JOINT NGO REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL & POLITICAL RIGHTS (ICCPR) ARTICLES 18, 19 & 21

For the 7th Periodic Review of Japan at the UN Human Rights Committee session

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NGO COALITION FOR FREE EXPRESSION & OPEN INFORMATION IN JAPAN (NCFOJ)
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Introduction

This report is a product of a collaborative effort by the following civic organizations:
1. Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace
2. Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan
3. Support Group for the Case of Itabashi High School Graduation Ceremony and “Freedom of Expression”
4. FoE Japan
6. Center for Prisoners’ Rights Japan
7. Lawyers’ Association Against the Conspiracy Law
8. Group of Protesters Against the Secrets Law and the Anti Conspiracy Law in Aichi, Japan
9. People’s Association Against Criminalization of Conspiracy
10. Greenpeace Japan
11. Japan NGO Action Network for Civic Space (NANCiS)
12. Japan Civil Liberties Union (JCLU)
13. Japan NGO Network for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ERD Net)
14. The Organization to Support the Lawsuits for Freedom of Education in Tokyo
15. Society for Abolishing the Family Registration System and Discriminations against Children Born out of Wedlock (AFRDC)
16. Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC)
17. Consumers Union of Japan
18. Japan Mass Media Culture Information Workers’ Union Conference (MIC)
19. International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination & Racism (IMADR)
20. Peace Boat
21. League of Lawyers Against the State Secret Act
22. Human Rights Now
23. Media Research Institute
Part 1 Freedom of Expression, Freedom of the Press, Freedom of Assembly and Right to Know

The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion & expression, David Kay, visited Japan in April 2017 and published his findings and a subsequent follow-up report. Since then, however, the crisis for freedom of opinion and expression in Japan has become increasingly dire, with no improvement at all, as will be illustrated below through recent cases.

Chapter 1 The Deepening Crisis of Freedom of Expression
In response to the Paragraph 23 of the List of Issues (LoI)

1. Recommendations
(1) The State Party shall take appropriate measures to prevent unwarranted threats and attacks on cultural and artistic expression.
(2) The State Party and local governments shall not unreasonably restrict opportunities for the presentation of cultural and artistic expression on the grounds that the expressed opinions and views differ from the Government's.
(3) The State Party shall ensure its police forces maintain their political neutrality in accordance with the Police Act and shall not violently interfere with the expression of critical speech against the Government.

2. Reasons for the recommendations
Paragraph 23 of LoI

With reference to the previous concluding observations (para. 22), please report on steps taken to clarify the vague and open-ended concept of “public welfare” and to ensure that it does not lead to restrictions on the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion or freedom of expression beyond the narrow restrictions permitted in paragraph 3 of articles 18 and 19 of the Covenant.

(1) A controversial exhibition at the Aichi Triennale "After ‘Freedom of Expression?’"
An international art festival, Aichi Triennale 2019's special exhibition "After 'Freedom of Expression?" was suspended only three days after its launch, until it was reopened for one week at the end of the festival. The statue of a girl symbolizing “comfort women” on display sparked controversy. Takashi Kawamura, Mayor of Nagoya, submitted a letter of protest over this exhibition to Hideaki Omura, Governor of Aichi Prefecture and chairman of the Aichi Triennale Organizing Committee. The Government also reconsidered its decision to award a grant to this exhibition. At that time, the Organizing Committee was inundated with terrorist threats, phone calls and e-mails of protest. The incident is deemed a case of de facto "censorship"
in which the Government interfered with the content of the exhibition and eliminated any expression that did not meet its points of view.

The purpose of the forcible shutdown of this exhibition was to draw attention to works of art that had been deprived of opportunities for expression in various parts of Japan in recent years, and to steer deliberation about how this had happened. Mayor Kawamura said that, given the use of taxpayers’ money to organize the festival, “it’s almost as if the entire country approves of this [the statue of the girl]”. However, Mayor Kawamura is mistaken in his view, in that the Government is essentially in a position to ensure diversity and freedom of expressions. If public authority evaluates and interferes with the content of individual expressions, freedom of expression and speech will be lost for the society.

The Agency for Cultural Affairs decided to withdraw a once-awarded grant altogether from the Aichi Triennale, but later retracted the decision and provided a reduced amount. The Agency made no effort to protect the art festival from terrorist threats and other unwarranted threats and attacks, but instead unilaterally made such decisions, stating that “the Organizing Committee was aware of grave risks to the safety of visitors and the exhibition venue, and to the smooth organization of the festival, but failed to inform the Agency accordingly upon receiving the grant.” If such arbitrary and self-righteous judgments by public authorities are tolerated, little room will remain in Japanese society for free expression and cultural and artistic activities, unless they cater to the whims of authority.

(2) Lawsuit on publication of a haiku whose theme was on the Article 9

In June 2014, a community center refused to publish a haiku composed by a citizen at a haiku class in Saitama City, on its newsletter. For many years, it had been customary for the haiku chosen by the class once a month to be published in the newsletter of the community center. The haiku reads: “Women’s march under the rainy season sky, ‘Preserve the Article 9.”’ It was authored by a woman in her 70s, who expressed the importance of peace.

The incident closely preceded a crucial cabinet decision in July that year, in which the Abe administration recognized the right to collective self-defense. The community center staff, at the base of the administrative pyramid, acting in line with the Government’s perceived intentions, decided it would be inappropriate to include in the newsletter the haiku that had expressed a view at odds with the Government’s, and did not allow it to be published.

The female haiku composer and her haiku classmates objected to the community center’s decision as unfair, however, which, upon coverage by the newspaper, escalated into a social issue. Several rallies were held locally. Eventually, a lawsuit was filed by the haiku author as the plaintiff on 25 June, 2015. The plaintiff

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2 Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution stipulates the renunciation of war and the non-reliance on force.
argued that the community center’s refusal to publish the haiku violated the freedom of expression guaranteed by the Constitution.

The court ruled on 25 October, 2017 at the Saitama District Court in the first trial, finding Saitama City’s refusal to publish the haiku illegal. Subsequently, the Tokyo High Court on 18 May, 2018 also ruled that the city’s action was illegal, and the Supreme Court on 20 December, 2018 rejected the city’s appeal and confirmed the decision. The mayor of Saitama City apologized to the plaintiff and published the haiku in question in the newsletter.

