local authorities to raising rent costs. Mosques, the central institutions of the Muslim faith, are main targets.”

Cemeteries

On 13 June 2004, vandals painted neo-Nazi symbols on Muslim gravestones in a night-time attack on a Strasbourg cemetery. According to an official of the Regional council of the Muslim Faith the stones had been toppled or covered in graffiti with “HH”, “88” and swastikas. On 6 August 2004, Chirac condemned the desecration of about 15 headstones in the Muslim servicemen’s military cemetery in Cronenbourg. (Fekete, 2004)

Also, a report by the BBC in 2008 shows in April 2007, Nazi slogans and swastikas were painted on about 50 graves in the Muslim section of the cemetery. Two men were sentenced to a year in prison for that act. The same report also mentions that vandals also desecrated 148 Muslim graves in France’s biggest WWI cemetery. A pig’s head was hung from one headstone and slogans insulting Islam and France’s Muslim justice minister were daubed on other graves.
CCiF highlights the tragedy of such attacks: ‘Many tombs of former Muslim soldiers have been desecrated in 2010, signifying a deep rejection of Muslims, even those who fought the Nazi occupation.’

A summary of CCiF’s findings for 2010 is appended as Appendix B.

**Discursive Racsim as Ongoing Human Rights Violations**

Working with this kind of human rights violation is perhaps one of the hardest –if not the most hard–fields in human rights studies. Though it seems that discursive human rights violation has little to do with general trends and every day well being of minorities, history has shown that no massacre could have been possible without discursive justification (Ameli et al, 2007).

Ideas surfacing in the public debate now have called for the deportation of second generation Moroccans, a ban on gender-segregated mosques and even the prohibition of Islam itself (Cesari, 2009). Today’s totalising discourse on Islam as an essentially antimodern, fundamentalist, illiberal, and undemocratic religion is something familiar in France (Banchoff, 2007).

Cesari (2010) makes a direct link between perception of the dominant community and Muslim experience of violence:

“‘The widespread misconception of Islam has its own particular version in France, where fears of a growing Muslim visibility have, since the 1980s, unleashed French passions, especially in the form of racist murders in suburban housing projects.” (Cesari, 2002: 36).

**Intellectuals and Islamophobia**

Roy (2007:5) sees pan-European trends and also agrees that Christian identity, or the idea of Christian heritage, is key in the reshaping of the French political and intellectual landscape, citing the influence of present day writers and intellectuals in
posing the idea of inevitable clash whether Muslims, or indeed ‘Islam’, are secularised or not e.g. Oriana Fallaci, Alain Besançon, Alexandre Del Valle. Studies of European perceptions of non-European societies highlight the Eurocentric and innately racist nature of these perceptions (Harrison, 2003: 3).

Murray (2006) and Geisser (2006) highlight the role of intellectuals in raising the anti-Islamic temperature. Murray (2006) cites the development of the neoreacs, a French equivalent of the neoconservatives in the US, who have impacted heavily on this debate. This group of philosophers, Murray argues, is in many ways more powerful than their equivalents in other society given the prominence of philosophers and intellectuals in the media in France.

Islamophobia and Literature

An anti-Muslim literary genre has become more popular over the last few years. Titles include Les islamistessont déjà là: Enquêtes sur une guerre secrète, La France malade de l’islamisme: Menaces terroristes sur l’Hexagone, La tentation du Jihad: Islam radical en France, and Sentinelle: Contagion islamiste en Europe, le vaccin (Cesari, 2010: 23). Amiraux (cited in IHRC, 2008) also avers to the rise of a literary genre that focuses on female survivors of violence and tragedy from Muslim communities who renounce their community and religion. Whilst not devaluing the experiences of these individuals, Amiraux argues that such works create a further hostile climate and demonise Muslims and Muslim women in particular.

The law on the veil and the deportation of imams were accompanied by hundreds of editorials and op-ed pieces in the press and a significant number of best-selling books in which the denunciation of fundamentalism soon shifted into a systematic attack on Muslims and Islam in general (Roy, 2007: 1).

The publication of the Danish cartoons in France also became a critical issue in the demonisation of Muslims in France (Allen, 2010).
Citizenship, Islam and ‘Assimilation’

Within the European context, France is most often put forward as exemplary for assimilationist policy (Meuleman & Reeskens, 2008).

Unfortunately, as seen earlier, there was no serious difference between right and left parties regarding migrants and Muslims. The Socialists stressed that a successful integration policy for immigrants already living in France depended on strict control of entries and they speeded up the deportation of ‘illegals’. Immigration thus moved to the centre of the political agenda (Cook and Davie, 1999) and many laws were passed against them.

On 23 October 2007, the French Parliament went further by passing an immigration bill that sanctioned DNA testing, allowed for government collection of ethnic statistics, and required applicants to pass exams on the French language and French values. Although the French Constitutional Court overturned the provision allowing for ethnic statistic collecting, it upheld the other facets of the law (Cesari, 2010: 11).

Although France began officially regulating immigration in the late 1800s, as discussed above, the French government does not recognise ethnic minority status and does not keep track of the ethnic origin of its residents. Rather, France offers just two classifications for residents, national and foreigner (étranger, a person born abroad without French nationality) (Bailey, 2008: 69).

Nevertheless, as the examples regarding the poor banlieus above, evidences, as well as much of the focus of public discourse, the issue of immigration is regularly intertwined with the idea of Muslims, regardless of whether they are French, French born, citizens or residents, in total disregard even of the official classifications of national and foreigner. This is compounded by much literature replicating this discourse as examples in this report have evidenced.
Education

CCiF (2011) reports that more than half of all individual attacks took place at a place of education. Schools have been a site of contestation and confrontation for several decades with various hijab affairs dating from 1989 culminating in the ban on religious symbols in schools in 2004 (IHRC, 2008). CCiF (ibid) extrapolates from this that:

“... these manifestations of Islamophobia against individuals is that it affects all areas of social life. The data represents trends which are not always stated openly. Discrimination against Muslims in education has evolved to Islamophobia which in turn has seeped in to other areas.”

The details of the hijab bans will be discussed below. Another area of confrontation, however, is the 2005 law to have French colonial history taught in a positive light (Scott, 2007). Murray (2006) cites intellectual Alain Finkielkraut from a Haaretz article. In a series of comments he later denied in part, Finkielkraut was quoted by the paper as saying: “Now they teach colonial history as an exclusively negative history.” Such views, argues Murray, are quite commonplace and expressed at that time frequently, with the ‘Law of 23 February 2005’ stipulating that: ‘school syllabuses recognise in particular, the positive role of the French presence overseas, notably in North Africa’. The law was voted for again just one month after the riots.

Finally, the idea of private Muslim education, in line with existing such provisions for Christian and Jewish communities has also been dismissed out of hand by the state and exemplifies again not only specific unequal practice at the policy level against Muslims, but also the privileging of Christian and Jewish communities within the ideals of the republic. In such an ideological and institutional climate, it has been impossible for Muslims to put on the policy agenda such things as support for separate Islamic schools or state aid for Muslim social service organisations. Muslims have tried to press for state aid to create Islamic schools under the same conditions that govern aid to Roman Catholic schools. In the 2002 presidential election, the
Forum Citoyen Cultures Musulmanes, a coalition of French Muslim organisations, presented a policy platform which included a proposal for state funding of private Islamic schools. Advocates of a strict version of laïcité dismissed this recommendation out of hand (Nielsen, 2009: 42). Figures vary, but according to Hiksey (2009) only two of the 8,000 state funded faith schools in France are Muslim.

Securitisation

1995 Bombings

In 1995, a group consisting of some Muslims youths conducted a series of explosions in France. In the summer of 1995, Keaton found that France’s Muslim population was collectively held responsible for the actions of a few. While many Muslim groups and individuals denounced these bombings, they also feared the hatred that these acts would unleash in a country where Muslims were already on such tenuous ground (Keaton, 2006: 19). The French state used these incidents to crackdown on immigration and hype up the ‘debate’ on republican values (Murray, 2006).

Police

Algerians had already been discriminated against and victimised by the authorities since the beginning of the Algerian war in 1954. The Algerian and Tunisian governments’ hunt for ‘Islamists’ in the 1990s has also had negative consequences for Algerians and Tunisians living in France (Waardenburg, 2003: 320).

In France, the 2001 Law on Everyday Security expanded police powers by permitting officials to stop vehicles, search unoccupied premises, and monitor or record electronic transactions without notice as part of anti-terrorism investigations (Cesari, 2010: 21).

In addition to many of France’s expanded police powers, the
laws permit the banning of religious groups that are claimed to “threaten democratic order”, unrestricted police access to financial records, electronic and postal communications, and most forms of transportation records, and the use of a previously controversial data-mining search method called the “gridsearch” (Cesari, 2010: 21).

Murray (2006) compares current experiences of young Arabs and blacks as similar to that of young black men in the 1980s in the UK suffering under the ‘sus (Stop and Search) laws’. In France, the use of identity checks as a means of targeting these groups creates just such tension. Murray cites evidence that verbal communication by police with these youths often uses the form ‘tu’ rather than the respectful ‘vous’, adding that when the organisation Devoirs de Mémoire spoke of the police-community relations in the wake of the riots, they averred to the common practice of police officers to call members of Arab communities ‘wog’ and imitate monkey cries.

Deaths in custody have also become a burning social issue, with Amnesty International heavily criticising the French police for five deaths in custody in 2011. January 2012 saw two more men die in separate unrelated incidents. Officers under investigation in both cases continue on duty at the time of writing. A human rights lawyer highlighted the ‘war measures’ employed by police, saturating the Guathiere housing estate in central France where youth torched cars in protest at the death of the first of these men, 30 year old Wissa El Yamni. 700 police were deployed in the operation.

2005 Riots and anti-Immigrationism

On 16 November 2006, the French parliament, dominated by Nicolas Sarkozy’s right-wing UMP party, approved a three-month extension of the state of emergency, which was to end on 21 February 2006 (Duthel, 2008). Murray (2006) argues that the riots were exploited by the political classes as a means to control ethnic minorities, by disregarding the social and economic issues (and the participation of French youths of European origin in the riots) and focusing on immigration, and cultural difference.

In highlighting the blurring of boundaries that exist
between immigration and security and their incorporation of Muslims and Islam, Sarkozy quite openly referred to Islam in his rhetorical justifications, arguing that any new migrants to France must be willing to accept the publication of religious cartoons in newspapers and for women to have identity photographs taken without wearing the hijab or niqab, two direct references to Muslims and Islam (Allen, 2010).

As Interior Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie said on 6 July 2007, echoing her predecessors, her ministry was committed ‘to build and control a French Islam (de construire et de maîtriser un islam français)’ (Bowen, 2010: 27).