Nonetheless, a trend continues to date wherein administrative offices tacitly give preference the Government’s perceived intent and indirectly suppress incompatible views. Every year on and around Constitution Day of 3 May, for instance, rallies are held in various parts of the country to commemorate the Constitution. The Government used to support such rallies in the past, but has ceased to do so these days. There were also instances where Rikkyo University professor Rika Kayama, a psychiatrist known for her criticism of hate speech, had her lectures cancelled twice in 2017 and 2018 in succession.

These cases demonstrate a pattern where freedom of speech and expression is undermined not by direct and violent interferences by the administrative offices, but increasingly as a result of their consideration of the Government’s implicit intentions or their inaction out of fear for radical protests by right-wing groups.

(3) Forcible removal of protestors during Prime Minister Abe’s campaign speech in Sapporo

On 15 July, 2019, several citizens were forcibly removed from the scene by police when the prime minister was delivering a speech in Sapporo in support of a candidate running in the House of Councillors election. Some of them heckled Prime Minister Abe, by shouting “Resign Abe!”, while the others held up placards criticizing Abe and his policies. At least nine people, including Masayoshi Osugi, a non-profit organization (NPO) employee in Sapporo City, were physically restrained by police investigators. Many of them asked police officers at the scene for legal grounds for their exclusion, but they were not provided a clear explanation.

On the other hand, many supporters of the ruling party were also present at the scene of the speech, cheering Abe, and holding up many placards of support displayed. The police took no action on citizens expressing support, while they removed placard holders questioning a pension issue and vocal protestors, without giving a reason. Many people, as well as these citizens concerned, protested this blatant violation of freedom of speech and expression of those who hold views differing from the Government by the police who are obliged to stay politically neutral.

The Hokkaido Prefectural Police did not provide an explanation at the Prefectural Assembly for about seven months after the incident, claiming that they were still confirming the facts. In the meantime, the Hokkaido Federation of Bar Associations and the Tokyo Bar Association released statements of protest and opinion.
on this case. A state compensation lawsuit was filed against the Hokkaido Prefectural Police by Mr. Osugi in December 2019, followed by another one by a female victim in February 2020, both of which are pending in the Sapporo District Court. Criminal charges were also brought forward against police officers at the scene of the incident for a crime of assault and cruelty by special public officials.

The Police Act provides for the political neutrality of police organizations. The Police Act Article 2 states that "The police shall be entrusted with the protection of the lives, bodies, and property of individuals; preventing, suppressing, and investigating crimes; apprehending suspects; traffic enforcement; and, maintaining public safety and order." The activities of the police shall be strictly within the limits of the scope of their duties as set forth in the preceding paragraph, and shall remain unbiased and impartial in their conduct, and any abuse of their authority is strictly prohibited, such as interference with the rights and freedoms of individuals guaranteed by the Constitution of Japan."

This incident closely resembles another case of the police surrounding and restricting the actions of a man who jeered the prime minister by shouting "Abe, resign!" during his campaign speech in front of the Otsu Station on 18 July, 2019, hinting at a probability that a police directive was issued nationwide to crack down on protestors jeering the prime minister. Such an exercise of police power is a violation of the Police Act Article 2, and merits criticism as an abuse of power that unduly restricts the freedom of expression.
Chapter 2 Violations of freedom of expression for people of Okinawan and Ainu

In response to the Paragraph 23, 27 and 29 of LoI

Among all the regions in Japan, Hokkaido and Okinawa are two regions where unique identities and their freedom of expression should be particularly respected. On the one hand, Okinawa had its own history under the Ryukyu Kingdom until it was integrated into the mainland in the modern era. Although many Okinawans consider their identity to be Japanese, their original language (Uchina-Kuchi) is incompatible with Japanese, and their cemeteries and deities are unique. Some Okinawans consider themselves to be of a different ethnicity than the Japanese. On the other hand, Hokkaido is home to the indigenous Ainu people. The Ainu people are trying to protect and inherit their traditional culture that is being lost under the past compulsory assimilation policy. Taking this historical background into account, the restrictions on freedom of expression in these regions are of particular concern, as detailed below.

1. Violation of freedom of expression in Okinawa and Ryukyu

(1) Recommendation

The State Party shall take immediate measures to refrain from excessive use of physical force and disproportionate penalties imposed on protests in Okinawa and defend freedom of expression, including protests, in line with the United Nations human rights regulations and guidelines including ICCPR, and in respect of the opinion of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention (WGAD).

(2) Reasons for the recommendation

Paragraph 23 of LoI

With reference to the previous concluding observations (para. 22), please report on steps taken to clarify the vague and open-ended concept of “public welfare” and to ensure that it does not lead to restrictions on the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion or freedom of expression beyond the narrow restrictions permitted in paragraph 3 of articles 18 and 19 of the Covenant.

Paragraph 27 of LoI

Please respond to allegations of undue restrictions on demonstrations, including recording of protesters, imposed particularly on protests against the Diet and protests in Okinawa that were met with excessive use of force and resulted in arrests, including of journalists covering those events, and disproportionate penalties imposed on protesters.

① In April 2019, the Supreme Court confirmed the sentence of two years in prison with a suspended term of three years for Mr. Hiroji Yamashiro, the leader of the civil movement against construction of US military bases in Okinawa. Since his initial arrest in November 2016, his detention was repeatedly extended, on accounts of past minor offenses, to five months in total. During this period, he was barred from seeing his
family or receiving medical treatment. The Naha District Court refused to accept evidence from a report on Mr. Yamashiro by the UN Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression in the first trial. UN WGAD has also presented an opinion\(^3\) to the Government of Japan on 27 December 2018 regarding this case, which the Government has yet to answer\(^4\).

2. The frequency of arrests for citizens demonstrating against the construction of US military bases in Okinawa is high: 14 people were arrested in nine cases in the four months from August 2016 to November 2016. Of those arrests, 57.1% were approved for detention by the courts, well below the 90% of all criminal offenses nationwide in 2015\(^5\). Many of the arrests were for minor crimes, and often without prosecution, raising a suspicion of unjustified arrests aimed at having an intimidating effect on civil society movements\(^6\). Excessive restrictions and arrests against civil society movements have not been rectified ever since the publication of the LoI prior to submission of the 7th Periodic Report of Japan.