The immigration debates focused on ‘security, control, and repression.’ Measures taken strengthened sanctions against ‘border trespassers and channels of illegal immigration’ and abolished residence permits for European Union citizens. In the aftermath of the Paris riots in 2005, tightened immigration controls were introduced, including the requirement that immigrants requesting 10 year residency permits or citizenship must master the French language and prove they have integrated into French society by signing a ‘welcome and integration’ contract, taking courses in French civics, and complying with and respecting the principles of the French Republic (Bailey, 2008: 79).

A report of the DGRG (Direction Générale des Renseignements Généraux) advised the issue of conversion to ‘radical Islam’ and the role of ‘extremist recruitment’ in prisons. Then Minister of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy recommended monitoring places of worship, while respecting religious freedom, monitoring activities in prisons, checking associations used as cover for radical or terrorist activities, fighting against incitement to hatred, violence and discrimination (in particular on the Internet), and deporting ‘radical’ Imams who hail from third countries. Despite stating that French Muslims should not feel alienated or humiliated and asking for an enhanced dialogue (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2005: 37), Sarkozy nevertheless made official the entirely separate security and legal regime for Muslims, which in effect was already in place.

54 France and the Hated Society: Muslim Experiences
The appearance of three schoolgirls in headscarves in September 1989 revved up collective anxiety. The girls’ actions symbolised something new: publicly claiming an identity as a Muslim in the “temple of the Republic,” the school (Bowen, 2010: 23). Bowen refers to this incident as if they were the only girls to practice wearing hijab at school in France, however the case came to light not because the girls were unique, but because their supporters were able to bring their suspension from school by their headteacher to public (including international) attention. The suspension was overturned and the girls returned to class, but the controversy continued. Teachers in a school in Nantua went on strike in 1993 to protest against students wearing Islamic headscarves in class.

After a hyping up of anti-Muslim rhetoric over hijab in 2003, the Stasi Commission was set up to investigate the banning of religious symbols in schools. No hijab-wearing woman was called to give evidence at the commission and the two Muslims called were openly aggressive to the concept and religion. The law was enacted on 15 March 2004 and immediately impacted hundreds of girls who wore hijab in schools across France (IHRC, 2008).

In 2006, the debate not only raged on, but also reached beyond the headscarf to include the Islamic face veil and the burqa, a type of garment worn by some Muslim women that covers their entire body and face except their eyes (Bailey, 2008: 19). One of the most striking aspects of the recent upsurge in debate surrounding the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in European contexts is the general feeling that everybody has something to say about it and feels concerned by it. Talking about the headscarf, having something to say about it and even taking a position (for or against) have become an obligation for every EU citizen (Amiraux, 2007: 126). Ameli et al (2004b) highlight the operation of this in the Shabina Begum jilbab controversy in the UK, where celebrities, apologetic Muslims and irate readers raged about her choice to wear a long coat to school based on her religious beliefs.

2003–04 saw similar events in France, with a group of celebrity high profile women submitting letters for publication
in the mainstream media decrying the so-called subordination of women by wearing the hijab (IHRC, 2008).

The European discussions on the right to wear an Islamic headscarf generally focus on abstract principles with the exclusion of central questions like children’s rights (Amiraux, 2007: 127-128). IHRC has identified in its 2008 report to CEDAW the various violations of women’s rights, human rights and child rights that the law poses. However, the public debate in France does not acknowledge these violations as existing and rather posits the law as the enforcer of rights.

Media

The representation industry plays a major role in promulgating demonic representation of Muslims and their beliefs. In the absence of a necessary conversation about the systemic causes of urban violence (Keaton, 2006), marginalisation, racism and the deeply problematic conceptualisation of republican values (Murray, 2006); a politicised rhetoric represents an imaginary demon of immigration, violence, ethnicity and Muslimness, all posited as the threat to France’s coveted ‘national identity’.

Murray (2006) blames the media not just for its systemic problems, but for an unaccountable and unrestrained project of demonisation:

“… television news reports of horrific massacres in Algeria, allegedly carried out by Islamic extremists, have been ‘coincidentally’ run before or after reports about the ‘hijab’ problem in France and sensationalist documentaries about les Islamistes are the regular fodder of French TV viewers.”

Ameli et al (2007) argue that this type of representation is often the only source of information that members of the dominant community have about minorities. Without a commitment of the mainstream media, particularly newsmedia, to provide alternative and positive images, minorities are not
only otherised, they are subject to representational violence and therefore made vulnerable to actual violence. This argument will be developed in Chapter 4 using the new theoretical model of Domination Hate Model of Intercultural Relations (Ameli, 2011).

There is no lack of complex, and sophisticated imagery that can be used by news and media producers. A case in point is the protest against the hijab and niqab bans. In some of the demonstrations against the hijab ban in France, headscarf-wearing protesters draped in the French flag, marching down the streets and singing the Marseillaise (the French national anthem once claimed by the extreme right), defiantly manifest the contested image inscribed on their signs: Françaises, Musulmanes (French women, Muslim women) (Keaton, 2006: 16) and “The veil: my choice” and “Beloved France, where is my liberty?” (Nagel, 2005: 1). Similar arguments have been set forth by wearers of the face veil. However taking Kramerae’s (1988) and Ameli et al’s (2007) use of muted group theory vis a vis minority relations with the media, it can be seen in this case that even though minorities are invoking and using the language of the republic (dominant community), the dominant community (here represented by the mainstream media) chooses not to hear them.

Houria Bouteldja (2012) summarises her experiences of filmic representation of Muslim/Arab otherness thus:

“A TV movie: Pierre and Djemila. He, handsome, loving, attentive. White. She, beautiful, in love, terrorized by her family. Arab. This film was intended for me, the daughter of an immigrant. It spoke to me. It told me how much my family was detestable and how much French society respected me. A film that turned me away from my people and made me forget that my father – male, of course – was also an Algerian worker (zoufri), an exploited person who worked hard so that we could survive, and that my mother was an immigrant’s wife who worked hard to raise us. The film explained to me, their daughter, that they treated me badly and that there was only one way out: I had to get away from them.”
The propagandistic elements of media representation serve to fuel internalised racism within minority communities, causing social problems such as internecine violence, high levels of community dysfunction, including mental health issues, and lack of self-worth and apathy to tackle the problems facing the individual and community/ies (Merali, 2011), as well as the creation of apologetic, authority friendly groups and leaders, which the government invariably prefers to deal with.

However, such scenarios are not permanent and the recognition of such structuralised oppression utilised by governments and institutions to control groups, is the first step in creating a liberatory movement. With organisations like CCiF, Comité 15 mars et Libertés and Parti des Indigenes de Republique tackling head on the issues of discrimination and hatred by recognising their systemic nature, the tide has started to turn in this war of who controls the narrative of Muslim experience and whose history is being privileged in the discourse of French society.
Chapter 4

Theory and Research Method
Here the Domination Hate Model of Intercultural Relations (DHMIR) (Ameli et al, 2011) has been adopted as the theoretical framework. Ameli et al (2011) compare older models of intercultural communication and after assessing their strong points and weak points, they propose DHMIR as one extensive – but of course not exhaustive – model for studying sensitivity in the context of intercultural relations.

DHMIR brings together mega factors effective in how intercultural perceptions take shape and discusses in detail how abstract entities like politics, representation, media and hate could have terrible consequences in everyday lives of minorities in developed destination societies. DHMIR poses that hate is something that has been harnessed by modern bodies of governance and is produced consciously to generate negative reactions from the hating society on the hated society. The outcome is predictable: discrimination, double discrimination and hate crime.

The Oxford Concise Dictionary defines the term hatred as ‘intense dislike; hate’. This term seems to be something obvious and easy to grasp but, in a highly complicated world, even the most subtle feelings of human beings enter a maze of mechanisms that the exact outcomes can hardly be imagined. The very psychological nature of hatred makes it prone to being manipulated through mind conditioning apparatuses, not least the media. The political economy approach to media criticism tells us that media objectivity is merely an illusion. The ‘field’ of media ownership suggests that there has been an increasing trend towards media concentration and conglomerate. As the world enters the information age, ideologies need more control over global media in order to subjugate publics. Political sciences have shown us that all ideologies need a strict policy of otherisation if they are to survive. Therefore, ideologies constantly and restlessly generate self-fuelling hate.

It is very hard to eliminate the hatred that is produced by ideology: hatred generates violence and ideological hatred generates unlimited violence. It can kill all of humanity without suffering any feelings of remorse or repentance (Khan, 2002: 201). So if hatred is institutionalised, this reveals a material manifestation. Hate crimes will be the outcome of hate ideology and DHMIR manages to show how the link between ideology and hatred culminates in a chain of endless hate crimes.

Herek (1989) defines hate crimes as criminal acts perpetrated
against individuals or members of specific stigmatised groups, which express condemnation, hate, disapproval, dislike, or distrust for that group (quoted in Rayburn et al, 2003: 1209). This is where DHMIR finishes theorisation. Hate is produced intentionally by the ideology but has different manifestations in politics, media, intercultural perceptions and the hating society, and finally is systematically justified to fuel a mindset of “doing something extreme as a final resort.”

This research employs a mixed methodology. First, a questionnaire containing open-ended and closed-ended questions was designed. The questionnaires were distributed in 2010 in France among Muslims. A turnover of 244 was obtained. The quantitative data was analysed using SPSS software. As not all respondents answered the open ended questions, the remaining qualitative data was processed with a categorisation approach. Finally, the data was compared in order to test the reliability of the approach. A fuller account of DHMIR as shown in the above diagram is to be included in the forthcoming report on the projects findings in the USA, Ameli et al (2012).
Chapter 5

Research Results
Demographic specifications of Muslim Respondents in France

Analysing the data gathered from 244 print questionnaires reveals that most of the respondents (69%) are in the age range of 19-34. The age group of 35-39 is the second largest respondent category with 14% of the total.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-24</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-44</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-49</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 and more</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>239</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No Answer</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>244</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Age group frequency distribution

As regards gender the contribution of women (59% of total) was considerably larger than the contribution of men (37%). There were questionnaires within which gender was not reported by the respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>235</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>No Answer</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>244</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Gender frequency distribution
68% of the respondents reported France as their country of birth. Morocco and Algeria had the second and third ranks (with 15.2% and 7% respectively). Other African countries (Tunisia, Egypt, and Senegal) were reported as the country of origin for the total of 4.5% and 1.2% of respondents reported other European countries like England, Germany and Kosovo. Some 80.7% of the respondents reported that they are French citizens. 16.7% of respondents declared that they are already citizens of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Senegal. The majority, 98.3% of respondents, stated that they reside and live in France.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>96.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Country of birth frequency distribution
There is a rich diversity in the city of residence in this study. Most respondents (41%) reported that they came from the city of Strasbourg. French cities have the highest frequencies and after French cities, come African cities. 11.9% of the respondents preferred to leave this question unanswered.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City or Town</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strasbourg</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other African Cities</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other French Cities</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casablanca</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mulhouse</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agadir</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algiers</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyon</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian Cities</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Hoceima</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European Cities</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>88.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: City or town of residence frequency distribution
The ethnic distribution of respondents also was explored. Most respondents (58.6%) described themselves as being of African origin, whilst those describing their ethnic origin as Arab (14.8%) do not clearly specify if the respondent is from North Africa or elsewhere. Those with European heritage were 10.7% of the total. Asians comprise in total 4.5%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Origin</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerian</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisian</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghrebian</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European (unrecognised)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berber</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African (unrecognised)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian (unrecognised)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>90.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Ethnic origin frequency distribution
The majority of respondents were French citizens, which bucks much critique of Muslims in France as unwilling to take French citizenship.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Citizenship</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>80.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>98.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Country of citizenship frequency distribution

As far as marital status is concerned, 50.8% of the respondents were married. 41.8% of the total number of respondents reported that they are still single. Widowed and separated respondents consisted of 7.4% of the total number of respondents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marital Status</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced/ Separated</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Marital status frequency distribution
With regard to Muslim expression and visibility, hijab has the highest percentage of 50.4%. 15.6% of the respondents wore a beard. As the participation of men was low, it indicates that a considerable number of male respondents believe that having a beard is one important element in Muslim faith. The lowest percentage for expressing Muslimness is by special clothes. Only 2% of the respondents expressed their Muslimness in this way.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hijab wearing</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible in other way</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have beard</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifying Muslim clothing</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>85.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: The Muslim visibility level frequency distribution

Analysing the data of the proportion of Muslims in the neighbourhood shows that Muslims are scattered in different neighbourhoods. However, the analysis reveals that 50.4% of the respondents live in neighbourhoods in which less than half of the population are Muslims, compared with 33.6% of respondents who live in Muslim majority neighbourhoods. This corresponds with arguments referenced earlier that Muslims can and do live in mixed environs, but are often to be found in high density Muslim situations through state policies in housing and employment.
Slightly more than half of respondents (52%) fall into the middle income group. This reflects a higher general income profile than is reflected in wider French Muslim society. The difference between the high income group (5.7%) and low income group (34.8%) tallies with OECD and other studies cited earlier that Muslims in France experience inequality in economic distribution compared to the rest of society. Further analysis of this is beyond the aims of this study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1/4</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 1/4 and 1/2</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 1/2 and 3/4</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 3/4</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: The proportion of Muslims in the neighbourhood frequency distribution
Most of the respondents (37.7%) had a four year academic degree and 48.4% of the respondents held some sort of academic degree. One possible explanation for this high level of education among respondents could be attributed to their youth and hence their access to better educational prospects than previous generations. Therefore, the relatively high level of education of respondents in this study cannot be generalised to the whole society of Muslims in France.

Table 10: Income group frequency distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income group</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Middle income</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower income</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher income</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>92.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Most of the respondents (37.7%) are either employed in public or private sectors. Among them 51.8% work in the private sector and 48.2% work for the public sector. The second group in this category are students who comprise 24.6%. 16.8% of respondents reported that they are unemployed.
A majority of respondents (68.4%) reported that they are practising Muslims and 20.6% of the respondents claimed they are highly practising Muslims. Therefore, about 90% of Muslims who participated in this study are practising or highly practising individuals.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self employed</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: Work status frequency distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Practising</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly practising</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular Muslim</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-practising</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13: Religiosity frequency distribution
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Being ignored / overlooked / denied service in public places</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>More than once a week</th>
<th>Once a week</th>
<th>Once a month</th>
<th>Twice a year</th>
<th>Once a year</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>No Answer</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being treated with suspicion or wrongly accused</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others reacting as if they were intimidated or afraid</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being talked down to</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinions being ignored or devalued</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hearing an offensive joke about Islam or Muslims</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being insulted or harassed</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being expected to be less competent because of Islam / hijab</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not being taken seriously</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being deliberately left out of conversations / activities</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being treated in an overly superficial manner</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being physically avoided</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being stared at by strangers</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being laughed at or mocked</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiencing hostility at work/school</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience reported</td>
<td>More than once a week</td>
<td>Once a week</td>
<td>Once a month</td>
<td>Twice a year</td>
<td>Once a year</td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>No Answer</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiencing hostility in the street</td>
<td>Frequency: 19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent: 7.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious beliefs being challenged denigrated by colleagues</td>
<td>Frequency: 15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent: 6.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being expected to fit stereotypes of a Muslim</td>
<td>Frequency: 16</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent: 6.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experiencing verbal abuse</td>
<td>Frequency: 14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent: 5.7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience of physical assault</td>
<td>Frequency: 3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent: 1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile atmosphere at your place of work / study / residence</td>
<td>Frequency: 10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent: 4.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being told that you are oversensitive or paranoid about racism</td>
<td>Frequency: 9</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent: 3.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witnessing or hearing of Islamophobia directed at others</td>
<td>Frequency: 8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent: 3.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeing negative Muslim stereotypes in media</td>
<td>Frequency: 70</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent: 28.7</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observing organizational policies negatively affecting Muslims</td>
<td>Frequency: 39</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent: 16</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observing political policies negatively affecting Muslims</td>
<td>Frequency: 40</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent: 16.4</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hearing Islamophobic comments by politicians</td>
<td>Frequency: 36</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent: 14.8</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial tensions in your city</td>
<td>Frequency: 14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent: 5.7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hearing racially or culturally offensive remarks</td>
<td>Frequency: 20</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>244</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent: 8.2</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14: The frequency of hate crimes experienced by Muslims in France
Comparing different types of hate crimes through the prism of frequency is a matter of contestation. The very fact that about 20 percent of respondents reported they had experienced physical attack shows the real situation of Muslims in a society that has been called a ‘safe haven’ for immigrants (see Bailey, 2008: 72). Not only are Muslims discursively and symbolically attacked, the lack of a supportive sufficient law enforcement system has made them vulnerable and prone to experience physical attacks as a natural and predicted event for average Muslims in France.

Moreover, previous studies including Ameli et al (2011) suggest that many participants in this study may avoid mentioning their negative experiences like physical attacks or rape. This study, along with the previous study by Ameli et al (2011) reveals that this is particularly the case for women. Although such missing data is typical of similar research, comparing the recurrence of hate crimes shows that French Muslims suffer these negative experiences. This will also be useful for designing a suitable strategy for coping with the long lasting physical and psychological effects.

Studying the recurrence and diversity of experiencing hate crimes reveals that ‘seeing negative Muslim stereotypes in media’ has the highest frequency with 87.3%. This finding makes a strong recommendation that other researchers conduct studies with the same theme to determine if a similarly high percentage is obtained and why. This high percentage is a strong indicator of how the Western media portray negative images of Muslims. After this comes, ‘observing political policies negatively affecting Muslims’, ‘observing organisational policies negatively affecting Muslims’, ‘hearing Islamophobic comments by politicians’, and ‘being stared at by strangers.’

The effects of demographic variables on experiencing hate crime in France

One dimensional tables show frequency of different hate crimes and experiences. Another dimension of this study considers the relationship between crime and demographic
variables. The following analyses will reveal if demographic variables have provable effects on the type and intensity of hate crimes and experiences. In this section, the only cases presented are those in which there is a proven correlation between one demographic variable and hate crimes and experiences. If a relationship was proven weak and unreliable, it has been omitted.

**Effect of age**

In general, age has little or no effect on diversity or intensity of hate crimes. However, in the two cases of ‘experiencing physical assault’ and ‘hearing racially or culturally offensive remarks’ age matters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>More than once a week</th>
<th>Once a week</th>
<th>Once a month</th>
<th>Twice a year</th>
<th>Once a year</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>under 18</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>89.50</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 - 29</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>89.70</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 49</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>6.90</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>87.40</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>14.30</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>14.30</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>14.30</td>
<td>57.10</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>87.70</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 15: Effect of age on experience of physical assault*
Correlation between age and “experience of physical assault” with Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.103 and degree of significance of 0.129 reveals the relative effect of age on this experience. The level of this experience is higher among youth under 18 and the over 50s. Generally, over 50s (with frequency of 42.9%) are more prone to having this experience.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>More than once a week</th>
<th>Once a week</th>
<th>Once a month</th>
<th>Twice a year</th>
<th>Once a year</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>under 18</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>15.80</td>
<td>26.30</td>
<td>21.10</td>
<td>26.30</td>
<td>10.50</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 - 29</td>
<td>9.90</td>
<td>9.90</td>
<td>27.70</td>
<td>28.70</td>
<td>8.90</td>
<td>14.90</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 49</td>
<td>10.20</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>13.60</td>
<td>19.30</td>
<td>21.60</td>
<td>22.70</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>14.30</td>
<td>14.30</td>
<td>42.90</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>28.60</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9.30</td>
<td>11.60</td>
<td>22.30</td>
<td>23.30</td>
<td>15.30</td>
<td>18.10</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16: Effect of age on experience of hearing racially or culturally offensive remarks

Correlation coefficient for relationship between age and ‘hearing racially or culturally offensive remarks’ is -0.125 with a degree of significance of 0.067 which shows significant relationship between two variables. The negativity of the correlation coefficient shows reverse relationship between age and recurrence of ‘experience of hearing racially or culturally offensive remarks’. Therefore, the older the respondents, the ‘experience of hearing racially or culturally offensive remarks’ declines.
Effect of gender

The effect of gender on different experiences of hate crimes varies. At first glance, ‘others reacting as if they were intimidated or afraid’, ‘being expected to be less competent because of Islam / hijab’ and ‘experiencing verbal abuse’ are more likely to be mentioned by women. In other kinds of hate crimes and experiences, no considerable difference could be located between genders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Others reacting as if they were intimidated or afraid</th>
<th>More than once a week</th>
<th>Once a week</th>
<th>Once a month</th>
<th>Twice a year</th>
<th>Once a year</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender: Male</td>
<td>10.70</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>22.60</td>
<td>21.40</td>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>33.30</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>13.30</td>
<td>19.50</td>
<td>15.60</td>
<td>19.50</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8.50</td>
<td>9.40</td>
<td>20.80</td>
<td>17.90</td>
<td>15.10</td>
<td>28.30</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17: Effect of gender on experience of others reacting as if they were intimidated or afraid

The effect of gender on experiencing ‘others reacting as if they were intimidated or afraid’ is proven by correlation coefficient of 0.015 and degree of significance of 0.129. As it could be seen in the table, women (75%) have had more such experiences in comparison to men (66.7%) and it also has occurred to them more frequently.
Table 18: Effect of gender on experience of being expected to be less competent because of Islam / hijab

The coefficient of correlation is 0.142 for relationship between gender and ‘being expected to be less competent because of Islam / hijab’ with a level of significance of 0.039 which shows significant relationship between the two variables. Women (68.9%) were more likely to have such experience compared to men (47.5%).