3. On 21 December, 2019, six citizens participating in a campaign against the construction of US military bases were arrested at the exit of the US Marine Corps Northern Training Ground in Takae of Higashi village. They were accused of a violation of the Special Criminal Act for allegedly having entered a US military base where the entry was prohibited\(^7\). On 19 February, 2020, five people were arrested on similar charges of trespass at a US military facility in November of the previous year in a case built through house searches. Given that the Northern Training Ground is located in a mountainous area with ambiguous boundaries, there had been no previous arrests and detentions on the allegation of violations the Special

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\(^3\) The UN WGAD, following information provided by All Okinawa Council for Human Rights and IMADR, admitted in an opinion dated 27 December 2018 that the deprivation of liberty due to the arrest and prolonged detention of Hiroji Yamashiro was discrimination based on political opinion and it was an “arbitrary” deprivation of liberty in violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and ICCPR. WGAD also recommended the Government to remedy Mr. Yamashiro’s situation without delay, and proposes to release Mr. Yamashiro unconditionally, and to give Mr. Yamashiro the right to claim compensation that can be exercised. 

\(^4\) All Okinawa Council for Human Rights, 29 January, 2020, "Statement to urge the Government of Japan to promptly implement Opinion No. 55/2018 adopted by the UN WGAD concerning Yamashiro Hiroji, and to accept the Country Visit by WGAD”

\(^5\) Okinawa Times, 30 December, 2016, "Arrest in Takae, 57% detention, a significant difference from 90% of all criminal offenses nationwide.”
https://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/77993

\(^6\) Okinawa Times, 28 August, 2017, “”Minor Crimes” arrests for a series of protests against new bases, half of which were not prosecuted, and lawyers “don't need to be detained.””
https://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/133698

\(^7\) Okinawa Times, 20 February, 2020, ““Prefectural police are getting tougher” On the suspicion of invading the northern training ground”
https://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/537270
Criminal Act by entering a US military base. These arrests can be described as a targeted crackdown on citizens’ groups opposed to the construction of US military helipads at the Northern Training Ground.

(3) Background

It is structural discrimination against Okinawa by the Government that lies behind a series of the excessive crackdowns of civilian opposition to the construction of US military bases in Okinawa, described in the reasons for the recommendation (1) to (3). 74% of US military bases and related facilities are concentrated in Okinawa, which represents only 0.6% of Japan’s land area. The construction of new bases is ethically unacceptable to the people of Okinawa, who have consistently suffered from the burden and damage of US military bases throughout the postwar era. Although the people of Okinawa have repeatedly expressed their opposition to the construction of new bases through elections and prefectural votes, the Government

8 In this case, the arrestees were released on 30 December without disclosure of the reason the lawyer requested after the arrest and detention on 21 December. The Naha District Court has designated the date of disclosure of the reason as 6 January after the detention deadline of January 1. It violates the provision of Article 34 of the Constitution, “No person shall be arrested or detained without being at once informed of the charges against him”, “nor shall he be detained without adequate cause”, “and upon demand of any person such cause must be immediately shown in open court in his presence and the presence of his counsel” and the provisions of Article 84 of the Criminal Procedure Rule, “The interval between the date on which the grounds for detention is to be disclosed and the day on which such request was made shall be no longer than five days; provided, however, that this shall not apply when there are unavoidable circumstances”. Okinawa Bar Association, 8 January, 2020 “President’s statement protesting against the strongly suspected unconstitutional/illegal response by the Naha District Court to the request for disclosure of reasons for detention and calling for prevention of recurrence”

9 150 years ago, in the process of constructing a modern nation state by the Meiji Restoration, Japan merged the Ryukyu Kingdom, which had been an independent nation until then, with the intimidation of the armed forces. Later, assimilation policies and imperialization education denied Okinawa’s unique language and culture, and Okinawans suffered from discrimination by Japanese on the mainland. At the end of the Pacific War, only ground battle was fought in Okinawa and one quarter of the inhabitants lost their lives. It is said that this ground battle was a rubble stone battle to protect the Japanese mainland. The US military continued to occupy Okinawa and seize land even after Japan became independent of American rule in the 1952 peace treaty. After returning to the mainland in 1972, the Okinawa people’s hope to reduce the base burden “on the same level as the mainland” was betrayed and the US military base continued to exist and concentrated in Okinawa.

10 The following data shows how the people of Okinawa were damaged by the concentration of US military bases in Okinawa at a density of 500 times that of mainland Japan. From 1956 to 2017, there were a total of 709 U.S. military-related aircraft accidents, 602 U.S. military field fires (38,163,866 square meters of vanishing area). The number of crimes committed by US military members and others from the return of Okinawa in 1972 to 2017 was 5,919, of which 576 were violent crimes such as murder, rape, and robbery, accounting for about 10%. Discrimination against Okinawa is also reflected in the actual situation of base damage.

11 In the past 10 years, candidates who oppose the construction of the base in Henoko in the series of political election including Mayor election of Nago City, prefectural governor’s election and national elections have
continues to push ahead with the construction of the Henoko base and the helicopter pads on Takae.

2. Violations of ethnic ritual freedom of the Ainu people: suppression of salmon harvesting for the Monbetsu “Kamuy-cep nomi”

(1) Recommendation
The State Party shall respect the innate ritual freedoms of the Ainu people and alter the current requirement of prior application for rituals of harvesting salmon under the Hokkaido Inland Fisheries Coordination Regulations.

(2) Reasons for the recommendation
Paragraph 23 of LoI

With reference to the previous concluding observations (para. 22), please report on steps taken to clarify the vague and open-ended concept of “public welfare” and to ensure that it does not lead to restrictions on the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion or freedom of expression beyond the narrow restrictions permitted in paragraph 3 of articles 18 and 19 of the Covenant.

Paragraph 29 of LoI

With reference to the previous concluding observations (para. 26), please report on measures taken to revise relevant legislation and fully guarantee the rights of the Ainu, Ryukyu and Okinawa communities to their traditional land and natural resources, to ensure respect for their right to engage in free, prior and informed participation in policies that affect them and to facilitate, to the extent possible, education for their children in their own language.