Table 19: Effect of gender on experience of verbal abuse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>More than once a week</th>
<th>Once a week</th>
<th>Once a month</th>
<th>Twice a year</th>
<th>Once a year</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>8.90</td>
<td>12.70</td>
<td>17.70</td>
<td>12.70</td>
<td>43.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>13.50</td>
<td>23.30</td>
<td>18.80</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>15.10</td>
<td>19.30</td>
<td>27.80</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17: Effect of gender on experience of verbal abuse
With regard to ‘experiencing verbal abuse’, the effect of gender is strongly proven with the coefficient of correlation of 0.224 and level of significance of 0.001. It reveals that women (81.2%) have experienced far more verbal abuse in comparison to men (57%). Based on the above three experiences, it could be said that generally, women are impacted more by hate crimes and experiences than men are.

**Effect of economic status**

Economic status has proven its effect on two kinds of experiences: ‘Being ignored / overlooked / denied service in public places’ and ‘experiencing verbal abuse’. Both experiences are more common among people with lower economic status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income group</th>
<th>More than once a week</th>
<th>Once a week</th>
<th>Once a month</th>
<th>Twice a year</th>
<th>Once a year</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower income</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>16.90</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>20.50</td>
<td>44.60</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle income</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>12.70</td>
<td>13.60</td>
<td>59.30</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher income</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>27.30</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>54.50</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>14.20</td>
<td>12.30</td>
<td>15.60</td>
<td>53.30</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 20: Effect of income group on experience of being ignored in public places*
The level of economic status on “being ignored / overlooked / denied service in public places” is proven by coefficient of correlation of -0.136 with degree of significance of 0.047. The table demonstrates that people with lower economic status have experienced being ignored in public places more than respondents with middle and higher incomes. However, analysing the table also reveals that those among people of higher economic status who experienced being ignored in public places, have mentioned that they have had these experiences more frequently, in comparison to people of lower economic status. 9.1% of people in the higher income group reported that they have had this experience more than once a week while others, 27.3% in the same group said they experienced being ignored in public places once a month.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income group</th>
<th>More than once a week</th>
<th>Once a week</th>
<th>Once a month</th>
<th>Twice a year</th>
<th>Once a year</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>lower income</td>
<td>7.50</td>
<td>8.80</td>
<td>26.30</td>
<td>17.50</td>
<td>17.50</td>
<td>22.50</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>middle income</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>25.40</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>20.20</td>
<td>30.70</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>higher income</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>18.20</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>18.20</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>45.50</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>24.90</td>
<td>15.60</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>28.30</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 21: Effect of income group on experience of verbal abuse

Moreover, the effect of economic status on “experiencing verbal abuse” is proven by coefficient of correlation of -0.102 with degree of significance of 0.146. As the economic status lowers, the participant is more likely to be verbally abused.
Effect of Education

Education levels impact most on diversity and intensity of hate crimes and experiences among respondents. The effect of education on experiences of ‘being treated with suspicion or wrongly accused’, ‘others reacting as if they were intimidated or afraid’, ‘being insulted or harassed’, ‘not being taken seriously’, ‘being physically avoided’, ‘experiencing verbal abuse’, ‘experience of physical assault’ and “being told you are oversensitive or paranoid about racism” was proven. Intriguingly, in all cases there is a negative correlation between education and each variable. In other words, in all cases the increase in level of education is accompanied by decrease in experiencing hate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Being told that you are oversensitive or paranoid about racism</th>
<th>More than once a week</th>
<th>Once a week</th>
<th>Once a month</th>
<th>Twice a year</th>
<th>Once a year</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary school</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>13.70</td>
<td>11.80</td>
<td>17.60</td>
<td>23.50</td>
<td>31.40</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational qualification</td>
<td>10.70</td>
<td>21.40</td>
<td>10.70</td>
<td>10.70</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>21.40</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>25.60</td>
<td>14.60</td>
<td>13.40</td>
<td>36.60</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate degree</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>55.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>14.30</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>14.30</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>71.40</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>15.40</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>15.40</td>
<td>7.70</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>61.50</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>9.40</td>
<td>16.30</td>
<td>14.30</td>
<td>17.20</td>
<td>38.40</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 22: Effect of education on experience of being told you are oversensitive or paranoid about racism
Correlation between level of education and experiencing ‘being told you are oversensitive or paranoid about racism’ with coefficient of correlation of -0.190 and degree of significance of 0.007 shows the strong and significant relationship between these two variables. As only a few of the respondents were in the ‘elementary school’ group, they were not considered in this study. As regards the other groups, ‘being told that you are oversensitive or paranoid about racism’ is experienced most among people with a lower level of education. In sum, 61.6% of the population had this kind of experience, which is considerable.

The idea that French society in general may characterise Muslims as being oversensitive regarding their experiences of racism and discrimination ties in with the discussions in Chapters 2 and 3. Intellectuals play a leading role in framing the public debate in which Muslim experience is demeaned as an attack on Republican values. Rather than Muslim negative experiences being accepted – much as the McPherson principle of perception demands in the UK, French intellectual debate posits Muslim experience as an expression of hostility – the victim becomes the aggressor. Murray (2006) in his discussion of the racist policy roots to and repercussions of the riots in 2005 quotes philosopher Alain Finkielkraut in Haaretz stating that blacks and Arabs were involved in an ‘anti-Republic pogrom’. Among the various other philosophers he cites with similar views, he refers to the 1980s comments of Pascal Bruckner who denounced ‘anti-white racism’, an issue given currency in 2011–12 with the failed case brought against Houria Bouteldja, spokeswoman for Parti des Indigènes de la République (Rodrigo, 2012).

Such attitudes affect the way institutions work. Whilst provisions of the French criminal law allow the consideration of hate as an aggravating factor in considering various crimes, including physical attacks, murder and extortion (see Appendix A), such motivation must be identified by law enforcement authorities. Given the response to the question above, it can be averred that such an understanding or readiness to accept such motivation as even existing may preclude such charges being laid before the courts, thus skewing reporting of hate crime related convictions and thus giving an unrealistic impression
regarding experiences of hate in France.

Additionally, as identified by Ameli et al. (2004b), this can also be a deterrent to Muslims reporting their experiences to law enforcement agencies, fearing double discrimination, whereby they face initial discrimination as a result of the attack and then subsequent discrimination at the hands of law enforcement authorities.

CCiF (2010) also raise similar concerns regarding reporting. According to their report on incidents in 2010:

“1. The Muslim population in France has traditionally rejected the position of victim and is accustomed to taking discrete positions in society away from the limelight/controversy associated with reporting discrimination.”

“2. The channels of voicing a grievance is often Islamophobic in itself, or seen as such by French Muslim communities and so necessary reportage is not undertaken.”
Being insulted or harassed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>More than once a week</th>
<th>Once a week</th>
<th>Once a month</th>
<th>Twice a year</th>
<th>Once a year</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary school</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>9.30</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>31.50</td>
<td>37.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational qualification</td>
<td>10.30</td>
<td>17.20</td>
<td>10.30</td>
<td>13.80</td>
<td>17.20</td>
<td>31.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>13.10</td>
<td>17.90</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>52.40</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate degree</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>65.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>37.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>62.50</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>10.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>10.50</td>
<td>5.30</td>
<td>10.50</td>
<td>63.20</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>7.40</td>
<td>8.80</td>
<td>14.40</td>
<td>17.10</td>
<td>48.60</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 23: Effect of education on experience of being insulted or harassed

Correlation between level of education and ‘being insulted or harassed’ is approved by coefficient of correlation of -0.177 and level of significance of 0.009 which is a strong and significant inverse relationship. It could be seen that in sum, 51.4% of participants have had such experiences. This means that more than half of the people in this survey have had this experience, among them 34.3% reported they frequently had this experience.
The level of education also had a serious effect on ‘experience of physical assault’. Correlation between these two variables is -0.175 with degree of significance of 0.011 which shows a strong but negative relationship between the two.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>More than once a week</th>
<th>Once a week</th>
<th>Once a month</th>
<th>Twice a year</th>
<th>Once a year</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary school</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary school</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>7.30</td>
<td>81.80</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational qualification</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>7.10</td>
<td>10.70</td>
<td>78.60</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>91.80</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-graduate degree</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>95.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>4.70</td>
<td>88.80</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 24: Effect of education on experience of physical assault
Effect of work status

The highest level of correlation between experiencing hate and a demographic factor is of work status. Work status has affected the ‘being laughed at or mocked’, ‘being physically avoided’ and ‘being insulted or harassed’ variables. It should be noted that the ‘retired’ group was not considered because only a few chose this option as his or her work status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work status</th>
<th>Being laughed at or mocked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>More than once a week</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>6.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>7.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>5.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 25: Effect of work status on experience of being laughed at or mocked

The effect of work status on experiencing ‘being laughed at or mocked’ is proven by coefficient of correlation of 0.254 with level of significance of 0.005. As it could be seen in the table, more than half of the people have such experience and students and the unemployed are more prone to having this experience.
Coefficient of correlation is 0.202 for experiencing ‘being physically avoided’ with a level of significance of 0.028 that shows strong and significant relationship between work status and ‘being physically avoided’. This experience is more common first in private sector jobs and second among the unemployed. The high percentage (66.2%) shows that a majority of the population have experienced ‘being physically avoided’.

Table 26: Effect of work status on experience of being physically avoided
Coefficient of correlation between work situation and experiencing ‘being insulted or harassed’ is 0.202 with a degree of significance of 0.028, which shows a strong relationship between two variables. Here, it could be seen that those working in the private sector are far more likely to be subjected to an environment of insult and harassment. Moreover, more than half of the population have had this experience.

**Effect of religiosity**

Results of analyses show that religiosity and its physical appearance have had little effect on experiencing hate. Apart from experiences of ‘being insulted or harassed’, ‘being expected to fit stereotypes of a Muslim’ and ‘being talked down to’, there has not been any significant relationship between diversity of religious expression and the intensity of experiencing hate.
Coefficient of correlation for type of religiosity and experiencing ‘being insulted or harassed’ is 0.203 with degree of significance of 0.002, which shows a strong and significant relationship between two variables. Therefore, as the level of religiosity increases, the person is more likely to have the experience of ‘being insulted or harassed’.

Table 28: Effect of religiosity on experience of being insulted or harassed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religiosity</th>
<th>More than once a week</th>
<th>Once a week</th>
<th>Once a month</th>
<th>Twice a year</th>
<th>Once a year</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secular Muslim</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>23.50</td>
<td>5.90</td>
<td>64.70</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-practicing</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Practicing</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>12.70</td>
<td>14.60</td>
<td>55.70</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly practicing</td>
<td>4.40</td>
<td>13.30</td>
<td>15.60</td>
<td>17.80</td>
<td>28.90</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>7.20</td>
<td>8.60</td>
<td>14.50</td>
<td>16.70</td>
<td>49.30</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There is a significant negative correlation between religiosity and ‘being expected to fit stereotypes of a Muslim’. Coefficient of correlation between these two variables is -0.119 with degree of significance of 0.084 which shows a strong and negative relationship between the two. Secular Muslims had more such experiences than religious Muslims. Overall, a majority of the population (70%) reported that they had this experience. It may be that, as with the case of white converts to Islam in Ameli et al (2004b) who reported significantly higher experiences of Islamophobia, secular Muslims in this context feel the effects of being expected to fit a stereotype more because of their expectation and experience of difference. In the former case, white converts become visible through conversion and therefore do not experience the normalisation of discrimination as other Muslim communities do. In the present case, secular Muslims have an expectation that their expression of secularity
in a state that defines itself as (aggressively) laic would mean that wider society would accept them on this basis. This result suggests that the societal expectations of Muslim stereotypes transcends religious affiliation and contains elements of racialised expectations. Indeed, some respondents answered the ‘visibly Muslim’ question by ticking ‘other’ then explaining “I have brown skin/I am black/I am Arab,” regardless of their actual religious practice. This is in contrast to UK respondents (Ameli, et al 2011) who were more likely to tick ‘not visibly Muslim’, a rarity among French respondents.

This suggests that both governmental, media and intellectual discourse regarding Muslim assimilation (from rejection of expressions of Islamic identity to the social contract for new immigrants) to republican and secular values belies a reality of structural and societal discrimination against Muslims. This also critiques the ideas of some authors that imply (often critically as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3) that Muslim religiosity and observance is the key determinant in causing reactions and responses from wider society and institutions.
The effect of religiosity on ‘being talked down to’, with coefficient of correlation of 0.109 and degree of significance of 0.10, shows a relatively strong and significant relationship between the two. The more religiosity increases, the more the individual is prone to the experience of ‘being talked down to’. In sum, a majority of the sample (74.7%) have had such experience. Such a finding, ties in with Grosfoguel’s (2006) argument that Islam and Muslims are seen through a racialised lens of inferiority through their cultural affiliation as adherents to Islam.
Effect of Mediation Variables on Hate Crimes and Experiences in France

In this survey, two variables of ‘being visibly Muslim’ and ‘the proportion of Muslims in the neighbourhood’ have been examined as mediation variables. The effects of these two variables on diversity and recurrence of hate crimes and experiences in France have been studied.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Being visibly Muslim</th>
<th>More than once a week</th>
<th>Once a week</th>
<th>Once a month</th>
<th>Twice a year</th>
<th>Once a year</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hijab wearing</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>33.30</td>
<td>11.10</td>
<td>26.30</td>
<td>15.20</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have beard</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>21.90</td>
<td>18.80</td>
<td>15.60</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify ing clothing</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>27.30</td>
<td>45.50</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible in other way</td>
<td>9.30</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>11.10</td>
<td>14.80</td>
<td>14.80</td>
<td>46.30</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not visible</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>65.20</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6.40</td>
<td>7.30</td>
<td>23.70</td>
<td>15.10</td>
<td>18.70</td>
<td>28.80</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 31: Effect of being visibly Muslim on experiencing verbal abuse

The effect of the mediation variable of ‘being visibly Muslim’ on ‘experiencing verbal abuse’ shows the highest correlation between variables in this survey. Coefficient of correlation in this relationship is -0.321 with a degree of significance of 0.00, which shows a high correlation between two variables. This table shows that wearing hijab and being bearded are two cases that have an effect on increasing this
experience. 84.4% of those who wear hijab have said they have had such an experience and among those who are bearded, 75% reported they have been a victim of verbal abuse.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Being visibly Muslim</th>
<th>More than once a week</th>
<th>Once a week</th>
<th>Once a month</th>
<th>Twice a year</th>
<th>Once a year</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hijab wearing</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>8.20</td>
<td>30.60</td>
<td>17.30</td>
<td>13.30</td>
<td>24.50</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have beard</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>9.40</td>
<td>31.30</td>
<td>9.40</td>
<td>43.80</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifying clothing</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>27.30</td>
<td>36.40</td>
<td>27.30</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible in other way</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>16.40</td>
<td>10.90</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>58.20</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not visible</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>72.70</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>4.60</td>
<td>20.60</td>
<td>17.40</td>
<td>12.40</td>
<td>40.80</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 32: Effect of being visibly Muslim on experience of being expected to be less competent because of Islam / hijab

Coefficient of correlation for ‘being visibly Muslim’ and ‘being expected to be less competent because of Islam / hijab’ is -0.259 with degree of significance of 0.0, which shows a strong but negative relationship between the two. The table shows us that wearing hijab and wearing Islamic clothes have had the highest effects on this experience respectively.
Finally, the coefficient of correlation between the extent of ‘being visibly Muslim’ and ‘being laughed or mocked’ is -0.244 with degree of significance of 0.0 which shows a strong correlation between two variables. For this experience, wearing Islamic clothes has more of an effect on this experience.

In sum, the results of this survey show that the intensity and diversity of hate crimes and experiences is directly and significantly affected by one’s appearance. The great difference between the ‘not visible’ group with other groups, in this respect, shows that the appearance of Muslimness correlates with experiences of hate crimes among respondents.

For another mediation variable, ‘the proportion of Muslims in the neighbourhood’, affects experiences of ‘being treated in an overly superficial manner’, ‘experiencing verbal abuse’,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Being visibly Muslim</th>
<th>More than once a week</th>
<th>Once a week</th>
<th>Once a month</th>
<th>Twice a year</th>
<th>Once a year</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hijab wearing</td>
<td>5.20</td>
<td>12.40</td>
<td>13.40</td>
<td>16.50</td>
<td>16.50</td>
<td>36.10</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have beard</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>15.20</td>
<td>12.10</td>
<td>24.20</td>
<td>39.40</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifying clothing</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>16.70</td>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>33.30</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visible in other way</td>
<td>8.80</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>12.30</td>
<td>8.80</td>
<td>12.30</td>
<td>57.90</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not visible</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>8.70</td>
<td>4.30</td>
<td>82.60</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.30</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.80</strong></td>
<td><strong>12.20</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.10</strong></td>
<td><strong>14.90</strong></td>
<td><strong>46.80</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 33: Effect of being visibly Muslim on experience of being laughed at or mocked
‘being laughed at or mocked’, and ‘being told that you are oversensitive or paranoid about racism’, there is no strong correlation among them. This is also proven by studying the effects of place of residence, nationality, and ethnicity of participants as these variables have no significant effects on diversity and recurrence of experiencing hate crimes. It appears that whilst there are racialised elements to how Muslims are perceived, the mark of ethnicity subsumes the idea of Muslimness, therefore ethnic difference is seen as akin to, or the same as, Muslim difference in the minds of perpetrators, whether institutional or individuals.

Effect of demographic variables on the experience of hateful policies

In this section, five variables, ‘witnessing or hearing of Islamophobia directed at others’, ‘seeing negative Muslim stereotypes in media’, ‘observing organisational policies negatively affecting Muslims’, ‘observing political policies negatively affecting Muslims’ and ‘Hearing Islamophobic comments by politicians’ are studied in terms of their relationships with mediation variables.
Table 34: Effect of demographic values on experience of hateful policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Pearson Correlation</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Work status</th>
<th>Religiosity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Witnessing or hearing of Islamophobia directed at others</td>
<td>-0.143</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeing negative Muslim stereotypes in media</td>
<td>-0.175</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observing organisational policies negatively affecting Muslims</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observing political policies negatively affecting Muslims</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hearing Islamophobic comments by politicians</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.112</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results of the study show that experiencing ‘observing organisational policies negatively affecting Muslims’ is affected by variables of level of education, work status and religiosity. The effects of these three independent variables on the above mentioned experience are almost equal. Level of education and
level of religiosity have had the reverse effect on the experience. This means that the lower the level of education and the lower the level of religiosity, the more the respondent would have such an experience. In terms of work status, those who work in the private sector and the self-employed have reported the highest number of these experiences.

It should also be mentioned that the level of education has a negative effect on ‘witnessing or hearing of Islamophobia directed at others’, ‘seeing negative Muslim stereotypes in the media’, and ‘hearing Islamophobic comments by politicians’. However, the last case is not only negatively affected by level of education, but is also affected by gender. Women report more cases of ‘hearing Islamophobic comments by politicians’ than do men.

**Analysing Open-Ended Questions**

In the theoretical sections, DHMIR was taken as the theoretical framework. The qualitative data collected is viewed through this model to see how hate policy, hate representation and hate practice is reflected in the first hand experiences of Muslim citizens in France. Generally, it is expected that a lay person is unable to put his or her everyday experience of hate practice into the wider context of politics, media and ideology. Qualitative inquiries help researchers to locate the missing link between everyday situations and abstract theorisations. The results of this study show that there are obvious aspects of hate ideology and hate policy that are apparent to lay people, the respondents in this survey, who have speculated on them.

**Hate Ideology**

When dealing with hate ideology, respondents concentrated on the reasons for the development of hate ideology. Intriguingly, Muslim participants in this study did not perceive the supposed ideological contradiction between Islam and Christianity as the main source of hate ideology, as suggested
by various theorists, as well as being hyped up in the “views of these French intellos … this Gallic new Right… labelled neoreacs, the neo-reactionaries,” (Murray, 2006) as a clash between a Christian heritage French culture and an Islamic heritage immigrant one. However some respondents did aver to the idea of Islam being seen to flourish at the expense of Christianity, thereby confirming that the neoreac argument based on Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations has crept into social thinking.

Chart 2: Reasons for hate ideology development amongst people

Misperception of Islam (33 percent) and increasing tendency to Islam (25 percent) have been mentioned as the most important sources of hate ideology.

I think there are many reasons. First, there is the fear of Islam’s empowerment and seeing the increasing tendency to Islam and growing number of people who convert to Islam while seeing Christianity being weakened. And second, Zionist lobbies.

Male 30-34
Misperception of Islam

I think poor knowledge of Islamic beliefs is one of the reasons for the situation. Moreover, Muslims have become a convenient target to be aimed at. When a country suffers a crisis and finds no way out, it throws the problem on Muslims.  
Male 19-24

Although racism can be studied in intercultural relations as a non-religious issue, because of the close relationship of race to religion as discussed above (only 10.7% of Muslims in this study are of French or European origin) this must be taken seriously.