Mr. Satoshi Hatakeyama, Chairman of the Monbetsu Ainu Association, and his colleagues publicly announced that they would catch salmon as their rights as indigenous people in the traditional Ainu ritual Kamuy-cep nomi (a ceremony to welcome newly spawning salmon). They then proceeded to catch salmon in the Mobetsu River in Monbetsu City on 1 September, 2019. In response, the Hokkaido Prefectural Government refused to grant permission for special harvesting, which is allowed in Ainu ceremonies, on the grounds that a prior application had not been submitted under the Hokkaido Inland Fisheries Coordination Regulations. Moreover, the Prefectural Government interfered verbally and through action with the ceremonial harvesting of salmon on the site, took video footage without permission, and filed a complaint with the police. The police confiscated the fishing equipment used and filed charges against the three people concerned on 25 February, 2020, after lengthy questioning. Prosecutors finally decided not to won one after another. The people of Okinawa continues to oppose base construction. In prefectural vote in 2018, the people’s intentions in Okinawa showed their opposition to landfill for the construction of the base in Henoko, with 70% of the respondents voting.
indict the case on 30 June.

Salmon, called *Kamuy-cep* (the fish of the gods) or *Sipe* (the main food) in the Ainu language, has been important commodity as well as a major source of food for the Ainu people. Since the Meiji era (1868-1912), however, salmon fishing in rivers, the main site of harvesting for the Ainu people, has been banned. Permissions from the Prefectural Governor are still required for the ceremonial harvest of salmon.

Although the newly enacted 2019 Act on the Promotion of Measures for Ainu calls for special consideration for preservation of traditional fishing methods, it is only effective so long as municipal governments take up such measures as part of their plans, and doesn’t oblige the Prefectural Government to lift the current restrictions on the Ainu rituals.

This situation violates the rights of indigenous peoples as enshrined in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and clearly denies the right of indigenous peoples to enjoy their own culture as stipulated in ICCPR Article 27. Moreover, the Government’s use of police powers to criminalize the objections raised by the indigenous people, without any attempt at dialogue with them, violates freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching, as stipulated in ICCPR Article 18, as well as freedom of expression, as stipulated in ICCPR Article 19.
Chapter 3 Constraints on political activities related to civil society and civil society space

In response to the Paragraph 23 of LoI

1. Recommendation

The State Party and local governments, including administrators of public facilities under local governments, shall not interpret the Article 2 of the Act on Promotion of Specified Non-Profit Activities too broadly nor apply it in such a way as to restrict NPOs to engage in political activities, not as their primary purpose but as ancillary ones, such as lobbying political parties or expressing support for specific candidates in elections in pursuit of the realization of their desired policies.

2. Reasons for the recommendation

Paragraph 23 of LoI

With reference to the previous concluding observations (para. 22), please report on steps taken to clarify the vague and open-ended concept of “public welfare” and to ensure that it does not lead to restrictions on the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion or freedom of expression beyond the narrow restrictions permitted in paragraph 3 of articles 18 and 19 of the Covenant.

(1) Pressure on civil society advocacy through an expanded interpretation of the Act

The Act on Promotion of Specified Nonprofit Activities\(^ {12} \) forms part of Japan's legal system for NPOs, whereby many civil society organizations are set up as legal entities. The Act sets restrictions on NPOs’ political activities\(^ {13} \) by excluding “the organization whose primary purposes are to promote, support or oppose any political doctrine or policy” from qualifying as a "specified nonprofit organization" (Article 2-(2)-(ii)-(b)). This provision is only intended to distinguish NPOs from political organizations established primarily for political and electoral activities as defined in the Political Fund Regulation Act, however. It should not be interpreted to restrict civil society advocacy\(^ {14} \). At the local government level, however, this provision has been broadly interpreted, giving rise to ordinances aimed at supporting and promoting local civic activities but only in return for compliance by the civil society organizations concerned with broad

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\(^ {12} \) Government of Japan. ‘Act on Promotion of Specified Non-profit Activities (Act No. 7 of 1998)’. http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=3028&vm=&re=&new=1

\(^ {13} \) According to the Civil Society Space NGO Action Network (NANCIS / https://nancis.org/), in response to the signatures of the representatives of the organizations in opposition to the Conspiracy Bill (2017), the local government officials called the organizations in question and made it difficult for them to continue the contract in the future. There were several cases across the country where pressure was applied, including hinting at it.

restrictions on political activities\textsuperscript{15}. It also led to instances where civil society groups perceived to advocate dissenting views with the government have been subjected to pressure or prejudicial treatment by local governments and local assembly members\textsuperscript{16}.

These issues pose potential or real threats to civil society organizations, whose essential mission is to advocate for and monitor implementation of government policies. The central and local governments should therefore take necessary measures to ensure that such a broad interpretation of the aforementioned provision should not impede civil society advocacy or their participation in political processes.

(2) Restrictions on political activities undertaken by civil society organizations through the amendments to the Saitama City Civic Activity Support Center Ordinance

In Saitama City, one of Japan’s largest cities on the outskirts of Tokyo, the city administration established the Saitama City Civic Activity Support Center as a base for civil society support, activities, and gatherings, and had it run jointly by the city administration and civil society, with the Saitama NPO Center, a local intermediary support organization, as the operator for the center. In 2015, however, a conservative member of the Saitama City Council unilaterally named 14 of the civil society organizations that use the Saitama NPO Center, including advocacy groups, as "political organizations that deal with themes that divide national debates and citizens’ discussions," and accused the Saitama NPO Center of giving priority to such organizations in the use of the facility. This led the Saitama City Council to unilaterally revise the ordinance for the establishment of the center without fully consulting affected civil society organizations, so as to bring the center under direct management by the city administration from April 2016 onward, excluding civil society organizations from the management of the center\textsuperscript{17}.

(3) Pressure from the central and local governments, and civil society’s forced self-restraint

Since the 1990s, Japanese civil society has been awarded a large number of grants, contracts and appointments as designated managers for public facilities under the central government and local government policies intended to promote the development of civil society on the one hand and the privatization of public works on the other. Due to the reform of the legal system for NPOs, civil society organizations are no longer in a position to receive strict guidance and supervision from the government and municipalities. There is an alarming rise in instances, however, where the central and local governments


\textsuperscript{16} For example, the case in the next section (2).

put pressure on civil society organizations and interfere with their claims and activities, on the grounds of funding relationships, beyond the scope of oversight for their granted or contracted projects. Some of those cases are politicized, involving politicians, such as local government heads and legislators, who have interest in publicizing their political achievements\textsuperscript{18}. There are also many instances where civil society organizations themselves tend to refrain from advocacy for fear of pressure from those in power and from society\textsuperscript{19}.