Misperception of Muslims (12%) is also considered as a possible fomenter of hate ideology. The effect of this misperception could lead the negative actions of individual Muslims being generalised to all people of the same religion in the minds of those ignorant of Muslims. Also, unawareness of Shariah, Islamic laws and religious virtues are seen as having the same effect.

Misperception of Muslims

Bad behavior of some of the Muslims, unawareness of Islamic laws and negligence in transferring Islamic virtues and sciences.  
Male 19-24

Aside from reasons mentioned above, other diverse reasons with limited frequency were also reported. Tendency to laïcité, perceived incompatibility of Islamic Shariah with this phenomenon, neo-colonialism, historical and fundamental differences with Islam, and Islamophobia are among other reasons respondents mentioned in this section.
Anti-Islam as a result of atheism

They have no shared religion or belief. Atheism is itself a religion and the politics shows itself in a way as if it wants to lead the whole world to the same path. In fact, they try to mislead people and in doing so, they cast scepticism on Islam.

Contradiction of Values

They have started understanding that Islam is diffusing ideas totally against theirs (faith, modesty ≠ infidelity, laïcité) and ... and they do their best to show a distorted Islam while at the same time they have put their belief as the main agenda.

Hate Policy

Hate policy can be short-term like an outcome in an election campaign or could be deliberately designed to be a long lasting Islamophobic project. Hate policy is produced intentionally to increase marginalisation, demonisation and otherisation of one or several hated societies, according to political and factional agendas. Historical turning points like 9/11 are exploited by politicians to mobilise against Muslim minorities in order to secure a single outcome of election victory. Hate policy has a well defined action plan in which it plays on fears present in the public’s mind.

The role of anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant rhetoric has played an increasing role in elections in France over the last thirty years. At the time of writing, the French Presidential election race has seen incumbent Nicolas Sarkozy raise the issue of halal meat at the outset of his campaign as the number one factor affecting the French public (Wilsher, 10 March 2012). Building on Islamophobic and anti-Semitic denigration of ritual slaughter, Sarkozy has argued that non-Muslims are
accidentally eating halal meat which has not been clearly labelled as halal thus causing offence to non-Muslim French and implicitly abusing them.

As Fysh & Wolfreys (2003) have pointed out, the rise of the far-right has seen other politicians jump on an anti-Muslim bandwagon in order to woo the increasingly significant right-wing vote. In this case, it was far-right presidential candidate Marine Le Pen who was first to wrongfully raise the spectre of all meat in the Paris region being halal and consumed by ‘innocent’ French without their knowledge. Sarkozy initially rejected this and clarified that the percentage of meat produced in this way was 2.5%. However, his trailing popularity behind the socialist candidate first saw his close political ally, Interior Minister Claude Gueant, condemn the socialist plan to allow foreign residents to vote in local elections as leading to:

“halal meat being imposed on all children in public school canteens. His argument was that foreigners with voting rights might influence local governments and push their own agenda – whether in school canteens, or in public swimming pools with separate hours for men and women.” (Haski, 8 March 2012)

Two days later, Sarkozy changed his position and jumped on the anti-halal bandwagon.

According to Murray (2006) the ideology of the far-right has prevailed:

“… with issues such as l’insécurité, l’immigration, ‘Islam radical’ and les travailleurs clandestins (‘illegal workers’) acquiring the same ubiquity in electioneering-speak as ‘jobs, education and health… The inflammatory language of [then] Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy, which many blame for igniting the disturbances [2006 riots], is reminiscent of the provocative outbursts of [Jean Marie] Le Pen
Respondents (38%) believe that development of hate policy in France is in line with associating Muslims in general with the events of September 11 and have culminated in hate policy. As can be seen in previous sections, unfair changes in migration and residence policies and unfair accusations against Muslims are manifestations or such pre-planned policies.

September 11 and hate of Muslims

At the international level, September 11 precipitated a wave of anti-Islam all over the world. At the national level, however, the media were the original factor fomenting this phenomenon. Media fomented hate of Muslims constantly and systematically. Sarkozy’s words naturalized anti-Islam thoughts.

Male 30-34
September 11 and Islamic garb

After the event of September 11, Muslims were denigrated constantly and they have been treated like terrorists. They say if we wear a veil, this is to hide a bomb.
Male 25-29

Islamophobia as Political Scapegoating

Politicians try to get their aims by developing and spreading the fear of Islam (they try to convince people that the main reason for the plight of the French people and country is foreigners and particularly Muslims).
Male 30-34

The clash between Israel and Palestine, as the subject of long term policies, and Sarkozy’s propagandistic policies, as short term policies (both 12%), were the next two categories drawn out of the qualitative data. Palestine is a very important question for Muslims and non-Muslim people all over the world and almost all countries have their own policies for this issue. However, when it comes to western countries like France, it could be used to foment a hate policy towards a section of the French who have never been to Palestine. The qualitative data gathered shows that anti-Islamic policies of Sarkozy have deeply affected Muslims’ perceptions of being members of a hated society in a country they perceive as home.

The events which took place at the global level raised enmity of some people against me. But, it was talks by Sarkozy that increased this problem seriously. It seems these enmities are supported by some people.
Male 19-24

The ‘Burqa law’, the President of France and Developing Hate of Muslims
The claimed “burqa” law which was passed after Sarkozy came to power has culminated in frequent insults by the people to Muslims . . .

Eleven percent of respondents said hate policy is a way to escape crisis. Political scientists know that when internal problems reach a dangerous point, an existential threat can have the effect on bringing the nation together again behind its leaders. Currently, different economic, demographic, political and environmental problems make European leaders prone to taking such policies of projecting the problem to a – constructed – outsider. The Paris bombings of the 1990s, 9/11 and 7/7, along with the constant negative portrayal of Muslims have been exploited to create such an environment.

Making Artificial Constructs When Confronting Political, Economic and Social Problems

Lack of awareness of Islam, integration policy in France, colonialist management of Islam and Muslims, attributing demonic portrayal of Islam are[all] designed to respond to political, social and economic problems.

Escaping the crisis

Forgetting the problems of society and pushing them to a second agenda.

Election contests (8%) constitute another short term reason to resort to the making of hate policy. As various authors, including Murray (2006) and Fysh & Wolfreys (2003) cited earlier, have argued, attacking Islam and Muslims has become a good strategy for attracting French voters.
Most of the politicians try to portray an unreal image of Islam. They even do that by showing suburbs that have no Muslim residents. They do their best to win the elections.

Male 25-29

This is unprecedented ... the end is attraction of people and their votes. Politicians misuse people's fear of Islam while they have no knowledge of Islam.

Male 35-39

Hate Representation

Hate representation is a very important ring in the chain of hate. It facilitates the implementation of hate policies developed from hate ideologies. As Ameli et al (2007) show, the media is crucial in creating subalternised others, as well as a fictitious sense of nation.

Islamophobic Use of the Media

Media deny the real Islam and shows it in the other way.

Female 40-44

Media Can be the Source of Hate Practice

The main reason for such stupid practices is the hands of the media who want to undermine Islam. These have led prejudices of people against Islam and Muslims.

Female

Media as a Political Tool

The only political reason is that these people want to get power and, in doing so, they use the media and, if the media is anti-Muslim, it is the best.

Female 25-29
Media as the Source of Hate Practices

People in the streets say that “do you know hijab is banned?” and nothing has changed because they believe everything they see on TV.

Male 25-29

Discrimination, Violence and Racism as Results of Negative Media Representations

Media and politicians produce a negative image of Islam and this leads to increase in discrimination, violence and racism against Muslims.

Female 25-29

This concurs with the findings of Ameli et al (2011a) in the UK pilot for this project, in which Muslims overwhelmingly cited negative media representation as the source of hate, with 66.9% of respondents stating that they saw negative stereotyping of Muslims in the media.

Hate Practice

The consequence of the body of hate ideology, hate policy and hate representation can be seen in its material manifestation, namely hate practices. CCiF (2010) are just one of many organizations that see a correlation between the anti-Muslim representation of Muslims in media and political discourse and a rise in hate crimes and experiences. Hate practices can divide into physical attacks, legal or civic ban, rape or threats of rape, insult or verbal abuse, and civil exclusion. Here, there are three groups. The first group has been subjected to hate practices. The second group has witnessed fellow Muslims being subject to hate practice. The third group was neither subject to hate practice, nor witnessed a fellow Muslim being subject to hate practice.
neighbours insulted me because I am Arab and Muslim and stole from me. But, because I was kind to them, they confessed their deed and gave my things back and I forgave them, Alhamdullelah. Since then, they are friends with me and we had no quarrel.

Female 40-44

Civic or Legal ban (12%) relates to all citizens’ practices against Muslims that have emerged as a result of discriminatory laws or negative representation of media. These bans are particularly obvious in workplaces, universities and schools.

**Hijab Ban Exemplifies Legal Discrimination**

I always had hijab at high school and when we entered the building, I removed it. But, on that day we were in the yard that they forced me to take off my hijab.

Female 19-24
I was the victim of ugly insults by my neighbour. When the hijab ban law was passed, I and some of my friends had our hijab and we were victim of intimidations by school authorities several times.
Female 19-24

**Discrimination and Verbal Abuse in the Workplace**

In my workplace I was told “we don’t want an alien.” She called the person in charge to challenge my presence. She called me a thief and told me all aliens are in France for burglary.
Female 50+

**Discrimination in places of Residence**

When we travelled to the south of France, we rented a house. Neighbours asked us to leave because of our Hijab.
Female 30-34

Being threatened with rape (10%) and being insulted or verbally abused (60%) are the most frequently reported categories. These kinds of hate practice have a wide range from direct use of insulting words to accusations and using foul and abusive gestures.

**Insult in Front of Children**

I had my 3 children with me. “You should take care of your children,” “they should not only learn to abuse,” “go back home.” In the street I was told “now we are in France!!”
Female 30-34

**Insult Because of Islamic Garb**

One day I was sitting on the train. An old man rose and said
“all of you wear hijab because you are stupid and witless. You are already denigrated. We don’t need you in our country.”

Female 19-24

Such findings vis a vis Islamic garb, particularly the hijab, are outlined in the work of the Comité 15 mars et Libertés (2005) and IHRC (2008 and 2009). Whilst at that time, hijab was banned in schools, the normalisation of anti-hijab and anti-Muslim women ideas led to the normalisation of discriminatory values in wider society. As such then and now, Muslim women find themselves barred from marrying if they don a hijab (IHRC, 2008 and 2009; CCiF, 2010), refused service at banks, shops and restaurants, and subject to verbal abuse in the street. Dressed up as a concern for the rights of women, these incidents and policies exemplify the realisation of hate ideology as experience via policy and media discourse. During the period of the introduction of anti-hijab laws, celebrities and writers joined forces in lending their weight behind the ban, as did most politicians.
Chapter 6

Conclusion
Based on the theoretical framework provided in the theoretical section of this book, hate crimes have been divided into four levels of hate ideology, hate policy, hate representation and experiencing hate in everyday life. The intensity of these four categories is dependent on what participants reported about their experiences and recurrence of the same experiences. Among these four categories, hate ideology is beyond the scope of this study, as this is a field study and focuses on analysing results of the qualitative-quantitative inquiry.

As shown above, the highest percentage belongs to media representation, mirroring the findings of the UK pilot project (Ameli et al, 2011). The negative representation media provide of Muslim people affects non-Muslim attitudes towards Muslims. Ameli et al (2007) argue that people perceive media representation as reality. There are continuous complaints regarding the skewed representation of Muslim people in the French media. Whilst it is recognised that not all media figures (indeed probably the majority) are pernicious Islamophobes,
media bodies suffer from institutionalised Islamophobia and racism (Ameli et al 2007) and as such need to work on structural responses to this issue – the first step being to recognise that such structural issues exist. In a climate where so-called republican ideals denigrate the notion of racism as an attempt by victimised communities to undermine the foundational values of the state, there is clearly a long way to go on this front.

Hate policy is reflected in participants’ experience of Islamophobia, Islamophobic expressions by politicians, exclusions of Muslims in political decision-making or implementing particular policies on them and, finally, policies which target Muslims in France. Muslim participants said the main reason for these policies is scapegoating and deflecting from crisis issues. Moreover, politicians resort to Islamophobia to design their election campaign strategy. Israeli aggression on Palestine, Sarkozy’s policies and the events of 9/11 are also cases which were frequently mentioned as pretexts and reasons for the making of hate policy.

There are various issues that could be put in the category of everyday negative experiences. This is a wide scale of issues, from symbolic violence like being ignored in public places and universities to more harsh types of violence like physical attacks, civic or legal bans, threats of rape, insults or verbal abuse, and being ignored are among the categories with highest frequencies.
For 29 categories of issues respondents were asked about, the highest frequency of experiences is once a month with 27.6% of the total. After this, twice a year and once a year were reported by 24.7% and 24.5% respectively. Once a week, with 12.4%, and more than once a week, with 10.8%, are in the next places.
Moreover, results of this analysis show that overall, 19–29 year olds, with frequency of 48.9%, have experienced hate crimes and acts more than any other age group. After this category, the next age group is that aged 30–49 with a frequency of 39%. Youth under 18 and the over 50s have experienced the lowest levels of hate crimes and acts compared to other age groups.
As far as gender is concerned, there is considerable difference in terms of diversity and recurrence of hate crimes and experiences. Women (63.3%) have experienced more hate crimes in comparison to men (36.7%). This could be attributed to the general structure of capitalist paternalism, in which women are constantly vulnerable. In this situation, women are subject to double discrimination. Moreover, as discussed, the relationship between hijab and being subject to hate crime and experiences is a possible cause of the high percentage of women in this category because of their social expression with their appearance.

From the income level perspective, middle income, with a frequency of 54.2%, has the highest rate of experiencing hate crimes. After this income group, there is the lower income group with frequency of 40.7%.0
Education had its effect on experiencing hate. The highest level of experience was reported among those who hold high school diplomas to undergraduates with 81.2% of the total. It should be emphasised that apart from the general trend demonstrating a higher frequency of experiencing hate crime with lower levels of education, the level of experiencing hate crimes in the education group of postgraduate and higher levels of education, and elementary school are very low.
The relationship between experiencing hate crimes and work status is very important, as the correlation tests have shown; the work environment is the most important factor determining how one Muslim citizen could experience hate crimes. Those who are employed in the private sector (38.8%) reported experiencing hate crimes more than any other category. Students are in second place in this respect with 26.2% of the total. The lowest rate for reported experiencing hate crimes is for the retired.
The previous chapter demonstrated that religiosity is an important factor in experiencing hate crimes. Here, it is seen that practising Muslims have had the highest rate (68.8%) of experiencing hate crimes followed by highly practising Muslims with a frequency of 23.2%.
The effects of appearance were discussed in detail in the previous chapter. However, the very existence of 8.5% of frequency of hate crimes among those who could not be identified as Muslims shows that hate crimes are something beyond Islam and Muslims. High rates of experiencing hate crimes among those women who wear hijab (48.3%) shows clearly that continuous hate representation of Muslims and their Islamic dress has had a very deep and significant impact on French society.
Recommendations & Concluding Thoughts

Reports such as this sum up their findings with sets of recommendations aimed at government, authorities and even civil society, including those groups and organisations from the community under discussion.

There is significant similarity in the findings which locate the source of much hatred against Muslims as the media with that of the partner report in this project, *Getting the Message: The Recurrence of Hate Crimes in the UK* (2011). However the task of setting recommendations out for this particular report is more difficult for the authors for a number of reasons as outlined here.

At the time of writing, an election campaign that has seen the rise of the far-right on an anti-Muslim ticket, mirrored by the adoption of the anti-Muslim rhetoric by all parties, is underway. Coupled with this is the proximity of the publication of this report to a violent act of murder and hatred perpetrated, it is alleged, by a Muslim against soldiers, a Rabbi and three Jewish children. The atmosphere in France is highly charged and in many senses toxic. An additional problem in setting out recommendations is the prominent role that intellectuals and the idea of the *académie* play in French society. As outlined above, the role of the intellectual in public life, as part of the media and media discourse and as highly respected political commentators, marks out the French social and political milieu from its equivalent in the UK. As such, a large focus of these recommendations should in fact target the community from which solutions should generally be sought, not from the hierarchies, as in this case, in which the genesis and locale of many of the structural problems discussed herein are to be found.

Whilst this report paints a bleak picture of both past and present, it is important to acknowledge that France is not a European pariah, but is exemplifying those same structural issues that have plagued and will continue to plague Westphalian nation states vis a vis the construction of subalternised others. While there is French specificity in the
bad, there have been notable exceptions of the good, be they the
dissident intellectual voices of past and present, or the actual
state institutionalisation e.g. of the Paris Grand Mosque decades
before similar such moves in neighbouring countries.

Nevertheless, there remain deeply ingrained problems with
French political and social life which affect Muslims, but in the
wider picture affect all ‘others’ in the French scheme, and
ultimately undermine the pretention and self-perception of
France as an exemplar state; a republic where all are equal and
free. The foregoing has outlined how this perception does not
match reality, and how even the so-called founding principles of
state are deeply problematic when it comes to questions of
transformation and liberation. The following recommendations,
though more generalized than usual, point us towards areas
where debate needs to be opened as an urgent measure for the
safety, sanity and security of all concerned.

Media

Media producers, whether of televised, broadcast and print
news, films, literature (as writers and publishers) and other
media, hold a key and vital responsibility with regard to the
effects of their work. Unlike other comparable states, France has
a developed understanding of the effects of hate speech, which
has meant, for example, that hate websites have not been able to
exist on French servers.

As such the following recommendations are made:

1. An invigorated discussion around self-regulation needs
to be had whereby practices, such as the juxtaposition of local
and international stories reflecting negatively on Muslims and
Islam, or the use of lazy and racist terminology, become taboo.
Such a discussion may need to be kick started externally, and
should ideally be done through the requirement of government
to pursue the issue of press standards, much as the belated
Leveson Inquiry in the UK has begun.

However, given that the mood for self-reflection over the
demonisation of Muslims may also be lacking amongst
government circles in France, this recommendation also targets civil society actors. This is a long term project, and one that civil society needs to work across boundaries on in order to effect a grassroots movement for change. Certain equalities speak emphasises that greater participation in mainstream media and institutions is the key for minority advancement in a Western setting. While the authors agree that better and more equitable representation of minorities in institutions is needed, this does not solve the key problems of institutionalised racism, Islamophobia and hatred. Civil society needs to understand how minorities are muted by mainstream discourse and develop strategies to obviate, not replicate, this.

2. There is a need for better law and policy on media demonisation. This requires a more thorough acknowledgement of what hate speech and representation is. There is also a need for better implementation of existing laws and policies. The operation of Islamophobia and racism within institutions means that currently, whilst Muslims may be the victims of such hatred, they are disproportionately accused of, prosecuted for, or persecuted as showing such hatred.

The Academy

As averred to above, this may be seen as an unconventional set of recommendations, however the central role of philosophers and intellectuals in French society means that they too share some of the blame as well as hold the key to the change needed.

1. A more open and inclusive academic regime must be fostered in the French academic community.

2. Self-reflection as to the effects of uncritical proselytisation of so-called founding principles must be accompanied by a desacrilisation of key ideas of the Republic. This is not necessarily to destroy such ideas or ideals, but to submit them to the type of interrogation that a healthy social project needs if it is to advance.
3. The understanding of how colonial and racist discourse operates in the academy must be pursued by civil society. Again, this is the project of a generation and requires that civil society work beyond narrow concerns.

More recommendations vis a vis law enforcement and the role of legislative bodies, as well as the political classes, can be made, however the foregoing has highlighted that not only is there a lack of interest on the part of such bodies in the type of concerns expressed herein, but that the community affected is quite proficient in understanding the positions these institutions take. It is perhaps better to end with a call to civil society to take upon itself the role of agent for change, ensuring that in doing so it maintains its allegiances to and respects the communities in whose name it challenges injustice. The ideas and belief systems of Muslims and the many ‘others’ who suffer similar marginalisation and hatred are sophisticated, diverse and sometimes polarised. All of those voices need to be carried. It is not the job of civil society to determine which of these beliefs is the universal truth for mankind; it is the job of civil society to ensure that all voices can be heard and all communities can exist in a context free from institutional and social hatred.
Appendix A

Excerpts from the French Criminal Code that Relate to Hate Aggravation

Source: legislationonline.org

Property damage
ARTICLE 322-1


Destroying, defacing or damaging property belonging to other persons is punished by two years’ imprisonment and a fine of €30,000, except where only minor damage has ensued. Drawing, without prior authorisation, inscriptions, signs or images on facades, vehicles, public highways or street furniture is punished by a fine of €3,750 and by community service where only minor damage has ensued.

ARTICLE 322-2


The offence under the first paragraph of article 322-1 is punished by three years’ imprisonment and a fine of €45,000, and the offence under the second paragraph of article 322-1 by a fine of €7,500 and community service where the property destroyed, defaced or damaged is:
(...) Where the offence defined in the first paragraph of article 322-1 is committed because of the owner or user of the property’s membership or non-membership, true or supposed, of a given ethnic group, nation, race or religion, the penalties incurred are also increased to 3 years’ imprisonment and by a fine of €45,000.

ARTICLE 322-6

Destroying, defacing or damaging property belonging to other persons by an explosive substance, a fire or any other means liable to create a danger to other persons is punished by ten years’ imprisonment and a fine of €150,000.