\textsuperscript{18} Above (2) is a typical example.
\textsuperscript{19} In many cases, civil society itself has interpreted the provisions of the NPO Law in (1) above in an expansive manner and refrained from advocacy on that basis.
Chapter 4 Status of freedom of broadcasting: Article 4 of the Broadcasting Act, Program Editing Guidelines
In response to the Paragraph 24 of LoI

1. Recommendation
The States Party should accept the recommendations of the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression, and swiftly abolish the direct governmental licensing system for broadcasters, replacing it with an indirect licensing system through the re-establishment of an independent regulatory body.

2. Reasons for the recommendation
Paragraph 24 of LoI, Question 2
Please clarify whether there are plans to review the legal framework governing the broadcast media to ensure that regulation of the media is independent of the Government.

Article 4 of the Broadcasting Act upholds the principle of fairness as a legal basis for interfering in the content of broadcasts. Article 174 of the Broadcasting Act and Article 76 of the Radio Act give the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications the power to order the suspension of any media that violates these laws.

In February 2016, the Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications, Sanae Takaichi, stated that the Government can order broadcasters to suspend operations if they breach the Broadcasting Act.

The Government reiterated the legitimacy of the Government’s authority to judge the political fairness of broadcast content in the "Unified Government View" on political fairness in broadcasting, which was approved by the cabinet in line with the statement by Ms. Takaichi.

In November 2017, the UN Human Rights Council and the UN Special Rapporteur David Kay recommended a review of Article 4 of the Broadcasting Act to strengthen media independence. However, the Government has stated that it does not "accept" such recommendations.

Until now, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government has often issued administrative guidance to broadcasters on program content, using/quoting Article 4 of the Broadcasting Act. Although it is highly likely that such instructions are a violation of the constitution, broadcasters have observed them because of the fear of being suspended if they come to the attention of the Government. This is because broadcasting licenses are now directly licensed by the Government. This system has chilling effect on broadcasters.

This direct licensing system, which is tied to the Radio Act, needs to be changed as soon as possible, and the creation of an independent administrative commission system and other indirect licensing systems that
are common in the international community should be discussed.
Chapter 5 Harassment against journalists unfriendly to the Government

In response to the Paragraph 24 and 27 of LoI

1. Recommendations
The State Party shall:
(1) not restrict journalists' participation in press conferences or questions by journalists in accordance with the recommendations by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression;
(2) stop severe restrictions on the activities of journalists in Okinawa;
(3) stop the harassment against journalists reporting on the comfort women issue; and
(4) not order journalists to return their passports or refuse the issuance of passports to them.

2. Reasons for the recommendations
Paragraph 24 of LoI, Question 3
Please respond to reports of government pressure on and interference with the media and of harassment of journalists who are critical of the Government or cover sensitive subjects, such as in the case of Takashi Uemura, who reported on the issue of “comfort women” in the newspaper Asahi Shimbun, leading to media self-censorship.

Paragraph 27 of LoI
Please respond to allegations of undue restrictions on demonstrations, including recording of protesters, imposed particularly on protests against the Diet and protests in Okinawa that were met with excessive use of force and resulted in arrests, including of journalists covering those events, and disproportionate penalties imposed on protesters.

(1) Restrictions on Tokyo Shimbun reporter Isoko Mochizuki’s questioning at a press conference at the Prime Minister’s Office
On December 28, 2018, the Cabinet Press Office of the Prime Minister's Office declared to the Cabinet Press Council (the press club of the Cabinet Office) that the questions posed by Tokyo Shimbun reporter, Isoko Mochizuki, at a press conference by the Chief Cabinet Secretary regarding the construction of a new U.S. military base in Henoko, Nago City, Okinawa Prefecture, were “factually incorrect” and "a repeated problematic act."

20 For background information about Ms Mochizuki and the Cabinet office, please see “Japan’s Blurred Vision of Media Freedom”
It sent a letter to the Cabinet Press Association and the Tokyo Shimbun stating that it was "concerned that the significance of the Chief Cabinet Secretary's press conference may be undermined" and that "we ask you to share our concerns."\(^21\)

The Newspaper Workers’ Union, experts and others have issued a statement to oppose the actions of the Cabinet Press Office.

On 15 February, 2019, the Abe Cabinet unilaterally declared that the questioning by a "certain reporter" from the Tokyo Shimbun at Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga’s press conference was "considered to be based on an erroneous perception of the facts" and the Cabinet approved the Government’s statement that this "may lead to a misunderstanding of the facts by a wide range of people in Japan and abroad, and, in turn, this could damage the significance of holding a regular press conference."

Regarding the wording "red soil is now spreading at the landfill site,"\(^22\) in the question by Ms. Mochizuki about the construction of a new U.S. military base at Henoko in Nago City, Okinawa, the prime minister’s office claimed that "the wording is inappropriate" and "contrary to the facts". It dismissed the question as a "factual misunderstanding" and a "problematic act".

However, it is clear from the situation at the site that red soil is spreading, and it is natural for a reporter to ask questions at a press conference, and it is also true that the Okinawa Defense Bureau and others have not responded to Okinawa’s request for an on-site investigation into the sand and soil after the problem was discovered.

(2) The removal of journalists in Okinawa

In August 2016, reporters from the local newspaper companies, Ryukyu Shimpo and the Okinawa Times, who had been covering the activities of residents and citizens protesting the construction of the U.S. military’s helicopter pads in and around Higashi-Mura Takae, Okinawa Prefecture, were forcibly removed by riot police and taken into custody for nearly 30 minutes without given a reason.

The chairman of the Okinawa Peace Movement Center, Hiroji Yamashiro, and six others were arrested and detained on suspicion of obstructing the execution of official duties and other charges. Freelance

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\(^{21}\) See a Letter from the Press Office of the Prime Minister’s Office to the Cabinet Press Council (Annex 1). The UN Special Rapporteur David Kaye sent the communication letter to the Government about this matter in July 2019, but the Government’s response was inadequate.

https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=24689
https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownloadFile?gId=34856...

\(^{22}\) It is illegal to use red soil as landfill in marine construction projects due to its harmful effects on the environment.
cameraman, Rodney Shimazaki, was among those arrested. Oddly, he was arrested by the Okinawa Prefectural Police at his home in Tokyo in November, about three months after the incidence for which he had been accused\(^2\). Ultimately, Shimazaki was not charged, but he was transferred to Okinawa, where he was detained for nearly a month and his computer and digital camera were confiscated.

In response to an inquiry into the Government position on this case by House of Representatives member Toshinobu Nakazato, the cabinet endorsed a statement on 11 October 2016 that "the police are properly carrying out their duties in order to fulfill their responsibilities, and the Government believes that the freedom of the press is fully respected."

Although the Government's written answer avoids confirming facts such as the detention of the reporters and the forcible removal of the citizens, the reporters showed the riot police their armband and employee ID cards, told them that they were reporters, and appealed to them not to interfere with their reporting. It is extremely likely that the riot police detained them with full knowledge that they were reporters. It is an undeniable fact that the journalists were surrounded by the riot police and deprived of their freedom of movements without having been given any reason for such interference. It is clear that the freedom of the press was far from being "fully respected", contrary to the claim by the Government.

(3) Persecution of former Asahi Shimbun reporter Takashi Uemura

Judicial decisions have been made continuously to exonerate and effectively condone the "fabrication" bashing of former Asahi newspaper reporter Mr. Takashi Uemura, who wrote articles about testimonies by former comfort women. "Fabrication" means that the journalist intentionally wrote something that is contrary to the facts, and this is a serious and negative allegation that may well kill the credibility of that journalist.

Uemura wrote a newspaper article about the testimony of Kim Hak-Sun, the first person to come forward as a "former comfort woman" in South Korea in 1991. In response to the article, Mr. Riki Nishioka, a visiting professor at Reitaku University, and journalist Ms. Yoshiko Sakurai, among others, attacked Uemura as a "fabricator" reporter in columns and articles starting around 2014. Massive quantities of threatening letters were sent to the university where Uemura worked, demanding his resignation, and personal attacks were made on the Internet, including the attacks on his family.

On 9 November, 2018, the Sapporo District Court (Presiding Judge Tadahiro Okayama) dismissed Uemura's claim in a lawsuit seeking damages and other compensation from Sakurai and three publishers, claiming that he had been defamed by reports that had alleged his article on military comfort women as "fabricated". Judge Okayama found that Sakurai's account tarnished Uemura's reputation in society, but

\(^2\) https://blogos.com/article/201665/
dismissed Uemura's claim, finding that she had reasonable grounds for believing it to be true and that her purpose for writing the article was in the public interest.

On 26 June, 2019, the Tokyo District Court dismissed Uemura's claim for damages against publisher Bungei Shunju and Nishioka. The district court found that claims made in Nishioka's article "were in the public interest and true for a significant part." It also found that Nishioka’s assumptions had a certain rationality (a good reason to believe that they were true) that Uemura had deliberately concealed the fact that Kim Hak-Sun had attended Keesen School, and that he had deliberately written a factually incorrect article to make Uemura’s mother-in-law’s lawsuit advantageous, as she was a senior member of the Korean Bereaved Families Association.

The court recognized that Uemura’s article "reported the fact that Kim Hak-Sun had been taken to the battlefield in the name of the Women’s Volunteer Corps and forced to become a comfort woman by the Japanese military (or a government agency)", yet concluded Nishioka’s claims as true in that Uemura had purposely written a false article without having certainty himself that Kim Hak-Sun had been forcibly taken by the Japanese military.

On 6 February, 2020, the Sapporo High Court rejected Mr. Uemura’s appeal, upholding the district court’s decision to dismiss his claim. On 3 March, 2020, the Tokyo High Court also dismissed Mr. Uemura's claim, recognizing that Nishioka’s claims were true and he had a good reason to believe they were. However, the Tokyo High Court, presiding Judge Fumiko Shiraishi, determined that the court could not find that Uemura had known of Kim Hak-Sun's alleged history that she had been sold to Keesen and had chosen not to report it in the article. Nor could it find that Uemura deliberately wrote a false article in order to gain advantage in his mother-in-law's case. It therefore denied the fact found by the district court that he had "fabricated" the article.

The series of judicial decisions in the Uemura trial shows a distortion of the court's perception of historical facts and women's rights. Symbolic of this distortion is the Sapporo High Court's reference to the testimony of the comfort women reported by Uemura, asserting, "If he had reported that a mere comfort woman came forward to testify, the value of his report would have been halved". The disparagement of women who lived through the long period of suffering after the war, and who came forward with courage and determination, as "mere comfort women" is itself a violation of human rights.

(4) Refusal to issue and order to return passports to block journalists (Mr. Tsuneoka and Mr. Yasuda) from traveling abroad
Recently, the Government has refused to issue and ordered the return of passports to some journalists and others.

In 2015, the Minister of Foreign Affairs prevented Mr. Yuichi Sugimoto, a freelance cameraman who was
scheduled to travel to Syria for reporting, from leaving the country by ordering him to return his passport on the grounds that it was authorized to do so "when it is deemed necessary to suspend travel for the protection of the life, body or property of the holder of the passport" under Article 19(1)(4) of the Passport Law. The court endorsed this decision by stating, among other things, that "although freedom of travel abroad is a fundamental human right guaranteed by Article 22(2) of the Constitution, it is subject to reasonable restrictions in the interest of public welfare". This decision has been become final and binding at the Supreme Court.

In February 2019, the Foreign Minister ordered journalist Mr. Kosuke Tsuneoka, who was scheduled to report in Yemen, to return his passport and prevented him from leaving the country.

In addition, the Foreign Minister refused to issue a passport to journalist Mr. Junpei Yasuda in July 2019, who had been held hostage in Syria for three years and four months on his previous mission. Japan's Passport Law allows for an extremely wide range of passport refusals and orders to return passports, providing that a refusal to issue passports (Article 13(1)(1)) or an order to return passports (Article 19(1)(1)) may be issued to "persons who are not permitted to enter the country to which they are going according to the laws and regulations in force in their destination".

The reason for these decisions was that Tsuneoka and Yasuda were banned from entering Oman and Turkey, respectively. The Government explained that the purpose of the legislation in Article 13(1)(i) of the above Passport Act is "international faith and trust".

However, the Passport Law, which allows the Government to order the return of a passport or refuse to issue a passport on an extremely broad range of grounds, and the Government's arbitrary use of this law to block all overseas travel, infringes on the freedom of overseas travel guaranteed by Article 22 (2) of the Constitution and ICCPR Article 12 (2). In particular, deprivation of journalists of the freedom to travel abroad infringes on their freedom of expression and undermines the people's right to know. International faith and trust cannot be a legitimate basis for restricting such freedoms.