Where this is a forest fire, or fire in woodland, heathland, bush, plantations, or land used for reforestation and belonging to another person, and takes place in conditions so as to expose people to bodily harm or to cause irreversible environmental damage, the penalties are increased to fifteen years’ criminal imprisonment and to a fine of €150,000.

ARTICLE 322-8

The offence defined by article 322-6 is punished by twenty years’ criminal imprisonment and a fine of €150,000: (...)

3° where it is committed because of the owner or user of the property’s membership or non-membership, true or supposed, of a given ethnic group, nation, race or religion. (...)
Appendix B

Summary of 2010 Report on Islamophobia in France by Collectif contre l’Islamophobie en France

Full report which is available here: http://www.islamophobie.net/rapport-annuel

INTRODUCTION:

In France for several years there has been contentious “debates” on secularism, national identity, religious fundamentalism, multiculturalism which have fuelled strong oppositions, spilling over into the mainstream partisan debate. These debates have resulted in the rejection of Islam as a political force in France and relegation to that of hostile belief, detrimental to the “liberal” French republic. CCiF’s annual report wishes to open up a debate on the position of islam in the public arena and how it is attacked. CCiF acknowledges that that the hardening of the French political elite in regards to Islam is not a political occurrence specific to France and stresses that it is a common theme across Europe where Islam is being rejected as the antithesis to “The nation”. After two decades of propaganda mainstream political discourse can be described as islamophobic, Crimes by French muslims have received intense media reportage but islamophobic crimes have often been sidelined from the public consciousness. CCiF acknowledges that islamophobia is just one expression of racism but needs a specific response.

CCiF notes that Islamophobic incidents in France since 2003 have undergone peaks and troughs. Their findings stipulate that acts against institutions and individuals correlated with the social and political policy of the government. In 2004 for example, in the months preceding the passage of the law prohibiting religious signs in school there was a peak in Islamophobic incidences. The years 2005 and 2006 were marked
by a regression in Islamophobic acts however a reflux was noticeable after the riots in Clichy\textsuperscript{8}

The turning point seems to be the case of “The baggage handlers at Roissy”\textsuperscript{9} which was swiftly followed by the penalising of a Muslim inmate at the Villejuif for wearing a djellaba. As 2006 turned to 2007 cruder forms of Islamophobia became apparent in French society with attacks upon Muslims by neo Nazis and the graves of Muslim WW2 soldiers being desecrated, Islamophobia has now very much infiltrated the public realm and can be visibly seen to have penetrated French social spaces such as shopping malls and other recreational spaces.

CCiF study of islamophobic acts in 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total number of islamaphobic acts in 2010</th>
<th>Islamaphobic acts against institutions</th>
<th>Islamaphobic acts against individuals</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>188</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2010, 22 mosques were targeted, including eight who suffered serious damage (such as fire, etc.). 11 of them were covered in hostile and insulting messages (such as “Islam out of France”). Finally, the last 3 have been soiled by urine and / or pig heads

**ISLAMOPHOBIA TO INDIVIDUALS:**

Of the 152 Islamophobic acts recorded against individuals, 115 affected women, 22 against men and 15 were acts aimed at Muslims in general. CCiF notes that woman remain the main victims of Islamophobia in France with 75.6% of individual cases concerning women We identify 26 attacks on only two men, or 92% of assaults that have to women victims. There are
14 verbal acts of which 6 are followed by threats or insults. 10 of these attacks occurred in shopping centres. There are 12 violent attacks, including two families that have been attacked at home. In total, 14 assaults took place in shopping malls.

VICTIMS PROFILE:

Islamophobia against individual Muslims represents 80.9% of all registered incidents; in 75.6% of these individual cases the victims are women. CCIF believes that this is not very surprising given what aspects of Islam the French mainstream media, political elites and academic pundits comment on. The successive “controversies of Islam” that are presented to the French public invariably appertain to women’s rights and gender (dis)empowerment. Issues such as the headscarf, niqab and the position of women within Muslim community in France has lead to a plethora of legislative bills and by laws as well as resolutions which have gradually restricted the rights of women while at the same time position Islam and “liberal” France as two diametrically opposed entities.

Places where Islamophobia occurs

67 of the 152 individual cases (or 44.9%), happened in the public sector/realm

Primarily it is in public services that Muslims are targeted by discrimination, “laws” and regulations related to secularism are employed in order to justify this and is often further legitimized by the political climate hostile to Muslims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Counters public</th>
<th>Police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From the above table one can see that the education area is the key area where Islamophobia is most rampant. 1/3 of the overt Islamophobic acts take place in public kiosks, the officers aggressively reject to serve Muslims dressed in religious garb etc. The police side, these events ranging from verbalization of a conductive falsely wearing a niqab, the pointing of abusive individuals because their regular practice, their theological stays abroad, they belong to religious associations, etc.. The underlying pattern is that the practice of Islam is synonymous with disloyalty, radicalism and terrorism. CFiC also reports the strength of a certain Islamophobia manifested in administrative rules and naturalization decisions, regularization, etc.. The practice of Islam in this case considered an obstacle to the integration process. The opposition between citizenship and Islamic identity is one of the ideological pillars of these forms of Islamophobia.

Most of the verbal aggression and hostile attitudes were targeted towards veiled women. The demand to “leave France” which symbolizes an increasingly held belief that Islam is an external entity to France, like a poison that needs to be extracted. Islamophobia in the workplace has declined from 20.83% in 2009 to 9.87% in 2010, a positive interpretation of this leads one to believe that this reflects a real decline. Another interpretation leads the reader to conclude that the rate of Muslim women employed, especially those that are veiled, has fallen dramatically, or women do not feel safe to wear their Hijab/veil to work.

What is most striking about these manifestations of Islamophobia against individuals is that it affects all areas of social life. The data represents trends which are not always stated openly. Discrimination against Muslims in education has evolved to islamophobia which in turn has seeped in to other areas.

**ISLAMOPHOBIA AGAINST INSTITUTIONS**

CFiC has recorded 36 Islamophobic acts in total in 2010, which is up 71% from 2009. In 2010 three cemeteries have been
desecrated, 26 mosques have been damaged 8 of which suffered severe physical damage whilst 11 of them were tagged with messages like “Islam out of France”. Three were soiled by urine and/or pigs heads. Opposition to mosque projects supported by political parties and associations develops through blocking building permits by local authorities to raising rent costs. Mosques, the central institutions of the Muslim faith, are main targets.

• The mosque as a symbol of belonging

- In 2010, 26 Islamophobic acts were recorded against mosques, this represents 72.22% of acts against institutions, an increase of 36% from 2009.
- On April 26 2010 a mosque was shot at in Istres, Southern France, thirty impact bullets were found.

• The cemetery as a sign of belonging

- Many tombs of former Muslim soldiers have been desecrated in 2010, signifies a deep rejection of Muslims, even those who fought the Nazi occupation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Mosque</th>
<th>Cemetery</th>
<th>Association</th>
<th>Private Company</th>
<th>Attacks on Muslims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>72.22%</td>
<td>8.33%</td>
<td>2.78%</td>
<td>11.11%</td>
<td>5.56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• **Association as a membership group**

  - More and more leaders of Muslim associations received threats and suffer damage to their homes. A local Muslim association even had its window completely broken.

• **Private Companies**

  - Shops offering Islamic produce such as Halal meat, Middle Eastern restaurants etc have been subject to attack. A halal Butchers in Marseille was fired upon by a gunman with a Kalashnikov rifle; 23 impact bullets were recovered.

**SYSTEMATIC UNDERESTIMATION OF ISLAMOPHOBIA IN FRANCE.**

CCiF states that it is important to understand how undervalued Islamophobic acts are by the French authorities/politicians/media.

They are under reported for several reasons:

1. The Muslim population in France has traditionally rejected the position of victim and is accustomed to taking discrete positions in society away from the limelight/controversy associated with reporting discrimination.

2. The channels of voicing a grievance is often islamophobic in itself, or seen as such by French muslim communities and so necessary reportage is not undertaken.

3. Islamophobic actions are often reclassified as racism, thus ignoring the religious motive of the act, it has taken years to get Islamophobia into the mainstream consciousness in France, and it is still a neologism.
4. Finally, civil society, it is very difficult for organizations like the CCiF identify and measure the extent of Islamophobic, for simple reasons: CCiF is not as well known is it would like to be and has limited resources.

CONCLUSION

The nature of the findings recorded here follows a trend from previous years and the only difference is that they seem to show an exacerbation of Islamophobia into other areas of French civil life. What once started within the education system as obvious discriminatory actions against Muslims has seeped into the public conscious with disturbing results. State policy therefore directly affects the general mentality of the population and has had the affect of fuelling islamophobia. The most alarming facts are the rise in assaults against people and the use of firearms against Islamic institutions. One should also note that the overwhelming amount of victims are women, the “liberal” attack on Islam has often been sanctified as “liberating women” however it has resulted in much structural oppression against women.

This report falls short of documenting the makeup of the victims and perpetrators, such a study which focuses on this area would elucidate priority areas and prompt action there.
Notes:

1 Translator (Karen Wisig) note to Constitution of PIR accessed 12 March 2012

2 Another such reclamation comes in the Rachid Bouchareb film entitled Inidgènes (2006) about the experiences of a group of Algerian soldiers fighting for France in World War 2. The problem of translation (conceptually) into English, of the term, is highlighted with the English title of the film, renamed Days of Glory.


4 The present-day states of Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal.

5 Named after the then Interior Minister Charles Pasqua

6 On 3 November 2006 more than 70 Muslim workers at France’s main airport were stripped of their security clearance, after an investigation claimed staff had visited terrorist training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Lawyers for ten of them stated, “They were asked how often they go to the mosque, whether they had been to Mecca and whether they know any imam.” Another lawyer commented, “We’ve not seen any objective evidence. The only common denominator we see is they are all Muslim.”

7 At the time of writing, the murders in Toulouse of soldiers and four Jewish citizens (including three children) by a Muslim assailant has reinvigorated xenophobic electioneering that had hitherto been heavily criticized for its Islamophobic content.
8 The riots of 2005 in France of October and November (in French *Les émeutes des banlieues de 2005*) was a series of disturbances by mostly French youths of African and Maghrebian origins in the suburbs of and other French cities. The reasons for the unrest have been pinned down by many on youth unemployment and lack of opportunities in France’s poorest communities.

9 On 3 November 2006 more than 70 Muslim workers at France’s main airport were stripped of their security clearance, after an investigation claimed staff had visited terrorist training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Lawyers for ten of them stated, “They were asked how often they go to the mosque, whether they had been to Mecca and whether they know any imam.” Another lawyer commented, “We’ve not seen any objective evidence. The only common denominator we see is they are all Muslim.”
Bibliography


Ameli, S.R. (2010). Domination Hate Model of intercultural Relations. Academic speech at Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran.


International Conference for Peace and Against Terrorism, 14-15 May 2011.