Such an order to return passports and refusal to issue passports violate the freedom of citizens to travel abroad guaranteed by ICCPR Article 12(2), and the freedom of journalists to report as guaranteed by ICCPR Article 19.
Chapter 6. Violation of the "right to know" in the Republic of Mozambique by the State Party

In response to the Paragraph 23 of LoI

1. Recommendations

The State Party shall

1) respect the right to know of the citizens of the Republic of Mozambique (RoM) who are affected by the development project it supports
2) call on RoM as the recipient country to disclose information in accordance with the judgment of the Administrative Court of RoM
3) ensure that the project does not violate the rights of local farmers and civil society by promoting itself to disclose more information on the projects held by the State Party.

2. Reasons for the recommendations

Paragraph 23 of LoI

With reference to the previous concluding observations (para. 22), please report on steps taken to clarify the vague and open-ended concept of "public welfare" and to ensure that it does not lead to restrictions on the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion or freedom of expression beyond the narrow restrictions permitted in paragraph 3 of articles 18 and 19 of the Covenant.

(1) As for this human rights issue, a new unconstitutional judgement was ruled by the administrative court of RoM after the announcement of the LoI.

(2) Civil society, including farmers in the target areas, have been campaigning against the Triangular Cooperation Program for Tropical Savannah Agriculture Development, which is an official development aid (ODA) project by the Japan-Brazil-Mozambique Triangular Cooperation (ProSAVANA-JBM)24. Their campaign against the project is on the grounds of lack of information disclosure and dialogue25, as well as

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24 See the Origin of the Triangular Cooperation Program for Tropical Savannah Agriculture Development (Annex 2).
(The original Portuguese text is linked at the bottom of the page where each URL is opened.)
repeated interference\textsuperscript{26} with and attempts at dividing civil society.\textsuperscript{27}

Civil societies in the three countries have been calling on JICA and the State Party, which has been contributing funds and essentially managing and supervising the project, to stop the project.

(3) On 1 August, 2018, the Administrative Court of Maputo City, RoM granted the request of the Mozambican Bar Association (OAM) to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security of Mozambique ("Ministry of Agriculture"), which supervises the Office of Coordination of the Pro-Savannah, for violating the right to know of the citizens of Mozambique\textsuperscript{28}. The court ordered full disclosure of "information in the public interest concerning plans, activities and decisions that may infringe on civil liberties and rights - especially information related to land, food security and nutrition in communities affected by pro-savannah projects\textsuperscript{29}" within 10 days\textsuperscript{30}.

\textsuperscript{26} The Stakeholder Engagement Project, etc. The website where the leaked documents for the project are posted: https://www.farmlandgrab.org/26158 参照 They are posted in the "Documents related to civil society consultation" section of this site. JICA acknowledges that the documents posted on this site are "leaked documents", that is, they are official documents. For a discussion of this case, see, for example, the "Pro-Savannah Communication Strategy Paper". For more information, see "What's Happening in Mozambique", Part 7 in the series "Smallholders and 'Campaigns' Against JICA's Intervention", WEB World, Sayaka Funada-Krasen, https://websekai.iwanami.co.jp/posts/1181 参照


\textsuperscript{28} Michihiro Ishibashi, Member of the House of Councillors, "Letter of Intent to Ask Questions about the Pro-Savannah," https://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/joho1/kousei/syuisyo/200/syuh/s200097.htm, and his reply to the questionnaire: https://www.sangin.go.jp/japanese/joho1/kousei/syuisyo/200/touh/t200097.htm

\textsuperscript{29} The original Portuguese document states as follows: "to make available to the general public relevant information of public interest concerning the organisation, functioning of the services and the content of decisions which could interfere with the sphere of citizens' rights and freedoms, particularly those relating to land, food safety and nutrition of the communities covered by ProSAVANA, "


(4) However, until July 2020, the Ministry of Agriculture has not implemented the decision and the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and JICA have continued to provide ODA to the project. Although the Japanese government abruptly announced on 21 July that it was terminating the pro-savannah project, the Japanese and Mozambican governments have not provided any reason for the termination, and the above decision has not been implemented.

In light of the fact that the General Principle of Development Cooperation of the State Parties stipulates the obligation to ensure and strengthen the governance of recipient countries, including compliance with laws and regulations, as a general principle of aid, the State Parties have an obligation as a donor to urge recipient countries to remedy violations of the right to know without neglecting them.

Therefore, the failure of the respondent State, RoM, to implement the above-mentioned judgment, and the fact that the State party continued to provide assistance to the said development project despite the fact that it continues to violate the right to know of the citizens of RoM, especially the peasants of the project’s target area, is a violation of its obligations under the said aid principles and a violation of ICCPR Article 19 (1), which guarantees the right to know in relation to the farmers and the Japanese aid workers who support the farmers. The cessation of the project does not exonerate the State party from violating ICCPR, and the violation of the right to know of the citizens and farmers of RoM and their supporters in Japan.

31 Councillor Tetsushi Inoue, Councillor of the House of Councillors, “Pro-Savannah Project”, written question and answer: https://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/joho1/kousei/syuisyo/201/meisai/m201159.htm
and Note 4 to the questionnaire and answer sheet of the House of Councillors member Michihiro Ishibashi
The Implementing Principles of the Framework for Development Cooperation state that “We will work together to foster an environment that prevents corruption, including by strengthening the governance of the partner country. From this perspective, we will strive to ensure due process and transparency in the implementation process in the implementation of projects”. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/files/000067701.pdf
32 https://www.mz.emb-japan.go.jp/itpr_ja/11_000001_00042.html
33 The Implementing Principles of the Framework for Development Cooperation state that “We will work together to foster an environment that prevents corruption, including by strengthening the governance of the partner country. From this perspective, we will strive to ensure due process and transparency in the implementation process in the implementation of projects”. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/files/000067701.pdf
ANNEXES

1. The letter from the Cabinet Secretariat to the Cabinet Press Club, dated 28 December 2018

2. An origin of the Triangular Cooperation Program for Tropical Savannah Agriculture Development (ProSAVANA-JBM)
We write regarding questions asked by a particular reporter from the *Tokyo Shim bun* to Yoshihide Suga, Chief Cabinet Secretary during a regular press conference at Prime Minister’s Office on 26th December. The questions included factual errors, as shown in the attachment.

We have several times previously asked *Tokyo Shim bun* to refrain from deploying questions that are not based on concrete facts. The company replied repeatedly that it would instruct the said reporter to field appropriate inquiries based on the facts. It is truly regrettable that this problem has occurred again.

Regular press conferences by the Chief Cabinet Secretary are made available not only on the website of the Prime’s Minister Office’s but are also live streamed by other media outlets. Inquiries by this reporter as well as statements by Mr Suga can be viewed immediately all over Japan and the world. We are deeply concerned that these inaccurate questions may cause misunderstanding domestically and abroad and damage the significance of these regular press conferences.

We are seriously concerned about the repeated problematic behavior by this particular journalist and we would like press club to be aware of the problem.

Our letter is not intended to make any conditions or restrictions on the journalist’s right to ask questions. As the cabinet, we try our best to grasp the facts and we hold press conferences with careful consideration for the accuracy of the information we send out. So again, we would like journalists to ask questions based on accurate facts.

We appreciate your continued support in organizing mutually beneficial press conferences for both the media and the government.
12月26日午前の官房長官記者会見における東京新聞の特定の記者による質問について、添付資料にお示しするとおりの事実誤認等がありました。

当該記者については、東京新聞側に対し、これまでも黙認に近かったにしても誤り、事実に基づかない質問は厳に慎んでいただくようお願いしてきました。これに対し、同社からは、事実に基づく明確な説明を心掛けるよう同記者を指導しているよう申と回答を繰り返し頂いてきましたが、にもかかわらず、再び事実に対する質問が行われたことは極めて遺憾です。

改めて指摘するまでもなく、官房長官記者会見は、官邸ホームページ上のインターネット動画配信のみならず、他のメディアを通じたライブ配信等も行われており、その中でのやりとりは、官房長官の発言のみならず、記者の質問も、国内外で直ちに読む可能になります。そのような場合でも、正確でない質問に起因するやりとりが行われる場合、内外の幅広い層の視聴者に誤った事実認知を拡散させることになりかねず、その結果、官房長官記者会見の意義が損なわれることを懸念いたします。

このような観点から、東京新聞の当該記者による軽率な問題行為については、総理大臣官邸・内閣広報室として深刻なものと捉えており、貴記者会に対して、このような問題意識の共有をお願い申し上げるとともに、問題提起させていただく次第です。

もとより、本件申入れは、官房長官記者会見における記者の質問の権利に何らかの条件や制限を設けること等を意図したものではありません。官房長官側においては平素より、事実関係の把握に努み、正確な情報発信に最大限留意しつつ日々の会見に臨んでいることを御理解いただき、メディア側におかれても、正確な事実を踏まえた質問をしていただくよう改めてお願いするものです。

メディア、政府の双方にとって有意義な形での官房長官記者会見の運営・実施のため、引き続き御協力いただけるように頼む次第です。
プロサバンナの起原

産みの親：日本（麻生首相）とブラジル（ルーラ大統領）

本日、日ブラジル首脳会談（概要）

平成21年7月10日

7月9日（木曜日）、18時45分（現地時間）から約30分間、麻生総理大臣は、G8サミット・アウトルーチ会合に出席したルーラ・ブラジル連邦共和国大統領と会談を行ったところ、概要は以下のとおり。

1．二国間関係
　両首脳は、両国の関係が、昨年の日本・ブラジル交流年を経て、近年で最も良好な状態にあるところ、今後、二国間関係のみならず、国際社会における戦略的パートナーとしても、益々関係を深めていくことに一致した。

5．食料安全保障
　今回のサミットでも議題となった世界の食料安全保障に関し、日伯両国は、「セラード農業開発」という世界にも誇れる協力の実績を有しているところ、この協力で培った知見を活かし、アフリカでの三角協力を進めることで一致した。具体的には、まずは農業の潜在力の高いモザンビークでの取組を進めていくこととなった。ルーラ大統領よりは、ブラジルとしてこの協力に共に取り組んでいけることを大変有意義と考えているとの発言があった。
Minutes of Meeting on Triangular Cooperation for Agricultural Development of the Tropical Savannah in Mozambique

Based on the Record of Discussions of the Japan-Brazil Partnership Programme (hereinafter referred to as ‘JBPP’) signed on March 28, 2000 in Tokyo, the President of Japan International Cooperation Agency (hereinafter referred to as ‘JICA’), Sadako Ogata, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Ambassador Celso Luís Nunes Amorim, announced in April 2007 the strengthening of the Assistance for Africa through cooperation under the framework of JBPP. In addition, in July 2009, at L’Aquila Summit, the Japanese Prime Minister, Taro Asō (then), and the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, agreed on promoting the agricultural development of Mozambique through cooperation under JBPP, applying the knowledge acquired during implementation of the Cooperation Programme for the Development of the Cerrado.

Considering the agreements reached, the Japanese Mission, headed by the Senior Vice-President of JICA, Kenzo Oshima, and the Brazilian Mission, headed by the Director of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (hereinafter referred to as “ABC”), Minister Marco Farani, jointly visited the Republic of Mozambique from 16th to 19th September 2009 and discussed the basic structure of the Triangular Cooperation Programme for Agricultural Development of the Tropical Savannah in Mozambique with the Minister of Agriculture, Soares B. Nhaca, the Minister of Planning and Development, Aluva Cuereleia, and other Mozambican authorities.

The three organisations represented by the signatories of this Minutes of Meeting agreed to keep the record of the results of the discussions on the current Japan–Brazil–Mozambique Joint Study, according to the annex attached hereto, as well as to promote joint actions for the early execution of the Triangular Cooperation Programme.


Kenzo Oshima
Senior Vice-President, Japan International Cooperation Agency

Marco Farani
Director, Brazilian Cooperation Agency

Soares B. Nhaca
Minister of Agriculture, the Republic of Mozambique
ブラジルの熱帯サバンナかつての様子→
「低投入⇒低生産性な農民」
「土地が有効活用されていない」
→スケールの大きな農業開発で地域経済発展
→海外から農業分野への投資を呼び込む

現在のブラジル
規模の大きな機械化された
農業＋大豆生産

Source: JICA's site on ProSAVANA
http://www.jica.go.jp/english/our_work/thematic_issues/south/project07.html
プロサバンナの前提と構想

資料2-2〜5
資料10